

EUROPE FINALLY READY ...TO DO MUCH MORE TOGETHER IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY



CREDITS

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POLICY PAPER

EUROPE FINALLY READY

...TO DO MUCH MORE TOGETHER IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY

The idea of European defence integration has been floating around the realm of public discourse for a number of decades – actually even prior to the establishment of the European Union (EU) by the Maastricht Treaty. Several waves of optimism about the idea of an authentic defence policy integration have been followed almost every time by a sobering-up period. Unlike most times throughout the second-half of the 20th century and the initial decade of the 21st, Europe seems to have found the proper (enabling) constellation of stars for a historic push in defence integration. Britain’s departure from the European policy integration process, America’s estrangement from Europe’s political elites and the return of insecurity both in Europe’s southern and eastern neighbours will ultimately change the course of European integration in defence and security matters.

The question is: how fast will the EU adapt its policies and structures to the new reality, given current challenges? Also, how efficiently will European leaders utilize this unique opportunity? Will Europe stick to predominantly inclusive (i.e. uniting) formats of cooperation or will it push forward exclusive structures under the auspices of the “coalition of the willing” and engage nations – like the example of the French-led European Intervention Initiative (E2I). This piece aims to evaluate the progress of the past years, highlight the potential avenues ahead and propose recommendations to steer the project of more capable Europe defence from an idea to reality.

UNBLOCKING THE STUMBLING BLOCK

Europe’s modern foreign and security policy mindset has been formulating since the transformative events of the late 1990s and the new millennium. Europe’s inability to shape the security developments in the Western Balkans (most prominently in today’s Kosovo) and the rise of terrorism’s global pre-eminence, have proved that the EU is unprepared (policy-wise) and unfit institutionally. It took modest Franco-British leadership to form Europe’s own defence and security identity and ambition (though limited). From Javier Solana’s heritage (i.e. establishing the position of EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and formulating EU’s first security strategy), through the Lisbon Treaty’s bringing about the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the prominence of Art. 42.7 on mutual defence, the EU’s defence and security apparatus was ready (and waiting) for a disruptive event to spark the impetus for its enhancement. Eventually, there was not a single,

but rather three disruptive enablers². First, Europe’s migration crisis and the string of terrorist attacks (Paris, Brussels, Nice). Second, the shocking result of the Brexit referendum. Third, the election of Donald Trump as the 45th US President and his reinvigoration of new American sovereignty (based on the previously unseen preference for unilateralism, protectionism and populism) and its direct impact on Europe.

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2 “European Security Strategy - A secure Europe in a better world”, The European Council, 2009, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/gc7809568enc.pdf> and “Article 42.7: An explainer”, The European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 November 2015, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_article_427_an_explainer5019#

THREE DISRUPTIVE ENABLERS FOR ENHANCEMENT OF THE EU'S DEFENCE AND SECURITY APPARATUS



The migration crisis and the string of terrorist attacks (Paris, Brussels, Nice).



The result of the Brexit referendum.



The election of Donald Trump to the 45th US president and his reinvigorations of the new American sovereignty and its direct impact on Europe.

Source: Author

The first enabler has given a rise of the feeling of increased insecurity in the eyes of the European public³. Facing this profound change (in a clearly negative direction) in Europe's general attitude towards the notion of its preparedness to provide adequate and competent defence and security leadership, European political elites pushed back on rising scepticism with a

package of historical initiatives. Today, we call them by the acronyms of PESCO (mentioned above), CARD (the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence), and EDF (the European Defence Fund). The Capability Development Plan (CDP), last updated in 2018, serves as a compass for those three tools. This list is far from exhaustive.

THREE NEW EU DEFENCE INITIATIVES

CARD
(the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence)

Provides Member States with an overview of capabilities and identifies opportunities for cooperation.

PESCO
(the Permanent Structured Cooperation)

Member States subscribe on a voluntary basis to binding commitments to jointly plan, develop and operate defence capabilities.

EDF
(the European Defence Fund)

Offers financial incentives for defence cooperation. It promotes cross-border defence cooperation between EU countries and between different stakeholders (companies, research centres, academia, national administrations, international organisations) to foster innovation and develop state-of-the-art defence technologies and products. PESCO projects may benefit from increased EU co-financing, which could amount to 30% - instead of 20% - for prototypes

Source: Factsheet on Permanent Structured Cooperation, May 2019⁴.

The second enabler, which was the "successful" Brexit referendum, created a window of opportunity to steer further defence integration initiatives as Britain – also known as the ultimate blocker of the supranationalisation of defence policy⁵ – is on course

to leave the EU and has already lost a major part of its informal authority in the discourse on the future of European defence policy.

³ "Europeans' attitudes towards security", The European Commission, 12 December 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/europeans-attitudes-towards-security_en

⁴ "Factsheet on Permanent Structured Cooperation", European External Action Service, 10 May 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_may_2019.pdf


⁵ Stephanie Hofmann, "Brexit will weigh heavily on European security. Here's why", The Washington Post, 18 October 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/18/brexit-will-weigh-heavily-on-european-security-heres-why/?utm_term=.8e5717e96571

This leaves the ground open for cooperation and competition around ideas not only between France and Germany, but also among other European nations which have divergent views on the direction of European defence integration. The differences between two main concepts of European defence cooperation have been unfolding since the Brexit referendum. The best example of it is PESCO.

On the one side there is France (with its prime diplomatic supporters), which prefers an approach of “action over inclusion” and “exclusivity over flexibility”. On the other hand, there is Germany (with a numerical majority of EU Member States on board) that insists upon inclusive structures and widely shared policies in European defence cooperation. Berlin sees these actions to be essentially a precursor to the ultimate goal of the defence integration – i.e. the formation of the European Defence Union – which shall be at the disposal to every (or any) EU member state to join and co-shape its realisation⁶.

The third enabler (i.e. Donald Trump’s election to the presidency of the United States of America) was the one which was a long time in the making. After a century of cooperation across the two shores of the Atlantic, the relationship between “Atlantic allies”, cemented by the fight and victory against Nazism and ultimately against Communism, is showing clear cracks on numerous levels and fronts⁷. On trade policy, climate policy and human rights, the differences between “Europa” and Trump’s “America” are obvious. On the defence and security front, Europe took the appeal by the U.S. to spend more and act now with a somehow surprising seriousness but also with an assertion of its right to align the modality of its spending and acting with its own strategic preferences of not only boosting national capabilities, but also allocating resources to joint “continental” endeavours⁸. America’s calling for a more active and self-capable Europe is resulting in greater integrative action today than any other time in the EU’s existence.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AS A SHARE OF GDP AND ANNUAL REAL CHANGE Based on 2010 prices



Notes: Figures for 2018 are estimates. The NATO Europe and NATO Total aggregates from 2017 include Montenegro, which became an Ally on 5 June 2017.

* Defence expenditure does not include pensions.

** With regard to 2018, these countries have either national laws or political agreements which call for at least 2% of GDP to be spent on defence annually, consequently these estimates are expected to change accordingly.

Source: NATO, 2019⁹

6 Nicole Koenig, “The European Intervention Initiative: A look behind the scenes”, Jacques Delors Institut, 26 June 2018 <https://www.delorsinstitut.de/en/all-publications/the-european-intervention-initiative-a-look-behind-the-scenes/>.

7 Robin Niblett, “Trump’s Visit Is a Reminder That Europe Is Being Bullied by America — And It Is Working”, Time, 3 June 2019, <https://time.com/5598980/trump-europe-bullying/>.

8 Michael-Ross Fiorentino, “NATO Pledge: Which European Countries Spend Over 2% of GDP on Defence?” Euronews, 14 March 2019, <https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/14/nato-pledge-which-european-countries-spend-over-2-of-gdp-on-defence>.

9 „Defence expenditure of NATO countries (2011-2018)”, Press Release, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 10 July 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fi2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180709_180710-pr2018-91-en.pdf

PESCO: EUROPE UNITED IN AMBITION, DIVIDED IN PRIORITIES

PESCO, created by the European Council’s decision on 11 December 2017, is today the clear flagship among all the defence and security cooperation-aimed platforms ever created in the history of the European Union. Voluntary in membership, but also legally binding once entered, it constitutes the EU’s answer to its critics’ blaming it for creating formal structures with questionable substance and limited impact in the world – like the EU Battlegroup concept of the Eurocorps concept¹⁰.

the military mobility enhancement, the Cyber Rapid Response Team, the EU Intelligence School, and the new Main European Battle Tank), attracting the interest for participation from even outside the future EU – meaning the U.S., U.K., Norway and others¹². Despite this progress, there are however, three main obstacles or open questions that PESCO has so far failed to address. Those are as follows:

The first is how to accommodate the legitimate interests of allied third states (non-EU, non-PESCO, but NATO) to participate and ensure efficiency while also not duplicating the policies, standards and procedures

MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATING IN PESCO

	Austria		Finland		Latvia		Slovenia
	Belgium		France		Lithuania		Slovakia
	Bulgaria		Germany		Luxembourg		Spain
	Czech Republic		Greece		the Netherlands		Sweden
	Croatia		Hungary		Poland		
	Cyprus		Italy		Portugal		
	Estonia		Ireland		Romania		

Source: Factsheet on Permanent Structured Cooperation, May 2019.

Unlike with previous initiatives, PESCO is not perceived as a stand-alone defence project. On the contrary, it has been built with an aim of deep coherence in defence planning (via CARD), defence industry financing (EDF), modernisation and procurement (via CDP). What is more, for the first time, the defence portfolio will be financed from the common budget in the next EU Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) to ensure a certain level of sustained financial investment¹¹.

The past two years already brought 34 common projects developed within the PESCO framework, spanning across all operational domains (air, land, sea and cyber), including ambitious endeavours like:

already developed within NATO (as 22, soon to be 21, European countries share EU and NATO membership). Since 2016, NATO-EU cooperation went further in just three years than it did in all the years prior to the landmark Summit in Warsaw. Since then, the two organizations closely cooperate and coordinate on the execution of 74 policy actions within the areas of hybrid threats, migration, cyber security and joint exercises¹³. Cooperation in all of the areas is mutually beneficial and mutually reinforcing for both sides in terms of sharing their expertise, financial burdens and human resources. The success of this endeavour shall encourage the EU to seek an ever greater opening

¹⁰ Yf Reykers, “EU Battlegroups: High costs, no benefits”, Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 38, 31 July 2017, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2017.1348568?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=fscsp20>.

¹¹ The framework of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework is yet to be agreed upon by the EU member states, thus the exact fiscal framework of the future Defence chapter is yet to be quantified as well. At the current state of negotiations / expectations, the Defence chapter shall reach 19,5€ billion – via 13€ billion devoted to EDF and 6,5€ billion devoted to the enhancement of military mobility.

¹² Alice Billon-Galland, Yvonne-Stefania Efstathiou, “Are PESCO projects fit for purpose?”, The European Leadership Network, 20 February 2019, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Final-PESCO-policy-brief-ELN-IISS-20-Feb-2019-ilovepdf-compressed.pdf>

¹³ „EU-NATO cooperation – Factsheets”, European External Action Service, 11 June 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en

towards NATO cooperation prospects and to avoid the temptation of duplication for the sake of exclusive ownership of the processes and policies.

The second is how to ensure greater inclusion of PESCO members in each or most of the 34 (and soon to be close to 50) projects, since today some projects (like military mobility) attract only 25 members while a sizeable number of projects lacks participation beyond 3-4 member states.

There is no doubt that the political and financial investment devoted to PESCO will ultimately pay off. However, the results will be seen only in the long-term — potentially decades — because aligning national legal and bureaucratic norms (for example, within the realm of military mobility) takes years. Even more time must be spent on research, developing, testing, approving and procuring major pieces of military “hardware” — like the PESCO-driven drones, helicopters or amphibious vehicles. That implies another crucial prerequisite for PESCO’s success: strategic patience (not to be confused with idleness) and endurance. The recent rise to geopolitical pre-eminence for Russia and China (despite their obviously present inner structural challenges and potential pitfalls) clearly shows the importance of strategic patience in developing the tools for strategic upgrades in military capability, operational preparedness and competitive domestic defence industries.

PESCO’s success — in terms of its efficiency and sufficiency — will thus be ultimately seen only at a later stage. In 2024, NATO members (including today’s 22 EU members) will assess the success of their Defence Investment Pledge and evaluate the pace and width of their proclaimed adaptation to the new global security reality. By then, we will see how much of an adaptation to a European security identity will have taken place. PESCO’s framework promises a platform to jointly develop projects that will increase the operational readiness of Europe’s forces, both on their own and naturally also as an integral part of the Alliance.

On its own, PESCO does not and will not constitute a sufficient boost for desired capability enhancement of the European armed forces. However, in line with the ongoing NATO adaptation process and the renewed ambition to boost Europe’s defences at the national level, even a minority of the declared projects coming to reality will make Europe better off than without them. European defence stakeholders must bear in mind

that the first years of project realization are crucial. If PESCO sustains financial backing and the enthusiasm of its members, it can showcase an actual track record of capability enhancement by 2024. If not, it is highly unlikely that it will ever gain traction at its latter stage of development. What we call today cautious optimism will be thus by 2024 be perceived as either the justification of the legitimacy of Europe’s quest for strategic autonomy or just another unfulfilled promise of European integration.

EDF: MORE THAN AN EMPTY PROMISE, BUT SHORT OF A GAME-CHANGER

Although the overall success of European defence integration is not solely based on the question of the size of the financial input, it is hardly disputable that any quest for strategic autonomy or enhanced defence posture or strategic capability upgrade requires a sustained and adequate financial mechanism in order to come to realization. While the predominant share of defence investment (either for R&D or procurement) is directed toward the national level, Europe’s ambition to step up its defence competence has led to the formation of the estimated €13 billion European Defence Fund (EDF)¹⁴.

Since the 2014 inception of the outgoing Juncker’s Commission, the defence agenda moved up to an unprecedented level of priority in the Union’s overall political agenda. The boldness of the initiative is driven by the Fund’s current orientation towards the support of “the entire industrial lifecycle”, starting with the research phase with support of up to 100% of the project’s value, continuing with its development (up to 20%) and ending with its certification (up to 80%). Aligning the Fund with the EU’s prime political objectives of supporting collaborative ventures, projects must include no less than three entities from three different participating countries. On the positive side, this creates a window of opportunity for SMEs from outside the strong national industrial markets, i.e. France or Germany, to participate in, and influence, the decision-making processes within programs.

However, there is an important caveat to consider: in order to utilize the Fund-driven opportunities, participants are obliged to co-finance the projects and contribute beneficial and applicable know-how. The failure to do so would leave out SMEs (for example, from

¹⁴ “EU budget: Stepping up the EU’s role as a security and defence provider”, The European Commission, 13 June 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4121_en.htm.

Central Europe, the Baltics or the Eastern Balkans) from accessing the major portion of financial assistance, which could place their industrial sectors at constant disadvantage vis-à-vis the prime industrial actors participating and benefiting from the programme.

It is not surprising that across the defence industries of the “Eastern” part of the EU (Poland, Slovakia or Sweden), the level of optimism for EDF’s value-added is still perceived with what one could diplomatically call “cautious optimism”¹⁵. However, given the size of Fund, it is unlikely to significantly harm either the industries of allied third states or the less-integrated and less-competitive industry actors within the EU itself. On the other hand, even if EDF contributes to, and enables the success of, any of the capability-oriented PESCO projects, it will already be considered a useful invention.

E2I: GOING OUT OF AREA. BUT WHO, WHERE AND WHEN?

The European Intervention Initiative (E2I), presented by the French President Emmanuel Macron in his famous 2017 Sorbonne speech is, one could say, the French reaction to the development of PESCO¹⁶. The Initiative has a primary aim to maximize the proximity of the individual European strategic cultures – a prerequisite for common threat assessment and potential joint military intervention. France’s priority in European defence integration is clearly placed on creating capacity to act together with European allies, even outside of existing military structures (commands and forces). Due to perceived over-inclusivity of PESCO, as well as the rigidity and lengthiness of its formal procedures, France decided to present something more than a platform for a long-term inclusive defence integration. To this point, ten European countries have embarked on the exploration of the potential strategic benefit of this project, namely: Belgium, Denmark (opted-out from PESCO), Estonia, Finland (EU, but non-NATO), France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom (opted to leave the EU).

E2I creates a formal but highly flexible ground for the inclusion of European nations with a “problematic” defence integration status, most notably the United Kingdom and Denmark. The fact that the Initiative only includes approximately one-third of the EU Member

THE EUROPEAN INTERVENTION INITIATIVE (E2I)			
	Belgium		Germany
	Denmark		the Netherlands
	Estonia		Portugal
	Finland		Spain
	France		United Kingdom

States, and formally remains outside of the *acquis communautaire*, is likely the most controversial element of its existence to date. While France (Europe’s soon-to-be leading military power) applauds its exclusivity and resists aspirations to widen the membership scope, Germany (Europe’s leading political power) holds long-term reservations vis-à-vis blatant expressions of desire for differentiated (selective) integration.

With its momentary cooperation on military intelligence matters, developing joint crises scenarios and response planning, as well as doctrinal alignment, some say that, at this point, E2I is nothing more than a military-to-military “strategic workshop” on media-coverage steroids¹⁷. However, France’s investment (not only financial) in the project, involvement by the UK (still to be one of the prime European defence and security actors), and the potential ability to include Italy (currently constrained by political disagreements), could be well enough to sustain the Initiative and further elevate its status. The Western European Union (an international defence alliance between 1948-2010) and the Schengen Area were created outside the EU’s institutional framework and were later transposed as the best solution for the endurance of their objectives, which can be true also for E2I.

¹⁵ Marcin Zaborowski, “Poland and European Defence Integration”, The European Council on Foreign Relations, 25 January 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/poland_and_european_defence_integration

¹⁶ “France and Germany are pushing rival models for defence co-operation”, The Economist, 2 February 2019, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/02/02/france-and-germany-are-pushing-rival-models-for-defence-co-operation>.


¹⁷ Alice Billon-Galland, Martin Quencez, “European Intervention Initiative: The Big Easy”, Berlin Policy Journal, 15 October 2018, <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/european-intervention-initiative-the-big-easy/>

THE PLACE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE NEW DEFENCE INITIATIVES

As of today, no country from the broader Central European region has joined the Initiative and none is expected to be doing so soon. With the noticeable exception of Estonia, E2I remains a platform for exclusively Western European strategic approximation. The success of E2I will ultimately depend on the members' ability to elevate this format in their priorities

states and organized crime, Germany and Central European nations pay more attention to the threat and challenges of the East. This is why France is not a lead nation (unlike the U.S., UK, Germany and Canada) in the most important deterrence initiative on Europe's Eastern flank – i.e. the Enhanced Forward Presence mission¹⁹ in the Baltic region, while at the same time Central Europeans has so far only left a relatively light (yet slightly increasing) footprint on Europe's stabilization military endeavours in the Mediterranean and the Sahel region.

MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)¹⁸



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2019

to a level high-enough to be noticed on the radar of strategic relevance, yet still not be high enough to irritate Central Europeans with a potentially felt notion of being ignored and left-out from the balancing of Europe's diverse (although not necessarily diverging) strategic priorities.

However, for a greater sense of solidarity and an ability to enhance cohesion among European nations across the continent, the gap in diverse threat perceptions should be bridged. The diversity in threat perceptions (i.e. thus in the consecutive defence planning as well) is clearly visible from the declared prioritisation of missions and capability development ambitions. While France concentrates its attention on the threats emanating from the South, be it terrorism, failing


The notion of Western European disinterest in an opening towards Central Europe is somehow problematic even today. While, countries like Poland and Hungary have ongoing issues with aligning their political priorities with EU-core rules, values and principles, their political path does not entirely represent the course shared by the entire wider region. Just like, E2I brings about a particularly useful opportunity small military European actors like the mentioned Estonia or even Portugal, similarly capable and ambitious Central European nations' militaries could one day benefit from the experience and expertise of toolbox-sharing with the leading militaries of "the old continent"²⁰.

¹⁸ *Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. More: "Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security", Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?view=map>

¹⁹ While France is present in the UK-led multinational battlegroups in Estonia with a contribution of approximately 300 troops, which is less than for example Slovakia and Czechia combined (cca. 380 troops).

²⁰ Alice Pannier, "Macron's "European Intervention Initiative": more questions than answers", European Leadership Network, 23 November 2017, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/macrons-european-intervention-initiative-more-questions-than-answers/>

**DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
MILLION US DOLLARS**



Notes: Figures for 2018 are estimates. The NATO Europe and NATO Total aggregates from 2017 include Montenegro, which became an Ally on 5 June 2017.

* Defence expenditure does not include pensions.

** With regard to 2018, these countries have either national laws or political agreements which call for at least 2% of GDP to be spent on defence annually, consequently these estimates are expected to change accordingly.

Source: NATO, 2019²¹

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- ▶ **Prioritise quality over quantity when it comes to PESCO's** project framework. While the ambition of having well over a dozen PESCO projects launched annually demonstrates the width of Europe's ambitions, it by no means guarantees PESCO projects will ever develop considerable implementation depth to really make a difference. Few projects developed to a higher end would bring about a more robust addition to Europe's defence capabilities than a larger number of only modestly developed projects.
- ▶ **Keep trust in Europe's main strategic allies**, even if they remain outside the proper integration process. Norway, the UK and the US do possess considerable know-how and expertise to potentially enrich the future development of the European defence market. Sustained protectionism from the side of the EU would on one side safeguard core financial investments, however it would also unnecessarily impoverish Europe's defence market development potential.
- ▶ **Develop and safeguard coherence with NATO standards and policy processes everywhere possible.** While European defence integration is a perfect way how to enhance the European pillar of the Alliance and also to address area where NATO lacks competence (f.e. legislative changes within the realm of military mobility, strategic communication or cyber defence policy), European defence integration should avoid duplicating already existing (and thus likely reasonable well-functioning) structures, policies and procedures.
- ▶ **Avoid formats that do not seek or do not advocate for regional balance** in membership and participation. While the E2I is worthwhile idea, its omission of the pro-European (i.e. pro-integration) countries from wider Central Europe could have a detrimental impact on the progress towards the European defence union by forcing the "outlying" countries to seek even greater strategic assurances from the United States of America.
- ▶ **Sustain investments into European defence** (both on the national and European level) even after a period of decline in the fiscal prioritisation of the defence portfolio has objectively ended. As European nations will be completing the final phase

(until 2024) of the era that started with the *Defence Investment Pledge* of 2014, it is widely expected that the investments into European defence will reach the highest point in a generation. It is crucial to devote sufficient resources to innovation-drive projects across all the domains, boosting the cyber security capability of Europe and not neglecting the human capital of the European armed forces.

- ▶ **Maintain the cost-efficiency and strategic-clarity driven mantra of a single set of armed forces**, i.e., for national defence policy, EU's CSDP and NATO missions and tasks. While the idea of a European Army sounds compelling to a segment of the public and political class seeking a gradual detachment of Europe from the *products* of the transatlantic era, the EU's quest for strategic (or cooperative, or competence) autonomy should not result in parallel military structures (of forces or command and control).

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