

A large, semi-transparent blue brain graphic composed of numerous small dots, set against a dark blue background with floating binary digits.

GLOBSEC INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

JUNE | 2020

Foreword June Edition

As the great lockdown started to ease around the world in the past few weeks, we also started to understand and find ways and means to cope with the magnitude of the political, economic and social fallout brought by the pandemic. But we are not out of the mud, as many regions and countries around the world still fight to keep their citizens safe, their health infrastructure and economies afloat.

We are more vulnerable than ever before in our lifetime, and the state of fragility worldwide is compounded by risks, such as climate change, migration, poverty and inequality, and a possible second wave of COVID-19. No country alone can deal with the consequences of the coronavirus.

With the creation of the **Intelligence Briefing**, GLOBSEC aimed to aid leaders, decision makers, businesses, to better understand how Central European countries are impacted by and respond to the COVID-19 global outbreak. Following this edition, the Intelligence Briefing will become a quarterly report, which will provide impartial analysis and food for thought related to the recovery of the region in a post COVID-19 period.

Major Risks Looking Forward

In May's edition, we identified three major risks to be closely watched, including the following: a. the socio-economic consequences of COVID-19, b. the deconfining efforts and return to fundamental freedoms and rights, and c. the impact of a second wave of COVID-19 for the region.

For this edition, we would like to maintain the emphasis on two out of three, and bring in a new associated risk that we will watch closely in the coming period.

- a. **We continue to see the economic consequences of the coronavirus as a major risk for Central European economies, with the latest projections by the OECD showing a bigger negative impact than initially projected. These will be reflected in both income per capita, unemployment rates, and productivity output in both 2020 and 2021;**
- b. **Amid increased global trade tensions, discussions over various forms of protectionism continue to unfold. Disruptions in the global supply chains represent a major risk for the region, as CE economies are fully integrated and dependent on key trading partners for growth;**
- c. **With the Schengen space opened, the risk of a second wave of COVID-19 infections increases. While Central European countries are better equipped to cope with a surge in cases, a second lockdown will trigger devastating consequences on national economies and the Euro Zone, and will pose real difficulties in rallying social consensus and support for new potential confinement measures.**

The June GLOBSEC Intelligence Briefing touches upon:

[Political Developments](#)

[Economic Outlook](#)

[EU Priorities and Implications for V4](#)

[Security Implications and Hybrid Threats](#)

The views expressed in this document are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of GLOBSEC as an organization.

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I. Central Europe Political Outlook

COVID-19 News at a Glance

COVID-19 statistics

	Total cases	Cases in the recent 24h	Cases per mln people	Test per mln people	Number of deaths
Czechia	10,064	+ 33	940	46,505	330
Hungary	4,077	+7	422	24,513	565
Poland	29,788	+396	787	31,408	1,256
Slovakia	1552	0	284	36,041	28

*As of 15 June 2020

Wearing masks: Wearing masks remains compulsory only indoors, on public transport, and outdoors when in contact with individuals at a distance less than 2m.

Lockdown measures: All V4 countries are currently entering the 4th or 5th stage of easing restrictions. In Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Poland mass gatherings of up to 500 people respectively are now permitted. Most public places including shops, shopping centres, theatres, and even sports venues have now opened, with some relatively mild restrictions in place.

Travel: Travel restrictions between Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia were lifted as of 5th June. Citizens are now allowed to cross the borders between these four countries without presenting a negative coronavirus test or having to undergo an obligatory quarantine. Additionally, Slovakia is now allowing entry without subsequent compulsory quarantine or negative test proof for citizens and residents from Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Germany, Norway, Austria, Slovenia and Switzerland. The Czech Republic has established a system of rules concerning the obligation for a negative test or a state quarantine [depending on whether the country is deemed low, medium, or high risk](#). Hungary has lifted travel restrictions for citizens from neighboring countries (other than Croatia, Ukraine, and Romania). Citizens of the Czech Republic, Germany, Serbia, Slovenia, and Slovakia are permitted to enter Hungary without testing or quarantine. Finally, Polish borders remain closed with exceptions (i.e. cross border commuters, work-related travels), and anyone crossing them will be required to undergo a 14-day state quarantine.

In Hungary

The state of emergency in Hungary is expected to be lifted on 20 June, revoking a controversial law that enabled the government to rule by decree without limits during the crisis period. Hungarian Justice Minister Judit Varga has demanded an apology [via her Facebook](#) from those who have attacked the government and criticized the law. Experts and human rights organizations remain skeptical about the government's intentions. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, a human rights watchdog, [warned](#) that if the legislation revoking the state of danger is adopted in the present form, it will allow the government to again rule by decree for an indefinite period, this time without minimal constitutional safeguards. Another worrying measure introduced as part of the anti-COVID response package, and that will remain in place, is the anti-hoax law. It has been criticized for threatening the freedom of the press. The police have already started over 100 investigations against alleged cases of spreading hoaxes. The law is applicable only during the duration of the COVID-19 related state of emergency, but experts worry that it can be easily re-enacted if the government decides to declare a state of danger in the future.

In Poland

After much controversy surrounding the ruling party's insistence on holding presidential elections on the 10 May despite the COVID-19 pandemic, and after a botched attempt to vote by mail, the Polish Presidential election has officially been postponed. The new election date is set for Sunday, 28 June. Voting will take place at polling stations throughout the country, with an option to choose postal ballots if the epidemiological situation requires it. Under new legislation, rushed through parliament to prepare for the new election date, all candidates who were up for election in May are grandfathered in. The only person who has to gather 100,000 signatures in 8 days to become a formal candidate is Rafał Trzaskowski of The Civic Coalition, who replaced [Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska](#) in the race.

The incumbent President, Andzej Duda, is still leading [the polls](#) with around 43% support, according to the latest data from 7 June. However, Duda has lost the momentum he gained during the height of the pandemic and can no longer be sure of a decisive victory in the first round. Warsaw Mayor, Rafał Trzaskowski, is second in the race after Duda with 27% public support, which is significantly higher than the [2% support](#) for [Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska](#) at the beginning of May. Should the two candidates meet in the second round, the latest polls predict Duda's victory by a small margin of about 6% of the total votes [53% to Trzaskowski's 47%]. Another candidate to watch is outsider Szymon Hołownia, a former journalist and TV personality with strong links to the Catholic Church. He is running as an independent candidate. Polls currently put him in third place with 8% of the votes, a similar story to former rock star Paweł Kukiz, who in 2015 received 20% support in the first round.

In Slovakia

During the pandemic, shops in Slovakia were closed on Sundays to allow for necessary disinfection, however the easing of lockdown measures brought back [a long-standing debate regarding the permanent closure of shops on Sundays](#). The economic arguments tip the scales mostly in favour of those arguing for keeping the shops open. From a macroeconomic perspective, this would only mean a loss of 0.15% GDP. The impact would be felt more by businesses as they come out of the crisis, as well as by employees, due to loss of work hours. However, the issue has been framed predominantly by cultural and ethical arguments, rather than economic narratives. On one hand, the 'Sunday should be a family day' argument, which is often focused on working mothers. On the other hand, the 'let's leave it open' argument, to enable consumer choices. According to the latest [opinion poll](#) done by FOCUS, over 72% of the respondents are 'certainly' or 'mostly' in favour of closing the shops. There are currently two pieces of legislation on this issue in parliament (brought by the opposition parties), which are due to be voted on during the June and July parliamentary sessions.

II. The Economic Impact

The OECD [published](#) its June Economic Outlook, labelling recent events 'the most severe economic recession in nearly a century'. The report uniquely presented two different macroeconomic scenarios in its projections, one assuming a single wave of the outbreak, and another accounting for a second wave before the end of the year. The plausibility of a second wave outbreak is real, and is already potentially [materializing](#) in some parts of the world. Therefore, it is crucial that V4 countries use the summer months to gear up for such a possibility, building medical capabilities and increasing testing and tracing resources. As the forecasts of various international economic institutions predict, the economic cost of a second wave would be dire, and even more so without preparedness.




Figure 1. Institutional Forecast Comparison 2020-2021

The OECD's second-wave scenario is the most costly possibility, but even a single-wave scenario, the OECD figures are more dire compared to all other institutions' projections. The OECD forecast was the last one to come out, thus it has the advantage of containing the most recent information on macroeconomic developments and takes into consideration the most reality-resembling assumptions. On the other hand, the [IMF predictions](#), which are the oldest of the bunch being released in April 2020, feature the most optimistic projections. A pessimistic revision is however expected in the upcoming period. The European Commission [estimates](#) hover in the middle. These predictions, apart from differences in macroeconomic models and the like, seem to be signaling that the more recent the data, the deeper the estimated contraction.

Earlier in May, the first pandemic bill came due, as epitomized by the Q1-2020 GDP growth estimate. Based on the implied performance of the Slovak economy in the first three months of the year, the tradeoff between managing the sanitary and economic crisis holds. Slovakia [managed](#) the coronavirus outbreak extraordinarily well, with the lowest per capita death rate in the region and in Europe, but the data suggests that this came at a sizeable cost to the economy. Slovakia's economy seems to have taken the deepest dive in the V4 region, measured on both, annual and quarterly bases (Figure 2).




Figure 2. The Estimated Pandemic Bill for Q1-2020

Source: Eurostat.

But the 'lives-livelihoods' tradeoff may not explain the full picture. Our [analysis](#) shows that the underlying dynamics is more complex and has to do with structural features of the Slovak economy. Slovakia is one of the most open economies globally, and [the most open](#) economy in V4. Hence, is the most vulnerable to shocks and distortions emanating from the external environment, especially those involving disruptions to global value chains. Slovakia was hit directly, through the domestic economy channel, on both, supply- and demand- sides, and indirectly through the shutdown of its key trading partners and the standstill that took over cross-border production. The corona crisis constitutes an ideal time to urgently rethink the Slovak (and the region's) one-sided economic model. To that end, the EU rescue and recovery package, combined with a more robust MFF 2021-2027 proposed by Brussels might become the much needed incentive to move forward with structural reforms (See: *Breakthrough through Brussels*).

Yet, the V4 response to the [Next Generation EU](#) package was mixed, with Poland among the largest beneficiaries, Slovakia voicing preference for structural reform conditionality, and Hungary and Czechia voicing reservations. The upcoming negotiation period will likely be stirring many emotions, while forging a political compromise between the EU27 will not be the easiest of all tasks. In this regard, the EU Council videoconference on 19 June might serve as a first milestone in this process, as discussions are expected to prepare the ground for an extraordinary summit, taking place maybe as soon as July.

BREAKTHROUGHS FROM BRUSSELS

The consensus converges around the notion that national discretionary measures are insufficient. Most leaders have agreed that the common, systemic, symmetrical shock – albeit with asymmetrical outcomes – requires a common European response. What they could not agree on was the size and shape of the common response package, [stalling](#) and putting forth interim compromise packages, until the Franco-German [proposal](#) transpired mid-May.

In the nutshell, the €500 bn recovery fund proposal crosses lines never crossed on several fronts, potentially increasing the firepower of EU's policy toolkit and the flexibility of EU fiscal policy, and maybe marking the beginning of a new European chapter leaned toward fiscal federation. Notably, it also marks a philosophical U-turn of Germany traditionally leading the frugal pack of countries, including Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland, which advocate lower EU spending and tight fiscal discipline, and have been jointly opposed to any mutualized shared debt instrument in prior discussions. Here is where the lines have been crossed towards an uncharted territory:

- ▶ **It proposes grants over loans** as a form of financing (i.e. cash transfers)
- ▶ **It involves common issuance of EU debt** guaranteed by its own budget/revenues¹
- ▶ **It implies new sources of EU joint tax revenues** (EU will need to levy new taxes on its own account) stemming from activities that transcend national boundaries, such as carbon dioxide emissions, financial and digital transactions

The frugals fired back with a counterproposal, objecting to grants over loans and favored a strings attached approach, quoting structural reform conditionality¹ and rule of law conditionality¹.

Ursula von der Leyen followed the Merkel-Macron suit on 27 May by unveiling even bigger, €750 bn recovery fund proposal, called **NextGenerationEU**. It involves both forms of financing, €500 bn in the form of grants and €250 bn as loans. This is on the top of the proposed EUR 1.1 trillion under Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The plan emphasizes EU policy priorities surrounding healthcare, energy transition, and digital policy, with the aim for making European economies greener, smarter and more resilient.

III. European Priorities- Implications for V4

A European Green Deal and Recovery

As for the European Green Deal (EGD) and the green recovery, Czechia and Hungary are the only V4 countries with a meaningful update since the crisis began.

In Czechia, Prime Minister Babiš walked back his initial public lambasting of the EGD during the pandemic by signing an internal letter supporting a green recovery prepared by the Ministries of Environment and Industry and Trade with input from the Czech Permanent Representation from the European Commission. Furthermore, Babiš made it clear in his comments to the media about the Commission's Recovery and MFF proposals that his country sides with the frugal. He believes EUR 750 billion is too much money, which will go to wealthier member states and the payback period is too long. Reading between the lines, he sees a threat to grant-based Cohesion funds

as the criteria for allocation of the EUR 750 billion favours member states with high unemployment rates before the pandemic began, i.e. not Czechia.

Meanwhile in Hungary, when asked why the government did not sign the joint open letter with 17 other member states explicitly supporting the EGD, the State Secretary responsible for energy and climate policy at the Ministry of Innovation and Technology responded that “supporting the letter is contrary to the interests of the Hungarian people.” Even before the pandemic the government has maintained a cautious and measured approach to the EGD, leading up to a new climate law that was passed by Hungarian Parliament 3 June. This gives a legal precedent for climate neutrality by 2050, showing that Hungary takes the climate crisis more seriously, but green NGOs have been critical, claiming that it is not ambitious enough and lacks concrete measures. Regardless, the government can silence outside critics by pointing to a law that neighboring Czechia and Poland have not yet adopted in line with the Commission. As for state recovery programmes, the debate in parliament is still ahead but they mostly focus on new and not green infrastructure investments.

Eastern Partnership

This year is highly significant for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative, as it foresees the adoption of a new policy framework and package of deliverables beyond 2020. This makes the upcoming EAP Leaders’ Videoconference for 18 June particularly important. The CEE states, the Czech Republic and Poland in particular, promote the idea of holding an additional physical Summit with the participation of all heads of EU and EaP governments/states in early 2021 under the Portuguese EU Council Presidency.

On 5 June, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán paid his first official visit to Belarus, one of the EaP participating countries. During talks with President Aleksandr Lukashenko, Mr. Orbán urged the development of political and business ties with Belarus and announced that it was time for the European Union to cancel existing sanctions. The EU restrictive measures against Belarus, which were initially introduced in 2004, include an embargo on arms and on equipment that could be used for internal repression, as well as an asset freeze and travel ban against four people designated in connection with the unresolved disappearances of two opposition politicians, one businessman and one journalist in 1999 and 2000.

IV. Security Implications and Hybrid Threats

Diplomatic Row Between the Czech Republic and Russia Continues

The escalation of tensions between the Czech Republic and Russia triggered by the removal of Marshal Konev statue from Prague square and the consequent hostile acts by Kremlin we covered in our previous [Intelligence briefing](#) has continued. On Friday 5 June, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced [the expulsion of two suspected Russian intelligence operatives](#) from the Russian Embassy in the Czech Republic. Interestingly, the reason for the expulsion was the fact they were involved in what appears to be an intentional manipulation of Czech intelligence services by spreading a hoax of a plot to use ricin against local Czech authorities responsible for removal of Konev statue. The manipulation allegedly originated as a result of an internal row among two embassy members. Russian authorities vehemently denied any such notion and vowed to respond in kind by expelling Czech embassy staff in Moscow.

Slovakia Joins Group of Countries Criticising “Code of Practice”

On 2 June, the European Commission initiated a public consultation on the most ambitious and complex reform of digital space since the adoption of the e-commerce directive. The Digital Services Act will have a significant impact on how we conduct business and spread information, and would shape how social media companies deal with illegal and harmful content hosted on their platforms.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that [Slovakia joined a group of Baltic countries](#) (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) in rejecting the current voluntary measures of social media companies in tackling disinformation enshrined in the Code of Practice against disinformation. The coalition of countries even called the Code of Practice, in a leaked position paper, “insufficient and unsuitable to serve as the basis for sustainably addressing disinformation on social platforms”.

This is a rare occasion when Slovakia expressed such strong criticism regarding the way social media platforms deal with disinformation. The rebuke follows a report [produced by GLOBSEC](#) criticising measures taken by Facebook during the Slovak parliamentary election campaign earlier this year. It is also noteworthy that the recent evaluation of the Code of Practice by the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services- ERGA was initiated and driven by its former Chairperson - Luboš Kukliš, a Slovak national.

Facebook Fact Checking Capacities Strengthened in CEE

In becoming a member of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), [Demagog.cz](#), a Czech fact-checking organisation specialising in scrutinizing political discussions was accredited as an official partner of Facebook to verify content posted on the platform. [Demagog association from Poland](#) is already a member of the IFCN and a Slovak branch – [Demagog.sk](#) is in the process of accreditation. Increasing personnel capacities dedicated to fact-checking in the region is crucial to increase the impact of fact-checking initiatives on Facebook and other platforms. Unlike some bigger markets, the resources dedicated to fact-checking content on social media platforms in the CEE region have thus far been insufficient to make a difference.

Application of Hungarian Anti-Hoax Legislation Raises Concerns

Hungary received significant media attention when the government adopted a [set of legislative measures to combat COVID-19](#) on 30 March granting the authority to rule by decrees. It concerned criminalisation of the intentional spreading of disinformation, which could hamper government efforts to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time of adoption, some media and critics raised the alarm of the potential for the misuse of power.

Two months later, the application of the legislation seems to partially substantiate these concerns. In May, several cases were reported when authors of posts and comments criticising governmental policies related to the pandemic were questioned by the police. According to [media reports](#), several people have been arrested and detained for several hours over social media posts. One case involved a member of the opposition Momentum party, who was detained in southern Hungary. The reason for his detention was a social media post criticising clearing non-virus patients out of hospitals to make room for COVID-19 patients.

The Hungarian authorities defended their action and stressed that all the detentions were conducted only in justified cases.

Contact Tracing Saga Reveals Vulnerabilities

The [struggle to develop European contact tracing apps](#), as well as the debates surrounding this effort has highlighted the fact that European states are still [reliant on foreign tech giants](#) for tech solutions despite repeated calls for digital and technological sovereignty from European leaders.

Many experts and policymakers have pointed the blame for this deficiency on the EU. Other than publishing guidelines on [inter-operationality](#) and [data protection](#), the EU is seen as less of a driver of tech innovation and research. European-wide efforts were mostly led by PEPP-PT, a group largely unaffiliated with any government. The joint [Apple-Google approach](#) has spurred on the development of European contact tracing the most. This has not come without some resistance. Officials from [France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal](#) called on companies, without explicitly naming Google or Apple, to allow for more flexibility in developing these apps. [France](#) has been especially vocal in its criticism of the tech giants, preferring a centralized approach that would keep the data under the control of the state. Although centralized and decentralized models both raise privacy concerns, the debate has highlighted the centrality of the tech giants.

The French app has run into issues both with its operational capability and its roll-out. Designed without Apple and Google's cooperation, the app is not functional while the phone is in sleep mode and it failed to show up in the [App Store or the Google Play Store](#) at the scheduled time. Even worse, an app from the government of Catalonia with a similar name to the French app became the most [downloaded app in the French App Store](#).

So far, Germany, Latvia, Italy, and Switzerland have [all already adopted the approach](#) developed by Apple and Google. In total 22 countries and some American states are considering it. European Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders also [threw his weight behind the effort](#). While working with Google and Apple can improve implementation, there are limitations on how much each government can customize their apps.

Alternatively, European states could adopt apps developed by Asian countries such as Singapore, which has made the code for their app [open-source](#). The main concern is that such approach replaces the reliance on tech companies with reliance on a foreign government, and long term it may not be preferable.

Aid in Times of Coronavirus

The table below takes stock of all aid delivered and received/purchased by V4 countries during the period March-May 2020.

*Important acronyms:

[EADRCC](#) - NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre

[SALIS](#) – NATO's Strategic Airlift International Solution

Donor State	Aid Recipient	Aid Sent	Aid Received/Purchased
Hungary - Bilaterally, in response to a request through NATO's EADRCC	1) Croatia 2) Slovenia 3) Bosnia and Herzegovina 4) Moldova	1) 6 April– 10,000 masks, 1,000 protective suits and other protective equipment sent to Croatia 2) Delivery of masks and protective equipment to Slovenia 3) In response to a call for aid by Bosnia and Herzegovina Hungary delivered 200,000 masks and 10,000 protective suits on 16 April 4) In coordination with the United States Hungary delivered medical supplies to the Republic of Moldova on 28 April. Visiting Chisinau, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary Péter Szijjártó personally handed over 100.000 masks and 5,000 protective overalls to the Moldovan authorities	N/A
Slovakia - Through the European Union Emergency Coordination Centre, in consultation with EADRCC. Fiscal resources of the Slovak Agency for International Development.	1) Italy 2) EU27 3) Moldova	1) On the 20 April Slovakia delivered 300,000 surgical masks and 500l of disinfectant concentrate to Italy with the assistance of SALIS 2) 5 May- Foreign Minister pledges 750,000 euro towards research for a coronavirus vaccine 3)On 7 May, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted a financial donation of EUR 50,000 to Moldova as an extraordinary contribution from the resources of the Slovak Agency for International Development SlovakAid. The donation was to be used for the purchase of medical equipment for five municipal hospitals of the capital city Chisinau	1) Operational import of facemasks, surgical gloves and protective suits, Imported from China, delivered by SALIS in joint mission tasked by Czech Republic and Slovakia

Poland - Bilaterally, through NATO's EADRCC and through Polish Centre for International Aid (PCIM)	1) Italy	1) 26 March – 15 medical personnel from Poland are sent to Brescia	1) 9 April, import of 190,000 Masks and 180,000 protective gowns from China using SALIS	
	2) Spain	2) 16 April Poland donates 20,000 litres of disinfectant to Spain	2) 16 April, 73 tons of medical supplies from China purchased by the Polish government were delivered by SALIS services included 14 million masks, 300,000 protective suits and a machine for producing masks	
	3) United States	3) 23 April, Polish government sends 9-person military medical team to United States for one week, to share lessons from respective outbreaks	3 June, SALIS mission brings 75 tonnes of equipment to Poland. The cargo plane delivered face shields, a mask making machine, protective clothing and medical gloves. The mission was requested by Poland's Ministry of Defence	
	4) Kosovo	4) Between 18-22 May the Polish military contingent operation with the NATO-led Kosovo Force delivered 50,000 face masks and 1000 litres of disinfectant. These supplies were transported via the Polish Air Force and delivered to the Health Institutions in Kosovo		
	5) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia	5) By 29 May Poland had dispatched nearly 70 tons of medical supplies across the Western Balkans to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia. This relief in coordination with NATO EADRCC included more than 10,000 litres of disinfectant and 100,000 face masks for each recipient		
Czech Republic - Bilaterally, in response to a request through NATO's EADRCC	1) Greece	1) 6 March – Czech Republic delivers 900,000 euros of humanitarian emergency equipment to Greece. This includes 10 pumps, 4 generators, 1,000 air mattresses, sleeping bags, blankets and towels and 10 tent heaters	1) 24 March, a cargo plane operating under SALIS delivered over 100 tons of protective equipment, including millions of facemasks, goggles and protective suits from Shenzhen China	
	2) Italy	2) 23 March delivers 110,000 masks to Italy	2) 30 March, several tons of urgent medical supplies arrive on an additional SALIS supported cargo flight from China. This delivery included vital respirators and facemasks	
	3) Italy and Spain	3) In response to NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) by Spain and Italy, the Czech Republic delivered aid to the countries on the 29 th and 30 th of March. A truck from the Czech Republic carrying 10,000 pieces of ppe and samples of newly developed hi-tech respirators printable on 3D printers arrived in Italy. Additionally, through a C-130 cargo plane sent by the Czech Republic personal protective equipment, masks, respirators and test kits were delivered to Spain		

	4) Slovenia	4) March 29 – 500,000 protective masks, 25,000 respirators, and 5,000 suits to Slovenia. (Euroskop), 1 million surgical masks and 200,000 FFP2 respirators (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	
	5) North Macedonia	5) 10 April the Czech Republic answers North Macedonian EADRCC request. The Czech military transport delivered 1,000,000 masks	
	6) Greece	6) 29 April – Humanitarian emergency equipment valued at 160,000 Euros donated to Greek Refugee camps	
	7) EU27 and Italy	7) 4 May– Czech Minister of Health pledges 750,000 euro towards research for a coronavirus vaccine; On the same day the government provides another 500,000 protective masks to Italy	