Publication

GLOBSEC’s Ukraine Support Club at the Munich Security Conference 2025

on 24.02.2025
UA path Forward

The Ukraine Support Club (USC) is an initiative led by GLOBSEC and based on the interactive exchange of former and active Ministers of Defence as well as other high-level personalities. The scope of this platform is to contribute to policy development at various levels of government in Allied and Partner countries and in international organisations - especially NATO and EU - regarding Ukraine´s Euro Atlantic integration. In the spirit of a Track 2 diplomacy initiative, the USC aims to deliver strong, relevant arguments for continued support to Ukraine and raise awareness on the implications of Ukraine's security and defence on European and Transatlantic security and defence.

Discussion: "Ukraine's Path Forward: Priorities, Sovereignty, and Defence towards a Post-War Landscape"

Date & Time: 15th February 2025, 15:30-17:00

Takeaways

Negotiation and Peace Deal Considerations

  • No deal is better than a bad deal. A poorly structured deal that compromises too much would be more damaging than having no deal at all, as it would fail to secure lasting peace and could undermine years of efforts to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  • Justice for Ukraine. Any potential peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia must prioritise justice and Russia must be held accountable for the atrocious war crimes committed.
  • Lack of European consensus on the positions to defend. While the ideal outcome would see Russia formally recognising Ukraine’s 1991 borders, there is currently no unified European consensus on the conditions necessary for a successful peace deal, raising concerns about the feasibility of any agreement.

Russia’s Long-Term Threat

  • Russia will remain a threat despite a potential ceasefire. Historical precedent has shown that Russia cannot be trusted to uphold its commitments in any negotiated agreement, and even in the event of a ceasefire, it is highly likely that Moscow would continue to engage in hybrid warfare tactics aimed at destabilising Europe while rebuilding its military capabilities.
  • Europeans’ cognitive bias hinders support to Ukraine. Despite clear evidence of Russia’s struggles on the battlefield and its inability to achieve a decisive victory, many European policymakers still operate under the cognitive bias that Moscow will ultimately prevail, a perspective that significantly undermines the collective efforts undertaken to support Ukraine both militarily and diplomatically.

 

NATO and Defence Spending

  • Insufficient Defence Spending Weakened the Alliance. The failure of several NATO countries to meet the 2% GDP defence spending target has directly contributed to weakening the Alliance, and the ongoing war in Ukraine has exposed these vulnerabilities, serving as a critical stress test for NATO’s resilience and readiness.
  • 2% of GDP is not enough. Rather than continuing debates over whether defence spending should be set at 2%, 3%, or even 5% of GDP, European countries should consider a more pragmatic approach, where investments are determined based on the country, its military capabilities’ gaps and size of its armed forces.
  • Raise awareness at domestic level on this crucial issue. Increasing defence budgets requires both economic stability and strong domestic political support - as is the case of Nordic countries. There is the need to foster internal dialogue both among political parties and with the population to achieve broader government and public backing for stronger national security measures.

European Security and Preparedness

  • Create regional initiative for stronger cooperation. The Baltic states have taken significant steps in strengthening regional defence, creating capabilities coalitions to better synchronise their efforts and increase readiness and preparedness.
  • Enhance Self-Sufficiency rapidly. The European Union must take serious actions into developing a more self-sufficient defence industry and fill the existing capabilities gaps. In this regard, the role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) should be further reinforced.
  • Expande global partnerships. The EU should foster deeper partnerships with countries beyond the United States – Norway, Canada, South Korea to ensure greater strategic autonomy.

Strategic Risks and US Relations

  • NATO’s Unity is Crucial. The Alliance remains the cornerstone of European security, and any weakening of this partnership will have severe consequences for NATO’s credibility, as well as for the ability of European nations to collectively deter external threats.
  • The Dangers of U.S. Alignment with Russia for Europe’s Security. If the U.S. President Trump’s strategy is to align with Russia as a way of counterbalancing China—referred to as the "Nixon Reverse"— this could significantly undermine European security, as it risks empowering Moscow while leaving Europe exposed to increased geopolitical instability.
  • Sustainable Peace: The Need for European Resolute Commitments. If a peace agreement is reached, European troops on the ground together with Ukrainian armed forces, will be necessary to ensure it is sustainable and to deter Russia from future aggressive actions.

Support for Ukraine

  • Keeping NATO’s door open to Ukraine. It is crucial for Ukraine to remain on track for NATO membership, as was previously agreed upon under the principle that accession would be possible when all allies concur and when conditions allow, ensuring that Ukraine’s security is not permanently sidelined.
  • The war is not over, and Ukraine needs military support. European countries must continue to provide Ukraine with the necessary military support, ensuring that its armed forces are fully equipped to defend their country, as any deviation from previous commitments would not only weaken Ukraine’s position but also severely damage NATO’s credibility as a security guarantor.
  • The future of Europe is tied to Ukraine. The security of Ukraine and the broader security of Europe are deeply intertwined, and it is imperative that policymakers treat these two aspects as inseparable to implement long-term strategic measures that strengthen both Ukrainian and European defence capabilities.

Authors

fmangiamelli

Defense and Security Senior Programme Manager

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Authors

fmangiamelli

Defense and Security Senior Programme Manager