Sputnik Moldova and the Kremlin’s Propaganda Machinery in Moldova’s Information Space

The presidential elections in Moldova in October and November 2024 played a crucial role in determining the country's geopolitical orientation, which remains polarised between pro-European and pro-Russian factions. Moldova's vulnerability to Kremlin foreign influence is evident across various domains—media, energy dependence on Russian gas, the significant Russian-speaking minority, and the unresolved Transnistrian conflict, which Moscow exploits as a strategic foothold to exert pressure. These factors create a fertile ground for Russian influence campaigns, which exploit domestic grievances, undermine pro-European political representatives, and erode public trust in democratic processes.
Information Landscape
Moldova's media landscape is heavily influenced by figures such as Ilan Shor, a pro-Kremlin oligarch who fled the country to evade prosecution on corruption charges. Taking refuge in Moscow, Shor has been implicated in attempts to destabilise Moldova’s pro-European trajectory, including efforts to undermine the government and influence public opinion through various media channels.
Already in 2022, in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moldova's Commission for Exceptional Situations suspended the broadcast licences of six television channels—Primul în Moldova, RTR Moldova, Accent TV, NTV Moldova, TV6, and Orhei TV—for disseminating disinformation about domestic events and the war in Ukraine. Additionally, in 2023, the Intelligence and Security Service of Moldova blocked access to 22 websites, including prominent pro-Kremlin platforms such as Kp.md and Vedomosti.md, citing their role in spreading war propaganda and hate speech. However, in December 2024, some Russian information portals resumed activity, despite previous bans.
While Moldovan authorities have taken steps to protect the country’s information space, the concentration of media ownership among pro-Kremlin oligarchs remains a significant vulnerability, facilitating ongoing influence operations.
Another key tool of Kremlin influence in Moldova is Sputnik News. Before the EU banned Sputnik following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it operated radio broadcasts, websites, and social media channels in more than 30 languages, including Czech, Latvian, Polish, and Romanian/Moldovan versions, widely consumed across Central Europe. However, since Moldova is not an EU member, Sputnik News remains a major tool of Kremlin propaganda in the country.
Sputnik News in Moldova
Sputnik News maintains a strong presence in Moldova’s information space in multiple ways. Firstly, a Moldovan version of Sputnik News in Russian is available at : https://md.sputniknews.ru/, primarily targeting the Russian-speaking minority. Although Moldovan authorities expelled Vitaly Denisov, the head of Sputnik Moldova, in September 2023, the website remains operational. According to SimilarWeb analytics, the outlet received 88,246 visits in December 2024, with most traffic coming from Russia. However, there was a 10% increase in traffic from Moldova, indicating growing local engagement with Sputnik’s content. While Sputnik News is blocked in the EU, EU citizens can still access it via VPN.
Source: SimilarWeb
Similarly, Radio Sputnik, which was among the 2023 blocked websites, has resumed full accessibility in Moldova. The station covered Moldovan elections and the constitutional referendum on EU integration, spinning pro-Kremlin narratives of election manipulation.
Example of Radio Sputnik’ articles on Moldovan elections
Source: Radio Sputnik
Despite EU sanctions against Sputnik’s radio and online platforms since March 2022, Radio Sputnik’s website remains fully accessible within the EU, suggesting a failure by the EU and national authorities to enforce the ban effectively.
Sputnik Moldova on Telegram
Using social media monitoring tool Gerulata Juno, several Sputnik-affiliated social media pages/channels were found in Moldova’s information space (see picture below). While Sputnik’s Facebook pages were discontinued, Sputnik remains active on Telegram.
Social media channels of Sputnik Moldova
Source: Gerulata Juno
Two channels of Sputnik Moldova were found on Telegram. First Sputnik Moldova with username @mdsputnikmd. According to Gerulata Juno, this channel has been inactive since 17 June 2024.
Source: Gerulata Juno
An analysis of social media accounts, which content was most frequently shared by this Telegram channel, shows extensive connection to Telegram channel Triunghiul Basarabean (The Bessarabian Triangle), a channel identified as spreading pro-Kremlin narratives and supporting Romanian presidential candidate Călin Georgescu. Other channels included Noutăți de ultimă oră din Moldova: cele mai importante știri (sputnik.md) (Breaking News from Moldova: The Most Important News (sputnik.md)), Prima Sursă | Первоисточник (First Source (Romanian) | Primary Source (Russian)), Sptnk Necenzurat (Sputnik Uncensored), and RT на русском (RT in Russia).
Channels from which Sputnik Moldova (@mdsputnikmd) Telegram channel shared content
Source: Gerulata Juno
Certain channels, such as Prima Sursă | Первоисточник, post in both Romanian and Russian, indicating a hybrid targeting strategy aimed at both Moldovan Romanian speakers and Russian-speaking audiences. Additionally, the presence of these channels in Romanian political discussions prior to the 2024 elections suggests a broader regional influence strategy, amplifying pro-Kremlin narratives across both Moldova and Romania.
From the connection analysis it is possible to observe that channels as Prima Sursă| Первоисточник, post content in both Romanian and Russian, and are targeting Romanians or Moldovan Romanian speakers and Russian-speaking audiences. Furthermore, as some these channels have been active prior the elections in Romania, this indicates a broader regional interconnectedness and aim to amplify pro-Kremlin narratives across both Moldova and Romania.
Another Telegram channel of Sputnik in Moldova is Sputnik Молдова 🇲🇩 with username @rusputnikmd and over 30,000 subscribers. This channel is quite active in Moldovan information space reaching over 4 million interactions in 2024.
Source: Gerulata Juno
The channel’s posts with most interactions, were the posts on presidential elections in November.
Source: Gerulata Juno
An analysis of connections and content being shared by this Sputnik Telegram channel revealed coordination of pro-Kremlin and Kremlin-affiliated channels and their targeting Russian-speaking minorities, living especially in Transnistria and Gagauzia. Channels such as Sputnik Ближнее зарубежье (Sputnik Near Abroad), Gagauznews — Новости для Гагаузии, and Площадь Суворова — Приднестровье сегодня (Suvorov Square — Transnistria Today) indicate focus on maintaining Russian influence in Moldova’s separatist region of Transnistria and the the Gagauzia autonomous region.
Top 10 channels from which Sputnik Moldova @rusputnikmd Telegram channel shared content from
Source: Gerulata Juno
Furthermore, strong presence of the Kremlin controlled media and institutions – as RIA Novosti, RT in Russian, and Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs is visible. And existence of Аргументы и факты в Молдове (Arguments & Facts in Moldova,) a local branch of a Russian media outlet, attests to the Kremlin’s infiltration of Moldovan information space. In addition, Sputnik Moldova disseminating content from channels Протесты в Молдове (Protests in Moldova) and Выбор Молдовы (Moldova’s Choice) suggests systematic amplification of anti-government narratives to destabilise the political environment and thus change Transatlantic orientation of the country.
Sputnik amplifying content of domestic political representative, particularly Bogdan Țîrdea, a well-known pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician, and local news channels like Кишинёв в теме (Chișinău in the Know) showcase high penetration of Moldovan society to the Kremlin’s influence operations targeting minorities and hyper-local communities.
An analysis of channels further promoting content of Sputnik Moldova shows well-organised pro-Kremlin information ecosystem. Sputnik’s content has been taken over by mainstream pro-Kremlin media like KP Moldova (Komsomolskaya Pravda Moldova), a Moldovan branch of the Russian tabloid KP, and Arguments & Facts in Moldova (Аргументы и факты в Молдове) both being identified as outlets disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives. Another category are outlets targeting Russian-speaking regions and fuelling separatism as Moldovan Piston, Suvorov Square – Transnistria Today, Gagauzia’s Truth, Gagauznews or Евразийская Молдова (Eurasian Moldova) suggesting alignment with Russia’s “Eurasian” geopolitical vision. Sputnik’s content was also disseminated by a number domestic political representatives, already mentioned above.
Top 10 channels most frequently sharing content of Sputnik Moldova @rusputnikmd Telegram channel
Source: Gerulata Juno
Analysing the dissemination of Sputnik Moldova content indicates several Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) as outlined in the DISARM Framework. Key observed TTPs include:
- Determine Target Audiences (T0073):
- Actors identify specific segments of the Moldovan population, such as Russian-speaking communities and residents of Transnistria and Gagauzia.
- Coordinate Messaging (T0080):
- Multiple channels, including KP Moldova, Arguments & Facts in Moldova, and various regional outlets, synchronise their content as observed from the content/network analysis above.
- Amplify (T0081):
- Content from Sputnik Moldova is shared extensively across various platforms to increase reach and influence.
These TTPs illustrate a coordinated effort to influence public opinion in Moldova, leveraging a network of media outlets and social media channels to disseminate tailored pro-Kremlin narratives in Moldova and neighbouring Romania. These findings reinforce the presence of a well-coordinated, multi-layered Kremlin influence operation in Moldova, leveraging Kremlin propaganda of Russia state-controlled media, aligned local political actors and oligarchs, and hyper-local channels/outlets amplifying Russian narratives and driving various societal tensions. With parliamentary election happening in 2025, the Kremlin’s influence operations will continue.
This analysis was written through the Information Defence Alliance project, and it is a public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the grant competition “Public Diplomacy 2024-2025 – the European dimension and countering disinformation.” The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

Methodology:
The tool used in this analysis was Gerulata Juno, a social media monitoring and analysis platform. Gerulata Juno offers extensive data-gathering capabilities across multiple social media channels. The provided metrics on social media channels’ connection, though regularly updated by the monitoring tool, were limited by the timeframe in which the channels were uploaded to Gerulata Juno and started to be monitored. Metrics for each channel reflect the entire monitoring period of that channel. For instance, if a channel has been monitored for two years, the metrics provide information for those two years