ONE ALLIANCE

The Future Tasks of the Adapted Alliance
GLOBSEC NATO ADAPTATION INITIATIVE

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PRESENTATION FOLDER: COLLECTION OF PAPERS
The GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative, led by General (Retd.) John R. Allen, is GLOBSEC’s foremost contribution to debates about the future of the Alliance. Given the substantial changes within the global security environment, GLOBSEC has undertaken a year-long project, following its annual Spring conference and the July NATO Summit in Warsaw, to explore challenges faced by the Alliance in adapting to a very different strategic environment than that of any time since the end of the Cold War. The Initiative integrates policy expertise, institutional knowledge, intellectual rigour and industrial perspectives. It ultimately seeks to provide innovative and thoughtful solutions for the leaders of the Alliance to make NATO more a resilient, responsive and efficient anchor of transatlantic stability. The policy papers published within the GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative are authored by the Initiative’s Steering Committee members: General (Retd.) John R. Allen, Admiral (Retd.) Giampaolo di Paola, General (Retd.) Wolf Langheld, Professor Julian Lindley-French, Ambassador (Retd.) Tomáš Valášek, Ambassador (Retd.) Alexander Vershbow and other acclaimed authorities from the field of global security and strategy.
The Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organisation which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. Given such changes, people in NATO societies want action/protection and are not seeing it. It has also shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the [Washington] Treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.”

13 December 1967
H.E. Jens Stoltenberg,
Secretary-General,
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

November 27, 2017

Dear Secretary-General Stoltenberg,

The GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative

As leader of the GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative, and on behalf of the Steering Committee, GLOBSEC and the many leading academics and policy-practitioners who have supported the work, it is my distinct pleasure and honour to present to you the formal outcome of over fifteen months of intense work on the future of NATO. This presentation folder contains the fruit of our labours: three major reports, as well as eight important supporting papers.

The main message for the Alliance is clear: NATO needs a forward-looking strategy that sets out how the Alliance will meet the challenges of an unpredictable and fast-changing world. To lay the basis for long-term adaptation, NATO leaders should commission a strategy review at the July 2018 Brussels Summit that could be completed by the seventieth anniversary summit in 2019, and which might be embodied in a new Strategic Concept.

This has been an Alliance-wide initiative from the outset that strove to strike a necessary policy balance between nations, policy-makers, practitioners and academic experts. The Steering Committee is living testament to that balance. Professor Dr Julian Lindley-French, our lead writer, from the UK, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola from Italy, General Wolf Langheld from Germany, Ambassador Tomas Valasek from Slovakia, and former NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow of the US all brought a wealth of knowledge and experience to the work. The steering committee was further advised by General Knud Bartels, James Townsend, and Dr Michael O’Hanlon. Particular tribute must be paid to GLOBSEC’s Project Manager, and Deputy Research Director Alena Kudzko.

Fifty years ago NATO adopted a new kind of defence with Flexible Response, and a new approach when Minister Harmel and his team called upon the Alliance to balance sound defence with committed dialogue to maintain the peace of Europe. NATO was spectacularly successful in accomplishing that mission. Today, in a very different world, an adapted NATO will need to embrace a new kind of flexible response in which defence, deterrence and dialogue come together once again to preserve the peace across the Euro-Atlantic Community, and far beyond. To re-forge NATO in a foundry of contemporary realism so that the Alliance can continue to hold aloft a shining beacon of liberty not just for its own citizens, but many others the world over.

Sir, I commend our report to you.

With my sincere respects,

General John R. Allen,
Leader, GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative,
November 2017
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GLOBSEC NATO ADAPTATION INITIATIVE

MAIN REPORTS

By the Steering Committee
GLOBSEC NATO ADAPTATION INITIATIVE

ONE ALLIANCE

The Future Tasks of the Adapted Alliance

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO is at a crucial decision point. The Alliance has adapted well in response to the watershed events of 2014 – rebuilding deterrence against threats from the East, increasing its engagement with the Middle East, and forging a closer partnership with the European Union. But as it nears its seventieth birthday, NATO risks falling behind the pace of political change and technological developments that could alter the character of warfare, the structure of international relations and the role of the Alliance itself.

NATO cannot stand still, or rest on its laurels. To maintain its credibility as a defensive alliance NATO must embark on a more far-reaching process of adaptation. NATO must ensure it has the capacity to fight a future war if it is to deter and prevent such a war. And it must have the political tools and partnerships to reinforce its military capabilities.

To lay the basis for long-term adaptation, NATO leaders should commission a strategy review at the July 2018 Summit that could be completed by the seventieth anniversary summit in 2019, and which might be embodied in a new Strategic Concept. NATO needs a forward-looking strategy that sets out how NATO will meet the challenges of an unpredictable and fast-changing world.

As the key elements of such a strategy, the Allies must:

► Embrace new geostrategic and transatlantic realities: Adaptation will only succeed if the Alliance confronts new geostrategic realities, including the need to deter a revisionist, militarily-advanced Russia, whilst also projecting stability to NATO’s South, and dealing with threats posed by states such as North Korea. To establish equitable burden-sharing between the United States and its allies, the Defence Investment Pledge (DIP) agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit must be honoured in full, and new money spent well.

► Strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture to prevent conflict and deter aggression: Enhancing the readiness and responsiveness of NATO conventional forces must be the over-arching priority, but NATO’s nuclear posture and strategy must also be modernised. Along with powerful, agile and resilient conventional forces, Allies need to adopt a warfighting ethos as core Alliance doctrine. NATO must re-establish the capacity for the swift generation of force mass and manoeuvre if NATO is to meet the force-on-force challenge. NATO should promote integrated deterrence, building on reforms to the NATO Command Structure, as well as undertake more systematic contingency planning, to ensure effective command and control across the conflict spectrum.

► Establish a high-level of NATO military ambition: All aspects of NATO’s non-nuclear conventional forces must be radically improved, including better integration of cyber and new technologies. Indeed, the strengthening of Alliance conventional forces is the sine qua non of adaptation. Whilst moving towards a new nuclear strategy and posture is also politically challenging, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group must seek to make advances where possible. NATO must at least be able to command simultaneously operations in a large-scale state-to-state conflict (a Major Joint Operation-Plus), and undertake a sustained strategic stabilisation campaign to NATO’s south. NATO’s crisis management mechanisms are still far too complicated. NATO’s role in the defence of the global commons must also be enhanced with multi-domain forces able to operate to effect across air, sea, land, space, cyber, knowledge and information. NATO must train and think as it plans to fight. Impediments to battle-critical information-sharing must also be removed.

► Strengthen NATO’s role in counter-terrorism: The terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area will increase. NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines and NATO’s support for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS are vital. However, NATO must also contribute more to preventing terrorist attacks on its members, including home-grown plots. Whilst this is primarily a national and EU responsibility, with law enforcement and interior ministries in the lead, NATO’s newly upgraded Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JIS), with its secure communications links to Allied capitals, could become a clearing-house for exchanging classified terrorist threat information.
Engage with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of principle: A new political strategy is needed for NATO to better engage with Russia. Dialogue must go hand-in-hand with defence with the goal of managing competition and reducing risks until fundamental differences that prevent a return to cooperation with Russia are resolved. At the same time, the Alliance must help Ukraine, Georgia, and other Eastern European neighbours to defend themselves and continue to promote the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans. The Open Door policy, and the possibility of future membership, must be upheld.

Promote a broad NATO security agenda: The enduring mission in Afghanistan is a reminder that the security of the Alliance does not stop at its borders. NATO needs a broader security role to reinforce the engagement of the Alliance across the Middle East, North Africa and beyond. Defence capacity-building to NATO’s south will be an important contribution to peace and security, working closely with regional security institutions, such as the African Union and the Arab League, as well as with individual partner nations.

Craft a smarter NATO: If the Alliance is to both protect people and project influence and power, NATO should better integrate the many centres of excellence into a network of excellence, and establish new centres to address new challenges. A bespoke Hyper War Centre of Excellence would help generate a coherent approach to future war, and combine work on Artificial Intelligence and expanded NATO cyber defence. NATO urgently needs a coherent approach to the development and application of artificial intelligence (AI) and its family of capabilities to defence and deterrence. Such a Centre would necessarily need to train and educate NATO’s civilian and military leadership, and include staff courses for NATO international personnel and member nation civilians.

Create an ambitious and comprehensive NATO-EU Strategic Partnership: The EU will become an increasingly important foreign and security actor and partner of NATO, with the NATO-EU strategic partnership increasingly important for the management of transatlantic relations. For many Europeans, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will be a, if not the vehicle for defence policy. The European Defence Agency will also be the mechanism of choice for the development of military capabilities for many Europeans. Therefore, NATO and the EU must overcome current barriers to foster a more substantial and mutually beneficial partnership and reinforce practical cooperation. A NATO-EU summit at heads of state and government level should be held at least once a year.

Foster wider strategic partnerships: NATO must also create a world-wide network of strategic partnerships and institutions. Indeed, at a time of globalised security NATO needs to better forge functional political, civilian and military partnerships across the world. The creation of consultative councils with states such as Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea would be an important indicator of such ambition.

Better equip and afford NATO: NATO must innovate as an alliance and streamline the delivery of new technology and equipment. On average it takes 16 years from conception of military capability to operational effect, which is far too long. Capability fielding timelines must be shortened, and commanders given a greater say in requirements development. NATO should promote a common standard for shared assessment, harmonised requirements and common specifications, expand the use of common funding, and conduct an Alliance-wide platform and systems audit as part of a Future Requirements Framework.

Deepen relations with established defence industries and forge new partnerships with the new defence sector: Critically, NATO must gain a far better understanding of the impact of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and data mining, together with their defence applications. Many of the companies driving new technologies are not defence giants, nor are many of them defence-focussed. Such companies will need to be sure that if they invest limited people and resources in NATO projects, their existence will not be threatened by sclerotic acquisition practices.
Equip NATO for the future of war: NATO needs a future war strategy that fully-integrates hybrid warfare, cyber war, counter-terrorism and hyper war, and the continuum between them. Critically, NATO must leverage the impact of new technologies on the security space and battlespace. NATO must better grip and exploit new information technologies, and systematically trawl newly-available artificial intelligence-powered capacities to exploit big data. To that end, NATO should consider creating an agency similar in mission to that of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

If the above recommendations are adopted, they would take NATO adaptation to a new level and reinforce the Alliance’s fundamental goal of preventing war and deterring aggression. Building on the short-term changes dictated by the earth-shaking events of 2014, these recommendations would also equip NATO for the even more formidable changes on the horizon.

THE GLOBSEC NATO ADAPTATION INITIATIVE STEERING COMMITTEE
November 2017
ONE ALLIANCE

The Future Tasks of the Adapted Alliance

FINAL REPORT
1. 360 DEGREE NATO: ADAPTATION BY DESIGN

“NATO’s essential mission is unchanged: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security, and shared values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.”

Warsaw Summit Communiqué, July 2016

1.1 2014 was a watershed year for the Alliance: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine brought to an end a 25-year period in which the West sought to make Russia a partner, and the declaration by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) of a caliphate took the terrorist threat to a new level. NATO responded by launching a comprehensive process of adaptation reflected in the decisions of the Wales Summit of 2014 and the Warsaw Summit of 2016.

1.2 Currently, the next NATO high-level meeting, planned for Brussels in July 2018, promises to be an implementation summit with no significant new “deliverables.” This would be a missed opportunity of historic proportions. European and global security are nearing an inflection point, with the advent of new technologies that will transform the nature of warfare, the structure of international relations and the role of the Alliance itself. The 2018 Summit should be the occasion for NATO to set a course for the longer term, to define goals for the next phase in NATO’s adaptation, setting the stage for major decisions at NATO’s 70th anniversary Summit in 2019.

1.3 The 2018 Brussels Summit should commission a major strategic review that would report to the 2019 anniversary summit, and which may in time lead to a new NATO Strategic Concept. However, adaptation is not an event, but a determined Alliance focus, embedded in a continuing process, aimed at preparing NATO to better meet risks, challenges and threats over the short, medium and long term. The primary twenty-first century mission of the Alliance must be to act as a strategic forum for political solidarity, provide a credible deterrent, and promote a smart, affordable defence. This strategic aim must necessarily be built on a powerful, agile and innovative warfighting force able to move swiftly across and through all the domains of twenty-first century warfare – air, sea, land, space, cyber, information and knowledge.

1.4 Critical to the efficacy of the future Alliance will be the forging of a new relationship between the protection of people and the projection of power, influence and effect. Redundancy, the creation of several systems that prevent an adversary from attacking one system-critical node, and resiliency, grounded in the hardening of systems and structures, must thus be the twin foundations of NATO adaptation from the outset. Indeed, an adapted, reinforced and resilient posture is the only way that a “360° NATO” will be rendered credible, as both a deterrent and a defence, across a spectrum of conflict that stretches from the cold peace of today to a possible hot war tomorrow.

1.5 The challenge faced by NATO is daunting. The Alliance, and its supporting processes and educational systems, have failed to recognise the extent to which the human capacity to think, decide, act and recover in a future war – so intense it has been dubbed “hyper war” – is fast changing the character of conflict and war. Consequently, the Alliance is in danger of rapid relative decline if it fails to embrace and exploit to the full technological advances in the waging of war. Historically, the side that has generated an equilibrium between decision-making, on the one hand, and technology, on the other hand, is the side that prevails in conflict and war.

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1 “Warsaw Summit Communique: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016” (Brussels: NATO) All subsequent references to the Communique are from this cited source. Hereafter referred to for the purposes of this report as ‘Warsaw’.

2 There are several acronyms and terms used for ISIS. The report uses the most commonly employed ISIS or Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.
1.6 The adapted and enhanced deterrence and defence sought by the Alliance must necessarily go hand-in-hand with efforts to further enhance both effectiveness and efficiency (E2). Achieving E2 will be vital if the adapted NATO is to field and maintain a sufficiency of military capability and capacity to meet its treaty obligations and, when necessary, rapidly re-direct and reinforce capabilities from East to South to North and vice versa. Adaptation must also enhance NATO’s use of the political tools of partnership and diplomatic engagement. Adapted partnerships will assist like-minded states to enhance their own resilience and legitimate self-defence, and help the Alliance project stability beyond NATO’s borders. Critically, diplomatic engagement will help manage tensions with Russia and expand the network of countries willing to support NATO’s policies and operations. At the same time, the Alliance must help Ukraine, Georgia and other Eastern European neighbours to defend themselves and continue to promote the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans. The Open Door policy, and the possibility of future membership, must be upheld.

1.7 NATO’s adversaries already consider themselves at war with NATO and the values for which it stands. Russia, Al Qaeda and ISIS are already seeking to sow disinformation, spread propaganda, and engage in influence operations aimed at undermining NATO and, by extension, EU societies. Both Al Qaeda and ISIS, as Salafi Jihadi organisations, are intent on terrorising the populations of the Alliance. Adaptation to these myriad challenges will thus require leaders to think big about the future of NATO, its political strategy and its partnerships. It will also require the Allies to spend more on defence and better integrate both forces and resources if the Alliance is to be properly equipped and prepared for the coming challenges. At the very least, adaptation will demand an expansion of NATO’s political capacities and missions if the Alliance is to face the new and very unholy trinity of hybrid warfare, cyber warfare, and hyper warfare.

1.8 Momentum and adaptation are the twin aspects of the same strategic question. Therefore, adaptation must return to the first principles of collective Alliance security and defence. The essential contribution of the 2014 Wales and 2016 Warsaw summits was to drive forward a new deterrence and defence posture, and re-posit and re-position the role and purpose of NATO by setting military adaptation against the full spectrum of security challenges facing the transatlantic community, from the East, North and South. The core effort of adaptation must thus be the enhancement of the military capabilities and capacities of the member nations the Alliance serves, combined with the further reform and strengthening of Alliance decision-making, as well as its command and force structures.

1.9 Even though adaptation must necessarily be pursued along several lines of development, and there is a range of adaptation drivers, the global aim of adaptation must lead to the generation of a new One Alliance concept for NATO: One Alliance in which the security and defence of each member is again the security and defence of all. One Alliance is thus the consequence, and the outcome of an adapted NATO; an Alliance that demonstrably combines peace through legitimate strength, and strength through peace. However, such a goal is not at all clear to NATO’s citizens, which begs two questions: why adaptation, and what are the drivers?

2. ADAPTATION DRIVERS TO THE EAST AND NORTH

2.1 Moscow seeks to revise the post-Cold War settlement. To that end, Russia has established a strategic continuum between hybrid warfare, cyber warfare and hyper warfare to keep the Alliance and its members politically and militarily off-balance, and to achieve escalation dominance. Russia under President Vladimir Putin not only questions the established rules-based system in Europe, Russian strategy is actively designed to disrupt and destabilise it. Russia is actively seeking to establish a sphere of influence that extends into Ukraine, including the Baltic States and the Black Sea region within the territory of the Alliance, and extends through south-east Europe to Moldova and Georgia. Russia is also seeking to actively destabilise democracy in both Europe and North America through hybrid warfare, specifically the use of disinformation and influence operations of which cyber is a key enabler and force multiplier. Moscow’s strategy since 2010 is founded on the large-scale modernisation and expansion of its armed forces, both in Europe and beyond. This has enabled Russia to consider embarking on expeditionary warfare not seen since the 1970s.

2.2 Russia is re-militarising the High North, making it another contested theatre. There is no clearer example of the impact of climate change on strategy than the opening of the so-called North East Passage (also known as the Northern Sea Passage), which would shorten the sea route between Asia and Europe by 3000 nautical
miles. Enormous energy resources are also believed to lie at an accessible depth below the sea-bed of the Arctic Sea. The High North is fast becoming an arena for international competition, most notably between Russia and Norway, but also between NATO partners Sweden and Finland, and Russia. The long-term dispute over the status of the Norwegian island of Svalbard could rapidly become a flashpoint.

3. ADAPTATION DRIVERS TO THE SOUTH AND BEYOND

3.1 NATO’s Southern Flank highlights a fundamental dilemma: how can the Alliance establish both a credible high-end deterrence and defence posture and help sustain the strategic stabilisation efforts needed to secure the southern Allies? NATO faces major threats from, and increasing instability on, its Southern Flank and well beyond. These threats are driven by a toxic mix of demographic change, insecurity over access to life fundamentals, such as food and water, inter-state tensions, the confessional struggle within Islam, the interference of outside powers, the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian struggle, and the broad failure of governance in many Arab states. Since the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in 2011, there have been four civil wars, with Syria simply the worst example. The migration and refugee crisis is being fuelled by the chaos and, as a consequence of the lack of effective governance that has ensued, criminal gangs are now trafficking millions of irregular migrants towards Europe from war-torn countries beyond the region, as well as from the Horn of Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

3.2 Russian intervention in Syria and the wider Middle East has exacerbated these problems, while challenging US and Allied primacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Profound instability is also aiding and abetting Salafi Jihadists in the region, and enabling them to insert and re-insert terrorists into Europe, as well as recruiting them from still-unassimilated Muslim populations across Europe. This is a threat that is likely to increase with the October 2017 fall of Raqqa, the self-styled capital of ISIS. It is a phenomenon that will likely continue due to the ongoing ‘Cold War’ between Iran and its Shi’a extremist allies, and the Saudi-led Sunni community, and which will likely be accelerated by the physical defeat of ISIS. Moscow’s alignment with mainly Shi’a regimes and groupings, while the US deepens its cooperation with the Sunni states and Israel, is likely to extend civil and political strife across the region. The possible collapse of governance in the African Maghreb, and the increasingly fragile nature of Egypt, are likely to reveal a potential major new source of heretofore unanticipated and untapped migration into Southern Europe, exacerbated by external interference in Libya.

4. INTERNAL DRIVERS OF ADAPTATION

4.1 NATO and the EU are simultaneously under attack and face threats along multiple fronts that are eroding public trust and confidence in both institutions. Populism and the rise of extremist parties, together with the failure of mainstream political parties to address the concerns of millions of citizens, exacerbate this loss of confidence.

4.2 The 2015–2017 terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain have revealed the extent of the growing terrorist threat in Europe. There can now be no question, given those responsible for some of the attacks that mass irregular migration into Europe is beginning to de-stabilise Europe, increase the risk of terrorism faced by European citizens, and cause friction between Europe’s increasingly diverse communities. Some of the attackers have come from long-established, but poorly-integrated or assimilated Muslim communities within Europe, and what appears to be increasingly radicalized youth elements in such populations. There is also a growing danger across the Euro-Atlantic community of reactionary, nativist movements morphing into terrorist networks that in turn could be manipulated by external powers. Terror networks of all persuasions also enjoy a growing symbiotic relationship with criminal networks. For the right price, the latter seem more than willing to enable and assist the former.

4.3 Neither NATO nor the EU possesses all the tools needed to respond to the range of current threats. A combination of burgeoning and increasingly sophisticated terror networks, spreading criminality and Russian destabilisation demands that both NATO and EU, as well as their constituent nations, begin to think differently and more comprehensively about security and defence and the relationship between the two. New approaches and new relationships will be required between intelligence, law enforcement, the security services, armed
forces, ministerial relationships across government, and relationships between governments if the Alliance is to both protect people and project influence and power.

5. ORGANISATIONAL & TECHNOLOGICAL DRIVERS OF ADAPTATION

5.1 If NATO’s twenty-nine nations are to buy the right capabilities, which means in turn acquiring the right equipment, the right process must be established to facilitate such an outcome. NATO is slowly realising the Defence Investment Pledge, with more countries joining the 2% Club and total non-US defence spending increasing by 4.3% during 2017. However, if increased funds are to be matched by their efficient and effective application, the Alliance will require a coherent requirements-based capability strategy. This must necessarily lead to Alliance members buying what they need, and not what they want. Such a strategy will doubtless be very challenging politically as the consequent spending plan will lock NATO into certain capabilities, potentially for decades. Such a strategy will also mean a different way of thinking about the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and the respective (and necessarily increasingly harmonised) NATO and EU requirements development processes. It will also likely require the wholesale reform of the European Defence and Technological Development Base (EDTDB).

5.2 Advances underway in security and defence-related technologies that span the conflict spectrum from hybrid war at the lower end, to hyper war at the future high end, will be rapid and dramatic. Hybrid war will continue to drive requirements for enhanced intelligence collection, cyber-security and critical infrastructure protection. Given the reliance of Alliance societies on web-vulnerable infrastructures, the effects of a cyber-attack could lead to significant if not catastrophic physical damage. The possibility of such an attack could be used by adversaries to prevent NATO coming to the defence of its member nations. The societal damage could also be profound because hybrid warfare involves an imperceptibility of conflict and promotes ambiguity and confusion about the scale and nature of the threat, as well as the necessary responses. This confusion could easily paralyse decision-making and dislocate increasingly diverse societies, the cohesion and resilience of which can no longer be taken for granted.

5.3 Hyper war, at the other end of the conflict spectrum, will place unique requirements on defence architectures and the high-tech industrial base if the Alliance is to preserve an adequate deterrence and defence posture, let alone maintain a comparative advantage over peer competitors. Artificial Intelligence, deep learning, machine learning, computer vision, neuro-linguistic programming, virtual reality and augmented reality are all part of the future battlespace. They are all underpinned by potential advances in quantum computing that will create a conflict environment in which the decision-action loop will compress dramatically from days and hours to minutes and seconds...or even less. This development will perhaps witness the most revolutionary changes in conflict since the advent of atomic weaponry and in military technology since the 1906 launch of HMS Dreadnought. The United States is moving sharply in this direction in order to compete with similar investments being made by Russia and China, which has itself committed to a spending plan on artificial intelligence that far outstrips all the other players in this arena, including the United States. However, with the Canadian and European Allies lagging someway behind, there is now the potential for yet another dangerous technological gap within the Alliance to open up, in turn undermining NATO’s political cohesion and military interoperability.

Against this backdrop, the Allies must:

6. CONFRONT NEW TRANSATLANTIC CHALLENGES:

6.1 Embrace new geostrategic and transatlantic realities: The post-Cold War strategic pause is over. NATO will be tested by peer competitors, global-reach terrorists and criminals, and, of course, the unknown. A major war can no longer be ruled out given the structural insecurities across much of the twenty-first century world. The 2017 nuclear crisis with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is proof of that. The Alliance today faces new peer and subversive competitors employing a range of strategies and capabilities that pose a threat to the nations and peoples of the Alliance. Equally, whilst the US security guarantee persists, pressures on the United States and its forces world-wide demand that the Allies do far more for their own security and
defence, and do far more through the Alliance if the strategic and political cohesion upon which NATO is founded is to be preserved.

### 6.2 Re-balance burden-sharing:

The United States provides 75% of Alliance forces and pays some 68% of the cost. The non-US Allies should propose a more ambitious political and military agenda for NATO, and commit the financial resources to make it effective. Allies should not only fulfil but go beyond the 2014 Wales Defence Investment Pledge of spending 2% GDP on defence with 20% per annum invested in new equipment by 2024. Collectively, the 28 non-US Allies must commit to shouldering in time at least 50% of the burden. The roughly 70:30 defence spending ratio between the United States and the rest of the Alliance is simply unacceptable and politically unsustainable.

### 6.3 Embrace the new “transactional” environment:

A new spirit of transactional burden-sharing in Washington will require the Allies to make some politically difficult decisions, including further increases in defence spending and extended deployments of forces on tough missions. The Allies must always remember that whilst a transactional mind-set is a reality in Washington, the Alliance is a transformational entity at its heart, grounded in shared values and interests, and is far more than a mere sum of its components.

### 6.4 Spend the Defence Investment Pledge (DIP) wisely:

NATO defence planning needs to generate far more traction in national capitals. If the DIP is not honoured, the damage to Alliance solidarity will be profound. Equally damaging will be a failure to spend the new money on the forces and the structures the Alliance most urgently needs to maintain an affordable and credible defence and deterrence posture. This means adhering much more rigorously to the recommendations and commitments made under the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) in order to eliminate priority shortfalls and reduce today’s disproportionate reliance on the United States for most high-end capabilities.

### 6.5 Strengthen NATO’s role in counter-terrorism:

With the October 2017 fall of Raqqa, the self-styled capital of ISIS, the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic Area will increase. NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines, with their focus on awareness, capabilities and engagement, are important. NATO’s support for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS is also vital. However, NATO could also contribute more to efforts aimed at preventing terrorist attacks within the territory of its members. While this is primarily a national and EU responsibility, with law enforcement and interior ministries in the lead, NATO’s newly upgraded Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JIS), with its secure communications links to Allied capitals, could become a clearing-house for exchanging classified terrorist threat information among allied internal security agencies on a real-time basis. The EU lacks the secure networks to exchange classified intelligence information in real time, so NATO would be filling a real gap while helping to make its people safer. Adaptation should help generate shared common NATO-EU strategic objectives across the counter-terrorism domain, whilst the European Defence Fund established in June 2017 could help to drive forward joint capability projects.

### 7. STRENGTHEN THE DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE POSTURE

#### 7.1 Make readiness and responsiveness of NATO conventional forces the over-arching priority of military adaptation:

All aspects of NATO’s non-nuclear conventional forces must be radically improved, including better integration of cyber and new technologies. Indeed, the strengthening of Alliance conventional forces is the sine qua non of adaptation. Work is underway to strengthen such forces and significant progress has been made in areas such Special Operations Forces (SOF) and specialised forces. However, adaptation needs to re-inject momentum across the NATO Force Structure, with particular emphasis on enhanced readiness and responsiveness.

#### 7.2 Better integrate Alliance forces on the Eastern Flank:

Enhanced Forward Presence is providing active deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank. However, significant further effort is needed to properly enmesh NATO’s forward deployed battalions in the Baltic States with local forces, such as the Latvian Home Guard and Estonian Defence League, and further enhance survivability. Such cohesion will be vital for border security, deployed force protection, and defence against hybrid attacks. New rules of engagement and a more robust and responsive command chain up to SACEUR are also being established, so that the forward-deployed battalions have the
authority to react quickly to aggression without waiting for a new political decision in Brussels. Such command integration will also be vital to ensure that graduated response planning properly combines both civil and military efforts. At the troop level, NATO must continue to promote improved equipment interoperability.

7.3 Embrace both agility and resiliency: NATO’s Adapted Force will need to emphasise both agility and resiliency. Even with the enhanced Forward Presence battalions, credible deterrence and defence will still be reliant on the capacity for rapid reinforcement. NATO will not generate much needed sufficient, heavier, and more agile forces until 2021 at the earliest. More Special Operations Forces will be needed, supported by the Very High Readiness Joint (VJTF) Force on a very short Notice to Move (NTM). At present the more unified Russian forces could probably get inside the Alliance’s OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop. The enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF) must become similarly more actionable and more deployable, reinforced by exercising and training that makes NATO’s Notice to Move credible. And, whilst the REFORGER concept of the 1980s cannot be re-created (at least not formally), adaptation must see the bulk of NATO’s heavier formations being better able to move, fight and stay in theatre, including the capacity to bring sizeable follow-on forces rapidly from across the Atlantic.

7.4 Modernise NATO’s nuclear posture and strategy: Whilst moving towards a new nuclear strategy and posture is politically challenging, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group must seek to make advances where possible. Russia’s revisionist policies since 2008 have already prompted a fundamental reassessment of Russian nuclear strategy and how this affects NATO’s nuclear posture. NATO’s decision-making processes are being streamlined; the readiness and survivability of the Alliance’s dual-capable aircraft (DCA) has been enhanced, the now-arriving 5th Generation fighter, the F-35 Lightning, is being incorporated into Alliance forces; theatre nuclear weapons are being modernised, declaratory policy sharpened, and conventional and nuclear exercises strengthened. A more comprehensive and robust approach to exercising is needed to include further integration of conventional and nuclear scenarios.

7.5 Build strategic redundancy into the Alliance deterrence concept: A key component of credible deterrence is to build redundancy into strategic plans and preparations. Strategic redundancy is generally associated with maintaining an excess of capacity, but it also involves technological innovations and developments that would render impossible the likelihood of the Alliance suffering a knock-out blow. National strategy must look beyond the short term, to anticipate plausible strategic futures, and to ensure that the long-range capability plan is not geared too tightly to a relatively short-term risk picture.

8. ESTABLISH A HIGH LEVEL OF NATO MILITARY AMBITION

8.1 Strengthen agility with a warfighting mind-set: The Alliance must take immediate steps to render itself more agile in the face of threats. However, only with a return to a warfighting mind-set would the necessary political impetus be generated to make such reforms. NATO’s early-warning system has been improved since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, including the establishment of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division, but more needs to be done to make the Alliance more ‘intelligent’ and sensitive to hostile acts. NATO’s crisis management mechanisms are still far too complicated, not least the Crisis Response System Manual which must be streamlined, and as a matter of urgency. Allies should consider artificial intelligence in creating big data solutions to assist in streamlining NATO decision-making.

8.2 Fully implement NATO’s adapted command structure: The existing NATO Command Structure was redesigned in 2010 and 2011 to reflect the diminution in the Russian threat and the shift from collective defence to expeditionary operations. While the current structure has proven its flexibility, adjustments will continue to be needed to equip the Alliance with a command structure that is able to “fight tonight” – to command and control Allied forces in a full-scale conflict, whilst still being able to meet NATO’s current level of ambition (2 Major Joint Operations plus 6 Small Joint Operations). The command structure needs to be able to handle operations across all the domains of contemporary warfare, including cyber warfare, information operations, hybrid threats, and hyper war and ensure the heightened situational awareness needed for the Alliance to respond quickly enough to short-warning and ambiguous hybrid attacks. In addition, the structure must be truly 360° — able
to fight terrorism and manage crises beyond NATO’s borders, with enough extra capacity to manage military contributions to the training of partner forces, capacity-building and other measures for projecting stability.

**8.3 Promote integrated deterrence and undertake more systematic contingency planning:** In pursuit of more integrated deterrence the Alliance needs to be far more rigorous, robust and responsive in its planning for a wide range of contingencies across the conflict spectrum. Such planning would reinforce NATO’s agility in the face of a host of threats. Specific steps should include regular intelligence briefings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the most urgent scenarios, deeper NATO discussions on policy, improved simulations and exercises, closer involvement of NATO capitals, and the delegation of further authorities to NATO’s military chain of command in a crisis. Regular crisis management exercises (CMX) have highlighted the need for an early delegation of authority, especially in the case of short-warning and ambiguous hybrid attacks, so that NATO is not confronted with a fait accompli because of delayed decision-making in Brussels.

**8.4 Build a secure networked NATO:** A more robust secure network for NATO must be created. As ever more and diverse numbers and types of partners become critical to Alliance mission success, networking will need to be enhanced and expanded to enable the secure broadcast of mission critical data and resilience against cyber-attacks. Critical national military and civilian systems need to be better integrated into NATO command structures.

**8.5 Better exploit lessons identified and collective memory:** Too often lessons identified do not become lessons learned, and are consequently lost. There needs to be a more effective framework for the systematic application of such lessons into Alliance mission command practice. Smart defence projects should be established to promote not just the exploitation of lessons, but also the collective memory of the Alliance. That goal would demand that the remit of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the Joint Assessment and Lessons-Learned Centre (JALLC) be expanded. Such initiatives will be particularly important if the Alliance is to re-generate significant forces as it relearns some lessons from the past. The old REFORGER exercises of the 1980s, and past best practice over controlling sea lines of communication, still offer relevant experience on how to generate, organise, command and support such a force.

**8.6 Train as NATO plans to fight:** If all Alliance forces are to be transformed into a warfighting force, they will need to be re-equipped both physically and intellectually. Exercising and training are not only a pre-condition for sending credible deterrence messages to any imaginable opponent, they are also a pre-condition for effective adaptation. NATO has already made significant progress under the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), and through implementation of both the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and Enhanced Forward Presence. The enhanced NATO Response Force will need to be better able to operate to effect with heavier follow-on units, or with other elements of the NATO force structure. The goal is for the Alliance to swiftly generate compatible and interoperable forces capable of achieving an appropriate level of readiness rapidly, and thus be able to rotate throughout the course of an Article 5 contingency.

**8.7 Transform doctrines and standard operating procedures (SOPs):** Crises could take place simultaneously and come in several forms. NATO must be ready to act across the full spectrum of military missions, demanding the full spectrum of military capabilities and capacities, ranging from warfighting to crisis management operations to counter-insurgency campaigns, including the requirement to conduct counter-terrorism operations. In an emergency, NATO must be ready and able to engage in enduring high-end combat if needs be as part of territorial defence. Doctrine and SOPs must be adapted for just such contingencies.

**8.8 Develop a Flexible Response 2.0 as a new comprehensive approach:** Adopted by the Alliance in 1967, Flexible Response called for mutual deterrence at the strategic, tactical and conventional levels. The threats to the Alliance in recent years have become increasingly diverse, many of which are less easily addressed by military means. NATO needs political, military and civilian tools that can be applied across the conflict spectrum as part of a reenergised comprehensive approach. The non-US Allies should come forward with a more ambitious political and military reform agenda for NATO and commit the financial resources to make it effective.

**8.9 Transform European allies’ military forces to become the backbone of Allied out-of-area operations:** Given the centrality of the United States to collective defence and deterrence, it is only fair that Canada and the European Allies takes a larger role in non-Article 5 missions. Over the coming years NATO must become
the primary instrument in changing the role of the bulk of non-US armed forces so that they can operate across the conflict spectrum. This will require Alliance forces that have sufficient mass to act as both stabilisation and reconstruction forces outside of Europe, but with sufficient networked, manoeuvre forces able to fight brigade or division-size battles in defence of NATO territory.

8.10 Establish a broader concept of NATO defence: NATO will have an important role to play in consequence management in event of natural or man-made disasters. One future threat could involve the use of biological weapons, or managing the consequences of a pandemic, such as Ebola or something worse. Capabilities are needed within both NATO and the EU that would enable an efficient military role in support of public health authorities to quarantine affected areas and to maintain public order in support of civil authorities. This may have to be an expeditionary or deployable capability.

8.11 Enhance NATO’s role in the defence of the global commons: The global commons – air, sea, outer space and cyber space – are vital to the defence of the Alliance. NATO needs to enhance its role in defence of the global commons, particularly in the maritime/amphibious domain. Such a role would help keep the United States strong where it needs to be strong, and would thus be a critical element in burden-sharing. There could be occasions when the Alliance might need to take the lead in and around its own waters, including the Littoral well beyond NATO territory.

8.12 NATO must become a hub for extended coalitions: One of NATO’s many unique selling points is the knowledge gained over almost seventy years of force generation and command of complex coalitions. Some of NATO’s strategic partnerships build on the co-operation that took place during the Afghanistan campaign with a range of like-minded states the world over. In Europe these states include, inter alia, Finland and Sweden. Beyond Europe these states include Middle Eastern partners Jordan and the UAE, and in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Given the globalised nature and impact of crises, the need for the Alliance to work together with such partners will only grow.

8.13 Improve intelligence and information-sharing to establish a shared threat assessment: Understanding when an attack is an attack will remain the sine qua non of the Alliance defence and deterrence posture. The speed of conflict and crises is accelerating, which in turn imposes on the Alliance what might be termed the speed of relevance. The protection of the Alliance home base against terrorism, disinformation, destabilisation, and the disruption of critical infrastructures must become better integrated via adapted intelligence and information-sharing. Adaptation rests upon there being a largely-shared view among the Allies about the new security environment and a perception of the shared threat it generates. NATO should leverage the Joint Intelligence and Security Division to achieve such a shared threat assessment, and also consider newly-available artificial intelligence-powered capacities to conduct big data-scaling to quickly distil petabytes of open source information into key indicators of potential threat activity.

8.14 Conduct active horizon-scanning and campaign design-testing: NATO should take the lead in a campaign of active horizon-scanning and campaign design and testing, to strengthen strategic foresight analysis to better prepare Alliance forces to meet the full spectrum of contingencies. If the Allies fail to help arrest a free-fall in the competence of governance across significant parts of the developing world, Europe will face elevated levels of immigration and with it the fostering of terrorist networks. Such networks could in time threaten the stability and security of Europe itself, especially if allied with increasingly capable and virulent criminal networks.

9. ENGAGE WITH RUSSIA WHILE SUPPORTING THE SECURITY OF ITS NEIGHBOURS

9.1 Engage Russia on the basis of principle: Precisely because of Russia’s frontal assault on the international rules-based system, a new political strategy is needed to manage what will remain a competitive relationship. This strategy should enable NATO to better engage with Russia via dialogue and diplomacy, even as the Alliance bolsters its deterrence and defence against the multiple threats Moscow poses. At a minimum, engagement should seek to reduce the risks of accidental conflict and restore stability and predictability of military activities. But engagement should also address head-on the fundamental reason why relations have deteriorated in the
first place – Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and its violation of the rules that have kept the peace in Europe since the end of World War II. Moscow must understand that the road to any substantial improvement in Allies’ relations with Russia, and any easing of sanctions, is contingent upon renewed Russian respect for those rules, starting with an end to its aggression in Eastern Ukraine.

9.2 Establish a new dual-track approach to defence and arms control: If NATO’s conventional and nuclear deterrent posture is to be adapted to re-establish a coherent defence and deterrence posture, the Alliance must adopt a dual-track approach to Russia. Dual-track would see Alliance conventional forces significantly strengthened and its nuclear forces modernised, whilst seeking new arms control talks with Moscow. The aims of these talks would include: re-establishing Russian compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; reducing the imbalance in non-strategic nuclear forces in Europe; enhancing transparency and predictability of conventional forces; and reducing destabilising concentrations of forces along NATO’s and Russia’s common borders.

9.3 Support Russia’s neighbours in solidarity: It is vital NATO continues to support Euro-Atlantic integration for the Western Balkans, and keep the door open for other future members over the longer term, if allies’ vision is to be realised of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Helping Ukraine, Georgia and other Eastern European neighbours to defend themselves, and/or resist Russian interference in all its forms, is the best way for the Alliance to discourage further aggression by Russia. The restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea is a long-term challenge, much like the illegal annexation of the Baltic States from 1939 to 1989. But Allies should insist that Russia end its undeclared war in Eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region and restore Ukrainian sovereignty over the occupied territories in accordance with the Minsk agreements as the prerequisite to improved relations.

10. PROMOTE A BROAD NATO SECURITY AGENDA

10.1 Create new consultative councils for strategic partners: As the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons attests, the security and defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area cannot be distinguished from the wider world in which the Alliance exists. NATO has already forged partnerships in the Middle East and North Africa through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and with four Gulf states through the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (ICI). Whilst these partnerships continue to face challenges, it is time the Alliance looked more systematically towards developing partnerships in South and East Asia by establishing several consultative councils with China, India, Japan, Korea and others, that build on the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, and are similar in scope to those established with Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s.

10.2 Increase NATO’s engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA): Allies need to decide whether NATO will remain a marginal player in MENA or assume a more pro-active role to counter instability, weak governance and violent extremism along NATO’s periphery. Too often, NATO talks big, but acts small in its southern neighbourhood. This is because of a lack of consensus on the attractiveness of NATO in the region, and an unwillingness to devote significant resources to partnership activities. If NATO wants to prevent the spread of instability, terrorism and illegal migration from across the Mediterranean, it should construct a coalition of allies and partners for intervention in the region, and contribute more to the Counter-ISIS Coalition and other counter-terrorism efforts in the region. One option would be to reinforce NATO’s new Hub for the South in Naples, and develop it into a major operational headquarters.

10.3 Expand NATO-led defence capacity-building in the South: Allies should propose a major expansion of NATO defence and security capacity-building programmes across the Middle East and North Africa to address the root causes of instability and extremism. Allied efforts now represent a fraction of what the United States (and some other Allies) commit bilaterally. If the Alliance is to project stability to its south NATO must also work more closely with regional security institutions such as the African Union and the Arab League where collaborative relationships might be possible and which would further legitimise the activities of the Alliance.
11. CRAFT A SMARTER NATO

11.1 Free ACT to challenge convention: NATO faces a crisis of ends, ways and means. Big thinking and new thinking will be needed to ease that crisis. ACT is to some extent the forgotten command. And yet the work it is doing is vital to creating the thinking Alliance that is central to adaptation. The NAC should seize every opportunity to enable ACT to think big about NATO’s adapted future. ACT must be given the best and the brightest from across the Alliance to drive forward the adaptation-innovation agenda. For example, knowledge interoperability will be a vital component of NATO’s reinvigoration, reinforced by a command chain trained and educated to succeed at every level. ACT’s mission should include seeking to better integrate new and existing technologies, as well as force integration and transformation.

11.2 Reduce or remove impediments to seamless NATO intelligence-sharing: Much more needs to be done to generate and share the actionable intelligence upon which a more agile NATO will rely. The establishment of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division, as well as NATO’s acquisition of five Alliance Ground Surveillance drones, are vital first steps on the road to creating a more intelligence-driven Alliance. However, there are too many legal and political impediments in many Allied nations to timely intelligence sharing with other allies and close operational partners like Sweden and Finland. This is a substantial, persistent, and easily exploitable vulnerability. Such impediments, as well as stove-piping between civilian and military services within some Allied nations, prevent law-enforcement and national intelligence agencies from gaining routine access to time-urgent intelligence information, and limit what is provided to NATO.

11.3 Promote a NATO standard for shared assessment, harmonised requirements and common specifications: Too often defence planners mask what is in effect national defence protectionism under the banner of nationally-specific requirements. This protectionism in turn inevitably leads to specific national (and costly) ‘solutions’, as well as the proliferation of different, over-priced, low-production runs, and often incompatible platforms and systems. NATO should seek to establish more uniform standards for equipment specification and requirements that encourage common platforms and fully interoperable systems.

11.4 Turn NATO’s Centres of Excellence into a Network of Excellence: The Alliance needs to be far more systematic in turning Centres of Excellence into a mutually reinforcing Network of Excellence that is better functionally streamlined, and more fully-integrated into the NATO Command Structure. There are 24 NATO- accredited Centres of Excellence (COE) covering topics that range from command and control to crisis response and disaster management, from cold weather operations to co-operative cyber defence, and from joint air operations to strategic communications. The centres support a range of activities including; doctrine development, identifying and learning lessons, improving interoperability and capabilities, and testing and validating new concepts through experimentation. Whilst there is a NATO policy on accrediting centres of excellence, most of them are stand-alone initiatives totally dependent on voluntary national contributions of personnel and not subject to tasking by NATO political or military authorities.

11.5 Establish New Centres of Excellence: A bespoke Hyper War Centre of Excellence would help generate a coherent approach to future war, and combine the work on Artificial Intelligence and expanded NATO cyber defence. NATO urgently needs a coherent approach to the development and application of artificial intelligence (AI) and its family of capabilities to defence and deterrence. Such a Centre would necessarily need to train and educate NATO’s civilian and military leadership, and include staff courses for NATO international personnel and member nation civilians. Such a centre would also afford the Alliance opportunities for industry-partnership in this area of revolutionary technologies.

11.6 Leverage the NATO Defence College in establishing best practices and sharpening defence education, training and evaluation: A beefed-up and re-considered NATO Defence College could provide the foundations for a defence education and training centre of excellence. The need to maintain comparative advantage places a particular emphasis on the quality of NATO personnel and the development of a mind-set that challenges officers to succeed at every level of mission command. This aim is of particular importance to the work of Allied Command Transformation and the development of best practice models on NATO Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE) that can be offered across the Alliance. The Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), together with efforts to enhance e-learning, are all part of adapting and equipping the Alliance for the future.
12. FOSTER A GENUINE STRATEGIC NATO-EU PARTNERSHIP

12.1 Create an ambitious and comprehensive NATO-EU Strategic Partnership: The purpose of the EU-NATO strategic partnership is to apply big means to big challenges. To that end, the partnership itself must be able to engage across the conflict spectrum. The EU will become an increasingly important foreign and security actor and partner of NATO, with the NATO-EU strategic partnership increasingly important for the management of transatlantic relations. For many Europeans the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will be a, if not the vehicle for defence policy. The European Defence Agency will also be the mechanism of choice for the development of military capabilities for many Europeans. Effective deterrence also demands a clear continuum of escalation between economic sanctions, much of which in Europe would fall to the EU, US and Canada, and the military options the Alliance could bring to bear in extremis. Therefore, NATO and the EU must overcome current barriers to foster a more substantial and mutually beneficial partnership and reinforce practical cooperation. A NATO-EU summit at heads of state and government level should be held at least once a year.

12.2 NATO and the EU must together foster enhanced resiliency: A strong home front is essential for credible deterrence to deny adversaries the capacity to block an effective response in a crisis, and thus to limit the political choice of allies. In turn it is vital that the nations harden their respective critical infrastructures. By working together to deter and defend against the full array of hybrid threats, NATO and the EU would achieve enhanced resiliency far more quickly than if the two institutions work separately and in isolation from each other. It is essential that NATO and the EU complete work on a joint hybrid “playbook,” and conduct joint NATO-EU exercises using realistic scenarios of potential Russian hybrid aggression not just against the more vulnerable Baltic States, but against any NATO and EU member. Russia’s interference in the 2016 US election shows that all of our countries are vulnerable.

12.3 NATO and the EU together must promote best counter-terrorism practices: With the fall of Raqqa, the flow of ISIS jihadists into Europe now poses a clear and present danger to European societies. Beyond integrating watch-lists and intelligence on known suspects and networks Allies and EU member-states together need to become better at sharing best internal/domestic practices with each other. NATO and the EU could act as honest brokers to enable such sharing. These best practices need to be at the heart of any enhanced NATO-EU Strategic Partnership.

12.4 Focus the NATO-EU partnership on better affording adaptation and better promoting effectiveness: If adaptation is to be generated via increased European defence spending, it is likely the EU’s European Stability and Growth Pact, as well as EU fiscal and budgetary practices, will also need to be adapted. A deeper, more comprehensive NATO-EU strategic partnership – especially in areas like countering disinformation and propaganda, internal security, and defence capacity-building in Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods, where the two organisations’ mandates overlap – would help to justify such change.

12.5 NATO and the EU must explore together new ways to collaborate in support of industry, technology-integration and innovation: The active participation of defence industry partners – old and new – will be critical if the Allies are to generate more bang for their respective bucks/euros/pounds/kroner. There are a range of impediments to sound investment, particularly in Europe, including: over-protected national industrial champions; an inability to agree on transnational specifications that prevent effective collaboration; the conflation of industrial policy with defence policy; the hanging of too many systems on too few platforms, which leads to small production runs that, in turn, drive up unit costs; defence cost inflation often driven by rent-seeking defence-industrial primary contractors who use the taxpayer as a subsidy generator; and too many ‘flagship’ political defence projects that de-stabilise defence budgets by preventing the purchase of cheaper alternatives, including off-the-shelf. The new European Defence Fund, which will provide seed money for multinational R&D projects that could help remedy NATO’s critical capability shortfalls, should also aim to eliminate these longstanding barriers.

12.6 NATO and the EU should jointly improve infrastructure critical to operations and expedite the transit of forces: National infrastructures in the Baltic States and elsewhere must be upgraded to ensure effective operations can be mounted and maintained. Transit arrangements are already in place for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF) to cross national borders. However, some legislative restrictions still exist in many countries that could add weeks or even months to
the onward movement of essential reinforcements. There have been several incidents when local authorities seemed neither to understand, nor accept, the transit rights of Alliance forces. If unresolved such frictions could compromise the ability of the Alliance to deploy forces during a crisis and undermine deterrence along the Alliance’s eastern flank. A “military Schengen Zone” could offer a comprehensive solution to cross-border movements, and could be greatly facilitated by a collective decision by the EU to create such a zone.

13. BETTER EQUIP AND AFFORD NATO

13.1 Shorten fielding timelines and give commanders a greater say in requirements development: Military commanders and end-users need a far greater say in requirement development, and much greater effort needs to be made to enable operational commands to drive operational requirements. Under the current system of procurement there are too many decisions that need to be made at too many levels, with consensus needed at too many milestones on the road to delivery. On average, it takes 16 years from conception of military capability to operational effect. This is far too long and calls into question the ‘speed of relevance’ of assets. In the current and future security environment, such lag times are security vulnerabilities and thus unacceptable. The Defence Investment Division (DI) and NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) have a critical role to play in accelerating procurement processes and should be given the resources and manpower to do the job.

13.2 Embrace greater use of common funding: Given the sheer scale and diverse nature of risks, challenges and threats faced by the Alliance a system that emphasises ‘costs lie where they fall’ is not the best way to make best use of existing resources. Adaptation should look at areas where expanded common funding may be applied, including a possible mechanism for the common funding of campaigns and operations to promote fairness and demonstrable burden-sharing.

13.3 Conduct an Alliance-wide platform and systems audit: NATO should undertake an Alliance-wide systems audit of existing platforms and systems, covering campaign critical military and civilian assets. NATO Standards exist across four domains: operational, procedural, material, and administrative, with the aim of facilitating standardisation in support of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). The aim would be to establish where force synergies can be better fostered, to properly establish shortfalls, and better understand how existing assets might be employed.

14. PREPARE NOW FOR A FUTURE NATO

14.1 As part of a broader strategy review, expand NATO’s hybrid warfare, cyber war, counter-terrorism and hyper war strategies into a future war strategy: The Alliance must better understand the continuum, and indeed the interaction, between all forms of war in the contemporary age. Allies should support a bigger NATO role in enabling the nations to prevent efforts to undermine political institutions, such as through the use of fake news and interference in elections. The new Joint Centre to Combat Hybrid Warfare in Helsinki is not only an important step on the road to the more effective countering of hybrid threats; it should also mark a new, more operational phase in the NATO-EU strategic partnership. This should include a combined NATO-EU strategy to prevent efforts to undermine political institutions in member nations, in countering radicalisation and violent extremism within Alliance populations, and in defending against highly-sophisticated influence operations, disinformation and so-called “active measures” by Russia, such as the recent hacking attacks and influence operations aimed at influencing the 2016 US presidential elections.

14.2 Embrace and leverage the impact of new technologies on the security space and battlespace: NATO should consider creating an agency similar in mission to that of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). If the Alliance is to properly embrace innovation it must as a matter of urgency consider the role of ground-breaking developments in technology, such as artificial intelligence (AI), deep learning, the military application of nano-technologies, as well as the developing and changing threat posed by chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and missile and other kinetic delivery systems and weapons. Hyper warfare is the idea that future war could take place at such a high level of strategy, technology and destruction that its effects
would be worse than the Second World War between 1939 and 1945. Humans must remain at the centre of
decision-making and to ensure that virtual barriers must be built into AI. However, ‘intelligent machines’ will play
an ever more important role in the conduct of warfare. One role for a NATO DARPA would be to educate leaders
and the wider defence community about the role future technologies will play in command, with particular
reference to AI. In the longer term, it could be the catalyst for new R&D and systems acquisition projects funded
collectively by the Alliance or by groups of Allies.

14.3 Innovate and integrate as an Alliance: The need to recapitalise and re-equip European forces through
adaptation is vital. Adaptation also affords the Alliance an opportunity to properly consider how best to innovate
in transforming structures and practices, how best to integrate new technologies with existing systems and
platforms, and what balance to strike between efficiency and effectiveness, and between collective assets and
common assets. Looking to the private commercial sector may well offer innovative lessons for the Alliance and
opportunities for enhanced collaboration with industry, such as the use by big business of big data for rapid and
deep market analysis.

14.4 Routinise the use of sustained red teaming: New thinking is an ally of adaptation. Robust ‘red-teaming’ will
be needed if adaptation is to maintain momentum. At times such thinking will need to be ‘disruptive’, particularly
in the way it challenges strategy, technology and procurement assumptions, not least to better integrate military
and civil defence. Non-military national assets will be as vital to the continuum between protection of the home
base and societies (critical national infrastructure protection, civil defence and consequence management) and
power projection. Advances in simulator capabilities can offer substantial improvements to the methodology of
red-teaming. The use of red-teams on exercises will also be vital, together with the better exploitation of new
simulation and deep learning technologies.

14.5 Implement a Future Requirements Framework: Adaptation should lead to an enhanced and sustained
exchange between defence planners, the technology/industrial community, and the broader security policy
community. A Future Requirements Framework is needed that would in time help harmonise defence equipment
choices by both Allies and Partners, and inform and reinforce the NDPP.

14.6 Smart up, don’t dumb down: Adaptation must promote better interoperability. One idea could be to
increase from 20% to 25% the annual defence expenditures committed to defence procurement, and increase
the proportion committed to research and technology within it. If the gap between the technologies available to
individual NATO forces grows too wide, then interoperability will be sacrificed to far more risky and less efficient
cooperaibility. With the United States committed to creating a modernised hi-tech, global reach joint force,
together with a $54bn planned hike in defence spending, the danger of a two-tiered and non-interoperable
Alliance is more real than ever.

14.7 Balance offensive and defensive cyber capabilities: If cyber is to be made properly into a distinct
operational domain, consideration should be given to the creation of a NATO cyber component within the NATO
Command Structure. A new balance will need to be struck by the Alliance between offensive and defensive
cyber capabilities as part of a package of so-called ‘cyber-effect instruments’. Both Alliance forces and the
societies they protect are at present dangerously vulnerable to cyber-attack. Much more needs to be done to
make forces, societies and systems more resistant and resilient to such attacks. This will raise significant legal
questions for some Allies, as the information war extends the cyber battlefield into the ‘front offices’ of Alliance
governments.

15. ONE ALLIANCE

“Adaptation: process by which an organism or species becomes adjusted to its environment”

15.1 If the above recommendations are adopted, they would take NATO adaptation to a new level and reinforce
the deterrence and defence posture of the Alliance. Building on the short-term changes dictated by the earth-

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shaking events of 2014, these recommendations would also equip NATO for the even more formidable changes on the horizon, including hyper war, and thus offer a worthy basis for decisions at the NATO Summit in 2018 and at NATO’s 70th anniversary Summit in 2019.

THE GLOBSEC NATO ADAPTATION INITIATIVE STEERING COMMITTEE
November 2017
NATO IN A CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT:

The Questions NATO Adaptation Must Address

STEERING COMMITTEE SCOPING PAPER
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NATO IN A CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT:
THE QUESTIONS NATO ADAPTATION MUST ADDRESS

14 November, 2016

The Steering Committee:
General (Retd.) John R. Allen, Professor Dr Julian Lindley-French, Admiral (Retd.) Giampaolo Di Paola, General (Retd.) Wolf Langheld, Ambassador Tomáš Valášek

HEADLINE:

Britain’s decision to leave the EU and Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States raise fundamental questions about the future strength, cohesion and very credibility of NATO. Fifty years on from the Harmel Report the Alliance must again consider its place and role in a rapidly changing world. Both the internal political environment and the external strategic environment of the Alliance are markedly different from when even the 2010 Strategic Concept was drafted. NATO faces not only a challenge from a revanchist Russia, but the threat of Islamist terrorism driven in turn by a failing Middle East and North Africa. There are also ‘exotic’ technologies emerging enabling ever smaller actors to generate ever greater threats. This Steering Committee Scoping Paper lays out the challenges of the strategic environment with which the Alliance must contend, and establishes the direction of travel for the GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative.

KEY QUESTIONS

Introduction
Can NATO Strategic Adaptation be achieved through evolution or is something of a revolution needed to make the Alliance fit for twenty-first century purpose? What does NATO Adaptation mean and what changes must it drive in the roles, missions, capabilities, capacities, and structures of the Alliance? These are the essential questions the NATO Adaptation Initiative seeks to answer.

NATO’s Adaptation Challenge
Does the Alliance and its member nations really understand how twenty-first century security and the strategic environment of which it is a vital part is unfolding, and what policies, strategies and action are needed to preserve a just and equitable peace? Is the crafting of the grand strategy implicit in NATO Adaptation any longer possible?

The Need for NATO Adaptation
What type of security and level of defence will be needed to ‘safeguard’ NATO ‘peoples’ in an age that in some ways is immeasurably more complex than the state-centric, Euro-centric bipolar strategic environment of 1949?

Twenty-First Century Megatrends and NATO
Given emerging megatrends can NATO think and act big enough? Given the shift in relative power away from the West how can the Alliance afford to generate sufficient power to mount credible deterrence and defence?

NATO’s ‘Classical’ Threats
Is the Alliance sufficiently politically robust to undertake proper threat assessment and make reasoned strategic judgements in the face of more ‘classical’ threats?

NATO’s Internal Political Environment
What are the implications of a Trump presidency for the Alliance? What are the implications of Brexit for the Alliance? Does sufficient shared political vision and courage to maintain all-important Alliance strategic unity of purpose and effort? Are the Allies up to making such choices? Can the Alliance any longer generate sufficient
political cohesion to craft strategic judgement? What would be the balance to strike as part of a new transatlantic burden-sharing compact?

**NATO Military Adaptation?**
Given the very different ‘strategic cultures’ within the Alliance can NATO generate sufficient military capability and capacity to meet the many roles and tasks agreed at both the Wales and Warsaw summits? What level and kind of armed forces should the Alliance aspire to generate? Such a question also raises further issues over what platforms and systems might need to be Alliance-wide projects, what level of military mass and twenty-first century manoeuvre Alliance forces should aspire to, and what minimum level of interoperability should Alliance forces maintain?

**Dealing with NATO’s Here and Now**
What role if any does NATO have to play given the challenges posed in and by the Middle East are generational? Does NATO really deter Russia?
NATO IN A CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: THE QUESTIONS NATO ADAPTATION MUST ADDRESS

“The idea that the future will be different from the present is so repelling for our conventional way of thinking and for our behaviour that, at least the vast majority of us, if not all, pose a great resistance to acting on it in practice”.

—— John Maynard Keynes, 1937

INTRODUCTION

Can NATO Strategic Adaptation be achieved through evolution or is something of a revolution needed to make the Alliance fit for twenty-first century purpose? What does NATO Adaptation mean and what changes must it drive in the roles, missions, capabilities, capacities, and structures of the Alliance? These are the essential questions the NATO Adaptation Initiative seeks to answer.

Paragraph Three of the 1967 Harmel Report states, “…the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organisation which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. Given such changes people in NATO societies want action/protection and not seeing it. It has also shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the Treaty [Washington] by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.”1 Is that true today? The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word ‘strategic’ as, “dictated by; serving the ends of strategy”.2 It defines ‘environment’ as, “surrounding; surrounding objects, region, or conditions, esp. circumstances of life, of person of society”.3 This Steering Committee Scoping Paper considers the ‘circumstances of life’ of the Alliance in 2017 in an effort to establish the parameters of NATO Adaptation and thus meet the challenges set by the Warsaw Summit Statement.

In fact, NATO has always been adapting. There have been several strategic concepts since 1949 all of which have endeavoured, with varying degrees of success, to drive and harmonise the defence and force planning of the Allies. There have also been successive reports that have sought to establish NATO’s role beyond the strictly politico-military. For example, in 1956 Canada’s Lester B. Pearson joined Italy’s Gaetano Martino and Norway’s Halvard Lange to produce, “The Report of the Committee of Three into Non-Military Co-operation in NATO”. Perhaps most famously fifty years ago Pierre Harmel of Belgium led the landmark “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance” which re-established the need for NATO and properly established at the core of the Alliance the twin strategic purposes of deterrence and dialogue; purposes which remain pertinent today.

The NATO Strategic Adaptation Project shares a similar level of ambition to its famous predecessors, and has been instigated at a similar moment of strategic uncertainty over the purpose and method of the Alliance that is not dissimilar to 1956 and 1967.

THE MISSION OF THE PAPER

The mission of this paper is to a) provide the strategic context of NATO Adaptation from which adapted politico-military, military-strategic, comprehensive security and partnership strategies must necessarily flow; and b) establish the scope of the Project to assist the drafting of both the Main Paper, and the other supporting and

3 ibidem p. 323.
augmentation papers. To that end this paper establishes the essential intellectual tension that will drive the NATO Adaptation Initiative by posing essential questions that the Main Paper and other Project papers will seek to answer. The Main Paper will be published at GLOBSEC in May 2017.

**NATO’S ADAPTATION CHALLENGE**

Does the Alliance and its member nations really understand how twenty-first century security and the strategic environment of which it is a vital part is unfolding, and what policies, strategies and action are needed to preserve a just and equitable peace? Is the crafting of the grand strategy implicit in NATO Adaptation any longer possible?

The Harmel Report and the NATO Adaptation Initiative share one important genus; both reports sought/seek to understand the place of the Alliance in contemporary geopolitics, and by extension, the meaning of ‘geopolitics’ in their respective ages.

Equally, the strategic environment of today is very different from the one that faced Pierre Harmel and his ‘wise men’ fifty years ago. If NATO is to properly secure and defend the citizens who pay for it the Alliance must also necessarily consider its role in, and the changing strategic context of inter alia defence and deterrence, nuclear policy, protection of the global commons (including space), geopolitical disorder, global instability, the consequences of failing and failed states, internal European disorder, societal resilience, hyper-migration, conflict over primary commodities, regional conflicts, most notably in the Middle East, terrorism, the challenge posed by illiberal states and sectarian forces to the liberal world order, non-conventional threats from new disruptive, penetrative, and destructive technologies, the consequences of the democratisation of destruction via other forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), societal resilience and recovery, as well as the potential for future shock.

Meeting such a challenge will not be easy. At the time of Harmel the control of security-critical information was almost everywhere the exclusive preserve of the state. This is why espionage was so central on both sides to the conduct of the bipolar Cold War. Globalisation, the internet of ideas and things, and information technology (IT) in general, has rendered a far greater degree of knowledge (and a far greater propensity to opine) far more open to all; elites and citizens, friends and enemies, states and non-state actors, the law-abiding and the criminal. In so doing this ‘democratization of defence’ has helped to change the social contract between the state and the individual, ended deference, and changed forever the relationship between security and defence, between the offence and the defence, and between defender and defended.

It is not only information that is today more diffuse in Alliance societies. Power is also more diffuse and more widely distributed, and governments no longer hold such power in exclusivity. This new reality has not only changed the very nature of critical strategic decision-making, but made it far more difficult. It has also spawned a generation of politicians, particularly in Europe, who see ‘leadership’ as the deft following of public mores and opinion.

**THE NEED FOR NATO ADAPTATION**

What type of security and level of defence will be needed to ‘safeguard’ NATO ‘peoples’ in an age that in some ways is immeasurably more complex than the state-centric, Euro-centric bipolar strategic environment of 1949?

For all the challenge posed by the democratization of defence even the most cursory analysis of NATO’s changing strategic environment reinforces the need for NATO Adaptation. Indeed, NATO’s environment has changed dramatically since the founding of the Alliance. Between 1949 and 1989 NATO’s purpose was the stuff of defence grand strategy; the organisation of credibly robust defence means in pursuit of equally challenging higher, political, defence and strategic ends in a dangerous Euro-centric world.
In the late 1940s there were over three hundred Red Army divisions just over the River Elbe on the inner-German border facing roughly half that number of Western forces, albeit underpinned by an as yet implicit American atomic guarantee. From the founding of NATO with the Treaty of Washington in April 1949 the Alliance had to adjust to a range of challenges any one of which could have ‘de-coupled’ the all-important transatlantic strategic link.

The post-war dismantling of Germany; the appearance of Soviet atomic and nuclear forces; the Korean War; the European Defence Community and the first putative steps towards the creation of ‘Europe’ – part state, part international institution; the rearming of the German Federal Republic; the creation of the Warsaw Pact; the decline of Britain and France as imperial powers; Sputnik and the missile gap crisis; Berlin crises, including the 1961 raising of the Berlin Wall; the Cuban missile crisis; Vietnam and the draining of US military manpower; the 1973 oil crisis and the threat of decoupling; the Euromissiles crisis; the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall; the 1991 Gulf War; the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia; the Kosovo Crisis; 9/11; the 2003 Iraq War; the return of a revanchist Russia post-2000; and the rise and challenge of political Islamism; and all such events punctuated by repeated economic crises in both Europe and North America.

In spite of all those many challenges the preamble to NATO’s founding charter, the Treaty of Washington, is as valid and as relevant today as it was back in 1949. “They (the Parties to the Treaty) are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law”. However, whilst the Treaty may be as valid as it was in 1949 what does it actually mean in 2017?

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MEGATRENDS AND NATO

Given emerging megatrends can NATO think and act big enough? Given the shift in relative power away from the West how can the Alliance afford to generate sufficient power to mount credible deterrence and defence?

The generation of influence is also becoming more complex, particularly in the context of the global megatrends NATO faces in which geopolitics and macroeconomics combine to radically alter the underlying assumptions driving security and defence policy. The relative decline of Western economic power, and the rise of Asia is going to further complicate policy-making via huge shifts in both the focus and the movements of populations, the emergence of country-size mega-cities, many acting as states within states, the march of technology and both the benefits and the burdens it brings, all leavened and forced into inter-connectivity by climate stress and the search for secure primary commodities and life fundamentals.

Over the medium to longer term twenty-first century geopolitics and macroeconomics would suggest four big geopolitical groupings are emerging all of which have critical strengths, and suffer from critical, potentially systemic weaknesses. Russia is a military, primarily nuclear power with a one-shot energy-producing economy. Whilst currently led by a political strongman Russia is structurally weak both politically and economically. China is a burgeoning military and economic power. Beijing is also an insecure and inexperienced strategic actor and subject to profound internal divisions. However, sooner or later China will challenge American influence in Asia-Pacific. Should the Allies prepare to get directly involved in such competition or seek to help keep America strong where the Allies need America to be strong? For example, what role would there be for NATO in dealing with a future nuclear Iran or North Korea? That in turn will mean a renewed commitment to demonstrating an idea of global-reach burden-sharing to an American public less instinctively Atlanticist by the year. And, at a time when American leadership of the West is perhaps as weak as at any time since the Vietnam War and possibly since 1945–1947 when the pressure was “to bring the boys home”.

What of geopolitics and Europe? The EU is a political and economic grouping that is grappling with its putative role as a military ‘power’. It may over time develop such power. However, the pending loss of its strongest military actor and second biggest economy will not only delay such ambitions, but will tend to reinforce the soft power leanings and preferences implicit in the July 2016 EU Global Strategy. The EU is also indecisive of action and will remain at best a weak military power, even if four of the world’s top ten economic powers are currently members.
Certainly, the West is not what it was. Power is shifting away from Europe, and quite possibly Canada and the United States, towards Asia-Pacific, and perhaps in time to Western Asia, and maybe even Africa. According to a 2010 Citigroup report, Asia accounted for some 24% of world trade, will account for 42% of such trade by 2030, and 46% by 2050.\(^4\) Whereas, whilst Western Europe represented 48% of world trade in 1990, 34% in 2013 it could fall to 19% in 2030 and 15% respectively by 2050.\(^5\) In other words, NATO’s world is today a fractured multipolar world dotted with asymmetric poles of power in which the price of generating strategic influence and effect, security and defence is ever rising for the Western state.

For example, some estimates suggest the global population could reach 9 billion souls as early as 2020, of whom over 70% will live in cities, compared with 7.5 billion in 2016.\(^6\) By 2050 50% of the world population will live in cities, with 75% of that population living less than 100kms from the sea, which will further facilitate mass movement. Emerging and re-emerging non-Western or non-aligned powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – the BRICS – represent 25.9% of the world’s landmass, 43% of the population and 17% of global trade.\(^7\)

Urbanisation and littoralisation are also taking place in parallel with the rapid growth in the world’s population, developments which reinforce the critical relationship between economic security and defence. The UN Development Programme suggests that by 2020 the combined economic output of three leading developing countries alone – Brazil, China and India – will surpass the aggregate production of Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United States, even though there are many potential shocks that could prevent the painless realisation of such an outcome.

Much of the change with which the Alliance and its members must contend is driven by people. There is a massive demographic shift underway in some of the poorest and least developed countries, with a huge population bulge in the world’s East and South, allied to an ageing, often stagnant or even shrinking population in the North and West. This ‘shift’ will inevitably lead to even greater migration flows than hitherto experienced, as well as increased urbanization.

Climate change is reinforcing societal stress world-wide. According to the International Office of Migration in 2015 some 65 million people were displaced, which is the same as the population of the United Kingdom.\(^8\) The search for secure life fundamentals implicit in this movement will further push people to seek secure water, food, and energy, and thus drive more migration from intemperate climate zones to temperate zones.

**NATO’S ‘CLASSICAL’ THREATS**

Is the Alliance sufficiently politically robust to undertake proper threat assessment and make reasoned strategic judgements in the face of more ‘classical’ threats?

NATO must not forget what might be deemed more traditional challenges and the need to deter and defend in the face of more ‘classical’ threats. Therefore, NATO must also pay close attention to the profound shift in the military balance away from Alliance members both within Europe and beyond, as well as how societal change will impact on the ability of the Alliance to conduct military operations. NATO is once again facing the need to generate sufficient military means, including the possible use of force in the emerging struggle between liberal and illiberal power. The primary challenge comes in the neo-classical shape of President Putin’s Russia, albeit it with irregular twists as he applies hybrid warfare in its many hydra-headed forms both around Moscow’s ‘near abroad’ and beyond. The seizure of Crimea from Ukraine and the robust use of force in Syria demonstrate the lengths Moscow is prepared to go to realise what it perceives as its strategic interests.

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\(^5\) ibidem.

\(^6\) http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/

\(^7\) See BBC News, 25 March, 2013, “Brics nations meet to cement relationships” www.bbc.co.uk/business-21922874

Direct challenge to the Alliance also comes in the completely novel and amorphous shape of ISIL and other Islamist groups, which are both a threat to Western values and societies and yet part of them. What kind of ‘force’ could be applicable to both types of threat and whether NATO can generate a sufficiency of both applicable and useable military capability and capacity will pose a fundamental question for the Alliance. Can a strategic juxtaposition be generated between a 360 Degree Approach and a credible Full Spectrum Capability in such an environment? Most forces of most Allied nations have for a long-time had the responsibility to support the civil authority in a time of emergency. However, with ISIL under intense pressure in Iraq and Syria, and the very real possibility that now exists of a terrorist counter-attack in Europe, and by extension the creation of an internal security front, would there be an enhanced role for NATO in ‘homeland security’?

And then there is future shock? There are emerging technologies that could deny, thwart, or even defeat NATO. There seems to be somewhat of a conspiracy of silence in NATO about the possible deleterious impact that cyber and anti-space technologies in particular could have on NATO’s ability to wage and prevail in high-intensity war. There is little or no effort to prepare, exercise and train for a kind of Russian follow-on-force cyber-attack against an Ally or partner far from a potential theatre of military conflict that could prevent NATO from acting. Why does no NATO exercise appear to address such scenarios? Should NATO play an offensive cyber/hybrid warfare role or should it be delegated to the Allies?

Therefore, whether it be creating a sufficiency of NATO defence and deterrence against Russia to NATO’s east, committing legitimate force to the struggle to stabilise the Middle East and North Africa and thus deny political ‘space’ to ISIL and their like, or insuring against future shock, the need for an appropriate level of military means, applied sensibly over time and distance is paramount, i.e. grand strategy.

Harmel emphasised dialogue in parallel with defence. Grand strategy implies strategic judgement, and that in turn demands proper threat assessment. Russia today is not the Soviet Union and the new Cold War is unlikely. Whilst dialogue is difficult it is vital the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, the US and bilateral efforts, seeks to maintain some level of engagement with Russia, if not at the level envisaged when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed back in 1997. It should also be recognised that Russia share many common interests with European and North American NATO Allies, and such interests must be both recognised and fostered. Therefore, whilst it is impossible to ignore what has taken place in Ukraine, what is taking place in Syria, nor either Moscow’s use of cyber and hybrid coercion against Allied states, defence, deterrence and dialogue should form part of a balanced triple-track approach in dealing with Putin’s Russia.

**NATO’S INTERNAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT**

**What are the implications of a Trump presidency for the Alliance? What are the implications of Brexit for the Alliance? Does sufficient shared political vision and courage to maintain all-important Alliance strategic unity of purpose and effort? Are the Allies up to making such choices? Can the Alliance any longer generate sufficient political cohesion to craft strategic judgement? What would be the balance to strike as part of a new transatlantic burden-sharing compact?**

The need for strategic judgement means there must be no illusions about the difficult internal political backdrop to NATO Adaptation. ‘Strategy’ implies choices and it is precisely those choices that is the purpose and indeed the challenge of NATO Adaptation. However, some of those choices will need to be tough ones demanding significant sacrifice on the part of the nations. These choices also in turn raise a series of questions which are themselves driven not just by external planning drivers imposed by the strategic environment, but internal political factors specific to the Alliance.

The specific political challenge concerns the willingness of NATO nations, buffeted by a series of political and economic challenges, to break free of the ‘we recognise only as much threat as we can afford’ culture that has permeated much of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), particularly in Europe, since at least the end of the Cold War. Will it even be possible to see a harder edge added to the soft power security and ‘defence’ culture now well-established in many European nations, and indeed Canada?
The Defence Investment Pledge (DIP) agreed at the September 2014 Wales Summit committed the Allies to ‘move towards’ 2% GDP on defence spending ‘within a decade’ of which 20% had to be committed to defence investment. The DIP is essentially an arbitrary input approach to defence expenditure. As such it is far from realising a NATO future force consequent upon a rigorous analysis of the strategic environment, let-alone worst-case defence planning seasoned by strategic judgement.

The need for strategic judgement also raises another challenge central to NATO Adaptation. There are several structural seams within the Alliance. There are those Allies who prioritise the threat to the East and insist on a strong force-on-force concept of defence and deterrence. There are those Allies who prioritise the struggle with ISIL and the ‘threat’ posed by the potential collapse of the entire Sykes-Picot state system in the Middle East and North Africa.

Naturally, many of these questions are to a significant extent reliant on the choices the United States makes and the place of the Alliance in US grand strategy. Given that the Americans now provide some 70% of Alliance forces the old adage that if Washington catches a cold Europe sneezes has never been truer. With the November 2016 election of President Trump the Alliance will now almost undoubtedly face a series of jolts to the political assumptions that have underpinned NATO since at least the end of the Cold War. Will President Trump weaken the commitment to Article 5 defence? If not, the Trump administration will almost certainly demand more investment from the Allies in their own defence. Will this be reflected in an insistence by Washington that all the European Allies fulfil the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit, or more? After all, US concerns about NATO are not simply party political, but strategy-structural. The US is a bit like Britain c. 1890: immensely powerful on paper but facing a widening range of potential and very different adversaries in vastly different places the world over, any one of which might gain temporary, local advantage and in the absence of capable allies force the US onto the strategic back foot.

If the American taxpayer is to be asked continue to pay for much of the credibility of NATO pressure on Europeans to undertake more equitable burden-sharing will grow. Would the Americans accept increased European influence over US policy that enhanced European military capabilities would undoubtedly imply? Given that the US is facing a $19.8 trillion national debt burden-sharing is no longer an issue Europeans can elegantly explain way. It will be a pressing question for the new Administration. The issue of US leadership of the Alliance begs one other fundamental question. Are Europeans willing to bow to American leadership given the rise of anti-Americanism in many European countries?

Europe is itself divided. The June 2016 democratic decision of the British people to leave the EU has reinforced the sense of a Europe divided. It is a sense further reinforced by the July 2016 August coup in Turkey and the stress this has caused on Ankara’s democracy in the wake of the failed ouster. Indeed, it is interesting the extent to which ‘Europe’ is facing a challenge from all three of its major peripheral powers – Britain, Russia, and Turkey. This may suggest that the centralisation of power on Berlin and Brussels may be itself a problem, as power is realigned around Europe’s strongest economic power Germany.

There are real dangers for NATO Adaptation from such tensions. Brexit threatens to become a major strategic distraction. Worse, if the Brexit negotiations are handled badly it could well lead an already fractious British people to either refuse to defend other Europeans because of anger over the positions taken by other EU member-states, or even lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom. Either way Europe’s strongest military power could be much reduced at a critical moment in NATO Adaptation. Equally, with the election of a sympathetic President Trump it could well be that London now has a new and powerful ally in its Brexit negotiations. At the same time, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has also warned that Europeans can no longer rely on the US to defend them and again called for steps towards the creation of a European Army. Could NATO be re-organised Harmel-like into two new pillars – the Anglosphere and the Eurosphere?

9 In May 1916 British diplomat Sir Mark Sykes and French diplomat Francois Georges Picot met to carve up the Ottoman Empire in states that would in effect be protectorates of the two imperial powers post World War One.
10 In fact if one goes back to the 1953 ‘Lisbon Review’ this problem was already apparent.
11 http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/
At the other end of Europe Turkey’s increasingly difficult relationship with other Europeans threatens to derail the developing and vital NATO-EU relationship. This is important. If the 360 Degree Approach and a Full Spectrum Capability are to be given any credible meaning much will depend on the strength of the NATO-EU relationship. However, the consensus/unanimity decision-making rules of both NATO and the EU suggest that a deepening of the strategic partnership is unlikely if relations between the UK, Turkey and the EU become steadily more fractious. Then of course there is the still as yet unresolved relationship between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, not to mention various Balkan tensions that continue to play out in both the Alliance and the Union. Can NATO Adaptation survive such tensions?

It is the military future organisation of the Alliance that is perhaps most germane to NATO Adaptation, and which is most subject to the many political tensions. A post-Brexit NATO could see the Alliance evolve into two new pillars – an Anglosphere and a Eurosphere. Given that Secretary-General Stoltenberg recently pointed out that 80% of NATO defence expenditure is made by non-EU states the implications of such a structure would be profound. An Anglosphere would tend (Canada excluded) to emphasise power projection and high-end capabilities built around more informal ‘Five Eyes’ US-centric type groupings, in which the role of strategic partners such as Australia and Japan might be at least as important as that of Allies. A Eurosphere would lean towards the EU’s Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP), German-centric, tend to emphasise soft power and be more legalistic and formal. At heart there would likely be two contending world views. Could the North Atlantic Council continue to function given such differing world views?

**NATO MILITARY ADAPTATION?**

*Given the very different ‘strategic cultures’ within the Alliance can NATO generate sufficient military capability and capacity to meet the many roles and tasks agreed at both the Wales and Warsaw summits? What level and kind of armed forces should the Alliance aspire to generate? Such a question also raises further issues over what platforms and systems might need to be Alliance-wide projects, what level of military mass and twenty-first century manoeuvre Alliance forces should aspire to, and what minimum level of interoperability should Alliance forces maintain?*

Political cohesion implies military synergy. NATO Forces 2020, Smart Defence, the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), and the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) were all designed to promote force synergy and are thus pivotal to NATO Adaptation. However, all three pre-suppose agreement over future force concepts and force levels.

The issue of strategic culture also raises fundamental questions about the future organisation of military power in Europe. What are the implications for the Alliance if post-Brexit there is a move towards an EU-centric common defence? Germany is already calling for some form of European Defence Union (EDU). Could NATO survive EDU or would such a structure be a natural fit for a revised Harmel-like EU pillar of NATO? After all, many European states could only strike a balance between economic security, social security and hard security via big economies of scale, and that could only be achieved by radical solutions, such as defence integration.

There is also a profound split between those Allies who are investing in power projection forces, most notably the US, UK and France, and those with forces able only to operate at the lower-to-mid end of the conflict spectrum, and only for a limited time. For example, much is made of the size of the NATO Force Structure and the fact that there are over one million personnel under arms in the Alliance. However, in a real emergency how much of that force would be able to move, move and fight, move, fight and rotate? How long would it take between ‘notice to move’ and ‘notice to effect’ for such forces?

The issue of affordability is central to NATO Adaptation. First, are NATO members willing to afford a changing and challenging strategic environment if that environment demands ever more of national exchequers? What about operational funding? Is the current system of ‘costs lie where they fall’ sustainable over the medium-to-long term, or will there need to be at least some modicum of common funding?

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These are challenging questions given that the current trends in the strategic environment suggest that if NATO is to defend and deter it will also need to develop and maintain a critical and coherent comparative military advantage with forces able to operate to effect across nine domains of security and defence; air, cyber, land, sea, space, information, knowledge, education and resiliency.

The Alliance will also need to consider carefully how best to legitimately modernise the NATO nuclear posture, and enhance the ability of the Alliance to overcome advanced defensive architectures such as Russian A2/AD. To what extent would such an effort require force integration and, if part of a comprehensive security approach, what level and degree of a whole-of-government/s approach will be needed to ensure nations bring all forms of state power into the fray? For example, enhanced intelligence-sharing will be vital, but do the Allies really trust each other over the use of sensitive information to share intelligence?

Perhaps NATO’s most pressing immediate military challenge concerns force generation and command and control. Of late NATO has been used as a force generator for coalitions with the implicit assumption that the Alliance will never again act or deploy at 28 (soon-to-be 29) nations. However, over time coalitions destroy alliances as they reinforce factionalism. Can NATO meet twenty-first century force generation and command challenges? The Alliance will need to be able to command available forces and ensure they are in the right place, at the right time, properly configured, and in sufficient number. This will include both national forces and forces directly under NATO command such as the VJTF and eNRF. What about rest of NATO Force Structure? Can it really be used? What about transatlantic reinforcement? It is really there? After all, military power is relative not absolute, and depends on the capabilities and capacities of an adversary.

Given the ever-increasing unit cost of Western defence equipment (as expressed via defence cost inflation) there is an additional question as to whether NATO can be properly equipped with a full spectrum force credible across and around a 360 degree security and defence environment? After all, Russia and ISIL are simply two of the many risks and threats NATO must plan for and which may become critical either in isolation or in parallel. For example, there is also the defence of the High North to consider. What will full spectrum operations demand in such an environment in terms of military capability and capacity and new technologies. What impact will evolving concepts of nuclear deterrence, cyber, nanotechnology, and micro-biology have on the battlespace, and by extension Alliance force requirements, concepts and levels?

DEALING WITH NATO’S HERE AND NOW

What role if any does NATO have to play given the challenges posed in and by the Middle East are generational? Does NATO really deter Russia?

For all the many ‘exotic’ threats NATO Adaptation must consider it is the twin threats posed by Russia to the North and the East of the Alliance and a failed Middle East to NATO’s South where the real challenge of the here and now is posed for the Alliance. Specifically, how those twin challenges might interact.

The paradox of the West is that whilst it has collectively failed in the Middle East, the West remains central to any resolution in the Middle East. Any ‘resolution’ that will demand from the collective West a long-term grand strategy that would need to work over generations. What grand strategy? Does the West have the strategic patience, coherence and consistency to make such strategy work? In particular, would NATO have a role in an all-important implementation plan that would certainly demand far more than training missions and advisory roles?

The state structure in NATO’s ‘near abroad’ in the Middle East and Africa is in danger of collapse, with poor governance, endemic corruption and deep sectarian divisions across the Muslim world. The current conflict in Syria has created perhaps the greatest humanitarian conflict since 1945 and has led to migration flows into Europe which are not only changing the social fabric of Europe, but undermining European and Alliance unity of purpose.

ISIL, Al Qaeda and their many affiliates and wannabes are determined to eradicate the Western-style state from the Middle East. Worse, there are irreconcilable state forces at work in the Middle East that the current tragedy...
in Iraq and Syria are masking and which could presage a general Middle Eastern war. What role could there be for NATO in such a war? What role would the Alliance have, if any, in helping to resolve incompetent, non-inclusive government, predatory corruption, massive inequality, and aiding burgeoning young populations who lack education and economic prospects?

There is no suggestion that the Alliance would take the lead in such a crisis, but nor is NATO any longer (if it were ever) simply a tool of last military resort. NATO would clearly have a role to play to help stabilise the space in which stabilisation, reconstruction and development would take place. However, fourteen years of campaigning in Afghanistan revealed the challenge of creating such a space. And yet, the failure to act beyond Operation Unified Protector in Libya has left a political space adjacent to Europe open to exploitation by human traffickers, criminal networks, and terrorists.

At root, the West seems unable or unwilling to understand the causes posed by the many challenges posed by the Middle East and North Africa and to accept the long-term commitment needed to re-establish stability. This lack of resolve profoundly affects NATO which after all is a big politics, high politics device. For example, to stop the blood-letting in Syria might at the very least demand a no fly zone. Is the ‘West’ prepared to defy Russia in Syria and impose such a no fly zone? If so what role for NATO?

And then there is President Putin’s Russia. To some Russia is a “Remains of the Day” issue, a remnant of Empire clinging on in the power-nostalgic Moscow elite mind dreaming of a return to some kind of bipolar US-USSR relationship. In fact, Russia today is more like Imperial Germany prior to World War One; arrogant, boisterous, insecure, temporarily and locally powerful...and weak. Yet is it really sound to dismiss the threat Putin poses to the Baltic States. That is certainly not the view in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and many of the Nordic States. Surely, it is at best as complacent for Southern European states to dismiss such concerns simply because Putin is ‘not in my backyard’, as it is for Central and Eastern Europeans to dismiss the threat posed by ISIL, migration, and a possible Middle Eastern war. After all, the ambition implicit in the Warsaw Adaptation commitment was that the Alliance prepare to credibly deter and defend against all such threats.

This challenge also begs a further question; does the Alliance still have the ambition to create a Europe whole and free and what does that now mean? It is clear the Alliance and its nations suffer from a certain enlargement fatigue. Is the Open Door to future enlargement still open and what role should future enlargements play in the grand strategy NATO is designed to fulfil?

THE CHALLENGE OF NATO STRATEGIC ADAPTATION

Basil Liddle Hart once wrote: “The higher level of grand strategy is that of conducting war with a far-sighted regard to the state of the peace that will follow.”13 The higher level of twenty-first century NATO grand strategy will demand the conducting of power with a far-sighted and shared appreciation of the collective effort on which all the members of the Alliance will need to invest to assure and secure all of their citizens. Adaptation must prepare NATO for the future, not return it to the past. The world today is very different from that of the 1970s and 1980s. The key adaptation thus concerns the role and missions of the Alliance in a contemporary global security environment of which Europe’s security is an integral part. Indeed, there can be no concept of a military-based defence without a clear understanding of the drivers, responsibilities and implications of broader security. Threats today are multifaceted, multi-dimensional and multi-oriented. Many such threats are unlikely to be susceptible to the forces and resources that NATO could bring to bear. And yet, the very inter-connectedness of such risks and threats means that NATO cannot ignore them, simply because they are difficult to predict. In such a strategic environment if NATO and its political masters continue to recognise only as much threat as they believe they understand or can afford, or simply get away with, there is a good chance NATO could at some point fail. Therefore, NATO cannot afford to simply do that which it has always done better. Whilst Article 5 collective defence remains the cornerstone of the Alliance it is by no means the entirety of what will need to be a re-designed Alliance edifice. That edifice would necessarily look a bit like Richard Rogers re-designed Bundestag in Berlin; a structure still rooted in its own history, but opened up and re-designed for a new age and a new country in a new Europe, in a new world.

It is a mission which calls for the biggest question of all; given NATO’s changing strategic environment what should NATO Adaptation seek to adapt and to what end? And, what about future shock? Does the Alliance have any sense of known unknowns, or are the unknowns so unknown that NATO must simply wait... and hope.

**November 2016**

**SUPPORTING SOURCES**

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ONE ALLIANCE?

Change Drivers in a New Strategic Environment

INTERIM PAPER
“The idea that the future will be different from the present is so repellent for our conventional way of thinking and for our behaviour that, at least the vast majority of us, if not all, pose great resistance to acting on it in practice. The difficulty is not so much in embracing new ideas, but rather in abandoning the old ones…”

— John Maynard Keynes, 1937

ABSTRACT

This paper establishes the risks, challenges, threats, and indeed opportunities the Adapted Alliance must both contend with and seize if NATO is to fulfil its mission to secure and defend the citizens of its twenty-nine nations in the twenty-first century. Implicit in that ‘challenge’ is a simple truism; the Alliance will only ever ‘adapt’ if the sheer scope and extent of strategic change is properly understood, embraced and acted upon with strategies put in place that render NATO truly fit for twenty-first century purpose. The nature of the changed strategic environment is such that the legitimate use of Allied force and/or influence has a vital role to play as a deterrent, a defence, and through several forms of tailored engagement. However, if the Adapted Alliance is to be effective, the European Allies must ease the global burden on the United States and create forces and resources that will enable them to become effective ‘first responders’ in and around Europe. Much of that effort will fall to the European Union, in partnership with the Alliance, and rest upon a continuum of ambition and effort between the three pillars of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, and co-operative security. The Alliance needs a Harmel 2.0.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

▶ **Hamel 2.0**: Fifty years ago Pierre Harmel presented a report to the Alliance that changed NATO strategy. This paper prepares the ground for what will be, in effect, a “Hamel 2.0” report which will be published in late 2017. This Interim Report establishes the risks, challenges, threats, and indeed opportunities, the Adapted Alliance must both contend with and seize if NATO is to fulfil its mission to secure and defend the citizens of its twenty-nine nations in the twenty-first century.

▶ **The Challenge**: Adaptation seeks to establish a credible, 360-degree approach to security and defence in the twenty-first century. Therefore, Adaptation must also maintain and reinforce the strategic and political cohesion between the Allies, some of which are focussed on the risks and threats to NATO’s east, others on the very different, but equally substantial threats to NATO’s south, as well as the growing challenge the Alliance faces to its north.

▶ **Global megatrends**: A major and implied challenge for Adaptation will be to help future-proof NATO by getting ahead of change-driving megatrends. Alliance members need a better understanding of the specific challenges and opportunities faced by NATO to establish the extent and scope of the radical change taking place in the strategic environment.

▶ **NATO today**: The challenge of the Warsaw Summit was to better link political and military requirements with resources, to drive Alliance prioritisation. Therefore, the Alliance sees 2017 as the year for implementing the Warsaw Summit commitments across the conflict spectrum and through the 360-degree threat and risk horizon, as NATO adapts to the ever-changing character of conflict.

▶ **The paradox of NATO’s strategic environment**: In an age of uncertainty, sound investment is the very commodity that, by promoting security, dilutes and in time banishes uncertainty. Conversely, investment failure, simply by ceding the field to others, accelerates and exaggerates uncertainty and thus guarantees negative strategic political consequences. Implicit in the global megatrends are change factors that make the need for the Alliance as strong as ever, whilst they erode the power of its pillars – its member nations. Russia is an essentially defensive power, led by a regime in Moscow that, in certain respects, seeks to ‘turn the clock back’ by re-establishing the unquestioned control and power of the state. Across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), there has been a dramatic failure of government and governance which has profound implications for the security and defence of the Alliance, particularly those Allies in the south. Climate change and the opening of the so-called ‘Northeast Passage’, along with the discovery of huge hydrocarbon reserves within the Arctic Circle, threaten to turn NATO’s High North into a contested region.

▶ **The NATO-EU strategic partnership**: The need for a deep and effective NATO-EU strategic partnership has never been greater. And yet, both NATO and the EU are facing centripetal forces. Indeed, if Brexit leads to profound political split between Britain and many of its European partners then the implications for the Adapted Alliance would be profound.

▶ **New Technologies and the Twenty-First Century Character of War**: New technologies and advanced science could lead to game-changing breakthroughs in the conflict space by NATO’s adversaries. In the past NATO and its members have tended to enjoy the ‘luxury’ of being able to confront threats in isolation, or at least sequentially, firm in the belief they enjoy comparative technological advantage. Today, that advantage is fast eroding as adversaries and enemies exploit hybrid warfare and prepare for future hyper-war.

▶ **Defence Investment**: The Alliance needs a clearly established NATO system for identifying common and harmonised equipment requirements. It is vital that increased investment is co-ordinated across the entirety of the requirements identified, which in turn must be based on a NATO strategy designed from the outset to meet the threats and challenges posed by a dangerous strategic environment. If not, the additional resources generated by meeting the Defence Investment Plan, and its goal of 2 percent of GDP per annum to be spent on defence, of which 20 percent must be spent on new equipment, would be ineffective.
NATO’s ‘Ten Year Rule’: A step change in Alliance thinking and acting can only come from a better common understanding of NATO’s place in the world. Many Allies do not believe a major war could happen within a decade and are, consequently, unwilling to engage in the kind of ten year plus NATO strategy required to deter, stabilise, engage, and, if needs be, fight a war.

Some ages past forgave mediocrity. This is no such age.
THE GLOBSEC ONE ALLIANCE ADAPTATION VISION

“NATO also continues to adapt its processes and structures to ensure that it is adaptable by design and inherently flexible, resilient, and responsive to any threat. To this end, NATO continued to rigorously pursue improvements to better integrate resources and work strands, including by adopting modern and innovative approaches and ways of working. These efforts will help improve prioritisation and better align resources so that the workforce, both civilian and military, is well placed to support the achievement of NATO’s top priorities”.

— Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Annual Report 2016, March 2017

DEFENCE, DETERRENCE, AND DIALOGUE

The Warsaw Summit Communique states: “NATO’s essential mission is unchanged: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security, and shared values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law”. Given that context, One Alliance Adaptation must return to the first principles of collective Alliance security and defence policy. Warsaw’s essential contribution was to drive forward a new defence and deterrence posture and to enable NATO to better project stability. As such, Adaptation is about re-positing and re-positioning the role and purpose of NATO in a new and rapidly changing strategic environment and by setting military adaptation against the big strategic picture that is fast emerging. It is also about enhancing the military capabilities and capacities of the member nations the Alliance serves, and the further reform and strengthening of Alliance decision-making, command and force structures.

Adaptation must ultimately concern the strategic mind-set of NATO leaders and citizens alike, and focus on the renewal of a credible link between the power and influence the Alliance must generate in a strategic environment that has changed radically since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and which demands resilient societies as much as projectable power. A new balance must thus be struck between the projection of power and the protection of people, in an age when the diffusion of power, the rise of technology, and the changing nature of societies render classical ideas of defence obsolete. Adaptation will thus require leaders to think big and far about the future of NATO and its partnerships. It will also require the Allies to spend more on defence and better integrate both forces and resources if the Alliance is to be properly equipped and prepared for the coming challenges. That means an Alliance committed to expanding NATO’s political capacities and missions to better shape the security environment, project stability to countries along the Alliance’s periphery, and counter disinformation, propaganda and influence operations aimed at undermining the societies of Allies.

INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago Pierre Harmel of Belgium led the landmark December 1967, “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance” which re-established and re-affirmed the need for NATO, and properly established at the core of the Alliance the twin strategic purposes of deterrence and dialogue, whilst enshrining Flexible Response as the guiding principle of collective defence. Back in 1967 the Alliance faced similar questions of purpose, mission, structure and cost as it does today, albeit in a very different strategic environment.

This paper prepares the ground for what will be, in effect, Harmel 2.0, which will be published in late 2017. This Interim Report establishes the risks, challenges, threats, and indeed the opportunities the Adapted Alliance must both contend with and seize if NATO is to fulfil its mission to secure and defend the citizens of its twenty-

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2 “Warsaw Summit Communique: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016” (Brussels: NATO) All subsequent references to the Communique are from this cited source. Hereafter referred to for the purposes of this report as ‘Warsaw’.
nine nations in the twenty-first century. As such the paper seeks to set expectations for the final report of the Steering Committee; Harmel 2.0.

Whilst the July 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit properly established NATO Adaptation as the core mission of the ‘new’ Alliance there is as yet little or no strategy in place to realise the change NATO needs to embrace. At best, a modus vivendi can be said to exist between those who wish to see the Alliance return to a warfighting concept of defence and deterrence more traditionally associated with the Alliance during the Cold War, and those that believe the far more pressing challenge is posed by the partial collapse of the state order across much of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the twin threats to the Alliance of massive forced migrations allied to terrorism that seeks to create chaos in the heartlands of the Alliance.

THE SCOPE OF THIS PAPER

This bridging paper exists midway between the Scoping Paper, that in November 2016 established the questions that an Adapted NATO must answer, and Harmel 2.0. The scope and ambition of this project matches that of Harmel; to re-define the mission of NATO by basing the Adaptation of the Alliance on sound analysis of the change-drivers generated by a strategic environment that has possibly changed faster since 2000 than at any time in history, certainly the history of the Atlantic Alliance.

The final report will lay out all the policy prescriptions that the Steering Committee has been developing during the year of this undertaking. To that end, this paper focuses on the three main challenges this project has established: Russia; instability to the south of the Alliance and the Salafi Islamist terrorism it is helping to spawn; and the impact of new ‘game-changing’ technologies and science with which the Alliance must contend but also seek to exploit.

MEGATRENDS

Global Megatrends

Before any analysis of the scope of NATO Adaptation can proceed, a better understanding is needed of the specific challenges and opportunities faced by the Alliance, in order to establish the extent of radical change taking place in the strategic environment. A major and implied challenge for Adaptation will be to help future-proof NATO, by getting ahead of change-driving megatrends. There are a range of global megatrends that will necessarily form the strategic backdrop to Adaptation that can be roughly divided into four linked change-driving factors, all of which have profound implications for the Alliance and the security and defence of NATO nations: climate change, rapidly-changing demography, resource-scarcity, and a structural shift in economic and military power from the West to the East. These changes are already leading to strategic consequences as competing groups within countries undermine state structures, and competition and consequent friction between states increases with profound shifts underway in the global balance of power and resources.

Climate change will place ever more, ever-bigger populations under ever greater stress. This stress could, in turn, help trigger systemic migrations far greater than those of the last few years on and around Europe’s borders. In the future such stresses could also grow exponentially in both scale and intensity, as rising sea levels and accelerating desertification render large swathes of the globe untenable. The mass movement of people will also be abetted by advances in global communications in all its many forms, and which in large part defines globalisation.

Mass migration is changing the nature of Western societies. The development of less cohesive, but more open Western societies, constructed on a liberal belief in tolerance and multiculturalism, and leading to more diverse societies will enjoy many intrinsic strengths. However, such diversity will also pose security challenges to Western societies. There is already evidence that mass migration is slowing, if not halting, the secularisation of Western societies. The entry of groups into society of people with very different beliefs and practices does not necessarily mean a critical loss of social cohesion, as most migrants wish to be productive members of their new societies. However, it is certainly likely that another megatrend – a resurgence in cultural friction and struggle –
could well be reinforced, thus creating a basis for further radicalisation of groups of people within the West, thus aiding recruiting by extremist groups, such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State.

More open societies are also likely to be far more vulnerable to penetration and manipulation by adversarial states and non-state actors. Russia’s use of hybrid warfare, and its exploitation of disinformation and concerted influence operations, might well be the harbinger of efforts by ostensibly weaker states, and highly-coherent non-state actors and criminal networks, to keep intrinsically stronger states politically (and perhaps permanently) off-balance.

Globalisation and urbanisation are two linked megatrends. States will likely become more advanced, but also more vulnerable. The growth of mega-cities (cities with ten million or more inhabitants) suggests the emergence of competing poles of power within state. These poles will render effective governance more complex, not least because of the reaction of nativist populations to the diversity implicit in the growth of such cities. Urbanisation and rapid changes in technology also tend to go hand-in-hand, due to the concentration of large numbers of skilled people.

Urbanisation may well promote a concentration of talent, but it is also likely to exacerbate the perception of inequality, as wealthy-educated people live cheek by jowl with poor, relatively uneducated and diverse populations. Such friction will, at the very least, tend to polarise politics and further fuel frictions and tensions within fast-change, high-tension societies and communities. The rising mega-slums that will accompany the growth of mega-cities could well create dense urban ‘no-go’ areas for law enforcement and may be implicitly governed by non-state entities, in direct competition with the writ of central government. There are a growing number of megacities in the world where central, provincial, and municipal governments are sorely pressed to extend control over the mega-slums. Implications for the Alliance? While there are no megacities as yet in Europe, NATO may well have to project stability into a distant megacity. As migrant populations grow, their concentrations in key European cities may, in time, develop the same no-go area characteristics of mega-slums already in existence.

For the Alliance such change, and the need to future-proof NATO through Adaptation (which is likely to take place across no more than two standard defence planning cycles) will have profound implications. Such change suggests new balances and relationships will need to be forged between police, armed forces and intelligence as a state is unlikely to be able to project power unless it can protect and control a fractious and complex home base. Moreover, technology could well create an inverse and perverse relationship between the size of any adversary group and its ability to cause mass disruption and destruction. New relationships will also be needed between law enforcement and criminal and military intelligence, as such distinctions fast become obsolete.

What if war broke out in a mega-city? How would such a war be fought? What kind of armed/police forces would be needed to both defend a state from without, and stabilise a state from within? These are the type of uncomfortable megatrend challenges an institution such as NATO must consider if Adaptation is to be seen as a serious effort to future proof the Alliance. After all, the Alliance is the last resort for security and defence to which it members will turn, not just during faraway crises, but during acute crises when an Ally might be facing defeat at home at the hands of a skilled enemy (or enemies) employing a range of attacks across the contemporary and future conflict spectrum, including cyber-disruption and the destruction of critical national infrastructure.

**Military Megatrends**

There is a real shift underway in the balance of world and NATO-regional military power that could well gather pace if Adaptation does not forestall what for the Alliance would be a profoundly unwelcome trend. The hard facts behind NATO’s relative power are reflected in these adverse military megatrends with which Adaptation and the Alliance must contend. The relationships and ratios between the relative economic weight of the liberal-democracies and the illiberal powers is shifting away from the former. This negative shift is being reinforced by an aversion of the democracies to commit expenditures to defence, particularly since the banking and sovereign debt crises of 2008 and 2010. This shift in expenditure is likely to continue and could lead to a profound shift in the world balance of military power if the Alliance collectively fails to act. However, it is not too late. In absolute terms the Western democracies together remain uniquely militarily strong. It is an assumption that is further strengthened if the liberal West is defined to include all major democracies the world over.
However, the adverse trends faced by the West are clear. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2015, the top five global economies were the United States with a gross domestic product of $17.9 trillion, followed by China ($10.9tr), Japan ($4.1tr), Germany ($3.3tr), and the UK ($2.8tr). By way of contrast, the Russian economy was worth some $1.3tr in 2015. Contrast economic weight with that of military investment and the picture becomes somewhat more complicated. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 2015 the top five global military spenders were as follows: the US at $597 billion (bn), China $146bn, Saudi Arabia $82bn, UK $56bn, and beyond the top five: Russia $52bn, France $47bn, and Germany $37bn. 4

NATO European powers have for the last eight years or so seen defence as an expense to cut within the national exchequer, as they pursued hard austerity policies which have accentuated, and to some degree exacerbated, relative Western military decline. Whereas, other powers, most notably China and Russia, have embarked on military expansions. In Russia’s case, this greater expenditure places Russian society and the Russian economy under significant strain but affords Moscow a powerful military force.

Equally, there are clear limits to Russia’s ambitions that the Alliance needs to grasp. Although President Putin shows no sign of abandoning his expansionist foreign and security policy that since 2008 has seen the invasion of Georgia, the illegal 2014 seizure of Crimea and much of Eastern Ukraine, and Russia’s incursion into the Syria, there have also been significant cuts to planned public investment, including some cuts in defence investment. The relative figures on defence investments programmes are telling with the US investing some $700bn on new equipment, Russia some $300bn, and the UK some $250bn. Still the World Bank suggests that Russia spent 4.9% of its GDP on defence in 2015 and Russia’s commitment of dwindling economic resources to its armed forces remains high when compared with the US, which in 2015 spent 3.3% of its GDP on defence, France at 2.1%, the UK 1.9%, and Germany 1.2%. 6

There are three caveats to this analysis. The figures for defence expenditure are themselves contested, and the relative ‘bang for the buck’ ratios generated by European military investment, compared with China and Russia, would appear to be unfavourable. In other words, the West, NATO Europe in particular, gets far less bang for each euro, krone or pound invested. 7

The tendency of Europeans to favour the appearance, rather than the substance, of defence investment is endemic in some areas of the Alliance. Part of the challenge is to agree on a basis for a sound comparison of defence investment. Statista confirms IISS estimates of US defence spending in 2015. However, both Statista and SIPRI suggest China spent at least $215bn on ‘defence’, i.e. its armed forces, whilst Russia spent $66.4bn. Interestingly, Statista also shows UK defence spending falling from £38.6bn in 2008/9 to £35.1bn in 2015/6, a real-terms decline of some 9% over that period. Although the UK is committed to a substantial defence investment programme over the 2015–2024 period, because of ‘adjustments’ made to defence accounting, actual investments of any substantive amount in the future force will not begin until 2018/9 and will not be enough to match ends and ways with means.

Furthermore, the impact of austerity politics on European defence continues to be reflected broadly across Europe. According to SIPRI whilst military expenditure rose sharply in 2015 across much of Central and Eastern Europe, albeit from a very low baseline, Western Europe saw defence spending fall 0.4% in 2015 to $253bn. Between 2006 and 2015 defence expenditure in the region fell by 8.5%, even though most Western European states were engaged in a major campaign in Afghanistan during much of that period. According to SIPRI between 2006 and 2015 US defence expenditure declined by 3.9%, whilst China’s and Russia’s grew by 132% and 91% respectively, whilst India increased its defence budget by 43%. In Europe, the British defence budget declined by 7.2%, the French defence budget by 5.9%, whilst the Italian defence budget contracted by a whopping 30%. Only Germany increased its defence budget by 2.8% over that period.

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3 World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, April 2016.
6 See www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GP.ZS.
7 See above
8 Unless otherwise stated all the data has either been sourced via Statista https://www.statista.com or SIPRI www.books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf (April 2016).
Perhaps the most informative data concerns the percentage share of world defence expenditure which reinforces the shift in relative power taking place between the world's only global power, the United States and regional-peer competitors with profound implications for the Alliance. In 2015 the US still represented 36% of world defence expenditure, whilst Russia represented 4%, the UK 3.3%, France 3%, and Italy, for example, 1.4%. However, China now represents some 13% of world defence expenditure. Between 1989 and 2015 the Chinese defence budget grew by more than 10% year-on-year. However, in February 2017 CNN reported that, “China... announced a 7% rise in annual military spending, the smallest increase in seven years”. The report went on state that Chinese defence spending in 2016 saw a 7.6% rise in defence spending with the defence budget rising to $146bn or 1.3% GDP. The problem with these figures is that many western analysts believe them to be a gross under-estimate of the figure Beijing really spends on defence.

The arms race underway in Asia-Pacific also has major implications for US grand and military strategy. According to SIPRI military spending in Asia and Oceania (Australasia and surrounding region) grew by 64% between 2006 and 2015. A significant part of this increase was made by China, and a North Korea that is almost certainly in the process of becoming a nuclear-power armed with intercontinental missile reach. US allies such as Japan and South Korea also increased their defence budgets markedly, as did Taiwan, Indonesia and the Philippines.

The situation in the Middle East is harder to gauge because data is difficult to gather. However, the quadruple threats of global Salafi Jihadist terrorist networks, regional-strategic competition and conflict, civil wars in fragile and failing states, as well as mass, forced, irregular migration pose as much a strategic level threat to the Alliance as Russian expansionism or intimidation. What data is available suggests an arms race of sorts is underway in the Middle East. Defence expenditures across the region increased by 4.1% in 2015 alone. Iraq saw the biggest increase in defence expenditure with a 35% hike between 2014 and 2015, with a 536% increase since 2006, albeit driven by very particular circumstances. Saudi Arabia spent an estimated $87.2bn in 2015, double the amount Riyadh spent on defence in 2006 and reflective of the regional cold war the Saudis are engaged in with Iran. The Saudis also spent $5.3bn from the national contingency reserves on operations in Yemen in 2015. In 2015 Tehran spent $10.1bn on defence. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia’s main regional-strategic competitor actually reduced its defence expenditure by 30% over the 2006 and 2015 period. There was a precipitous fall in defence expenditure following the imposition of EU sanctions in January 2012. However, with the lifting of sanctions on the export of oil and gas it is believed Iran will increase its defence expenditure in the coming years.

The message for NATO? For Adaptation to succeed it must be firmly embedded in a proper understanding and appreciation of global change. Given that the United States is the only superpower, any change in the balance of global military power that adversely impacts on Washington will also impact upon NATO Adaptation. Whilst the intent of the Trump administration to increase US defence spending by 3% is to be welcomed, without the material support of the Allies Adaptation could fall well short of expectations and critically undermine the sharing of risks and burdens.

**NATO TODAY**

Where is NATO today in its efforts to meet the Adaptation challenge of the new strategic environment? 2017 is seen by the Alliance as the year of implementing Warsaw Summit decisions across the conflict spectrum and around the 360-degree threat and risk horizon as NATO adapts to the ever-changing character of conflict. The challenge of Warsaw is to better link political and military requirements with resources to drive Alliance prioritisation. This section sets forth NATO’s current situation and presages the later main report by offering some initial prognostications.

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Level of Ambition: NATO remains committed to being able to conduct two major joint operations and two smaller joint operations or one very large joint operation (MJO-Plus). However, NATO command and control structures are not as yet able to meet such a demanding level of ambition. The NATO Command and Force Structure is thus being adapted via a range of short-term structural changes to both its personnel levels and its capabilities. By February 2018, the aim is that the Command Structure will be ready to plan for the deployment of heavier, reinforced, and/or follow-on forces organised in warfighting formations, and hold such forces at a high state of readiness for longer periods. However, the realisation of such a force will take several years, as will the capacity to properly undertake Major Joint Operations (MJO).

Defence investment: In his 2016 Annual Report Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg reinforced the defence investment challenge: “We still do not have fair burden sharing within our alliance...Only five allies met the 2 per cent guidelines in 2016. We must redouble our efforts to speed national efforts to keep our pledge”10 The Annual Report also stated that US defence spending new represents 68.2% of NATO defence spending, even though US GDP only represents some 45.9% of the NATO ‘economy’. Establishing a proper and legitimate benchmark for burden-sharing would not be a simple matter of establishing a ratio of 50:50 between US and NATO European forces. The US is a global power, indeed the world’s only global power, whilst its European Allies are distinctly regional actors. Therefore, to re-establish equitable burden-sharing, which the US Administration regards as critical, the ratio would probably need to be nearer 60:40 in favour the US, albeit reinforced by a clear European effort to improve the scope and the capability of its expeditionary forces.

NATO Budget 2016: The military budget of the Alliance in 2016 was divided thus; Allied Command Operations received 76% of the budget, Allied Command Transformation 22%, whilst the rest (SHAPE, International Military Staff, North Atlantic Council, and Office of the Chief of Security) were responsible for 7%.11 It must be assumed that much of the funding for Adaptation would come via the NCSEP (NATO Command Structure Entities and Programmes). In 2016 NCSEP funding was structured thus: NCS Structure and Manpower 40%, NCCB Enterprise 22%, air defence systems 17%, transformation 8%, deployable forces 5%, training and education 5%, outreach 1%.

Institutional Adaptation: Alliance prioritisation is closely linked to efforts to establish a new strategic planning framework to help better co-ordinate the work of all the assistant secretaries-general and thus focus staff and resources on priorities. This framework will be supported and underpinned by a shared ‘rolling picture’ to promote effective co-ordination. Agency reform continues with much effort committed to the further streamlining of the NATO Command Structure and Headquarters, with a new system of annual reporting established to provide effective oversight of progress. Much of the above suggests a NATO-focused common effort, although the common funding available to the Alliance is only $2bn per annum. More common funding is seen as an essential force multiplier for the Alliance.

Agile decision-making: NATO efforts to promote more agile decision-making include enhancing data-fusion between NATO HQ and SHAPE to better enable the Alliance to decide and act quickly, supported by a rolling information assessment and a more granular intelligence picture. This update, it is hoped, will also assist leaders to better distinguish between a so-called cyber nuisance attack, and an all-out hybrid attack that could presage war. The Alliance has also further strengthened its capacity for agile decision-making through the creation of a new Assistant Secretary-General for Intelligence at the end of 2016 to better co-ordinate national intelligence efforts.

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10 See France and Spain fail to hit defence spending”, The Times, 14 March, 2017.
11 Source: International Military Staff (Unclassified) (March 2017)
Military Adaptation: A major challenge for NATO at present concerns the standing up and deploying of so-called follow-on forces beyond the Very High-Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF), the time it would take, and indeed the forces that would be available from the rest of the NATO Force Structure (as well as available reserves) in the event of an emergency. There is still significant work to be done. Current estimates suggest that to mobilise all NATO forces would take between three to six months. Military adaptation is focused on enhanced readiness, training and the development of critical capabilities. NATO forces still face critical shortfalls in areas such as precision-guided munitions (PGMs), strategic air-lift and joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR). More needs to be done to realise NATO Integrated Air Command and Control and to strengthen ballistic missile defence (BMD), and to move towards replacement of the ageing NATO AWACS (airborne warning and control) fleet. Further development is also needed on NATO ground surveillance, beyond the five Global Hawk drones.

Smart Defence: Efforts to ease shortfalls are focused on the Smart Defence and Connected Forces Initiatives launched by former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Eleven Smart Defence projects have been completed. Such projects are closely-linked to defence planning priorities and include multinational projects, such as the development of the Special Operations Component Command, and project groups focused on developing JISR (which reached initial operating capability in 2016), as well as the planned AWACs replacement scheduled for 2035.

Logistics: NATO seeks to establish more robust military and civilian logistics capabilities that would be available to the Alliance in peacetime, crisis and in conflict. The focus is on upgrading the necessary infrastructures, pre-positioning of forces, food and fuel supplies, and guaranteeing and securing them, as well as ensuring runways, railways and roads meet with military requirements in a crisis. The logistics challenge faced by the Alliance is daunting. The 2016 deployment of a single US Armored Brigade Combat Team proved logistically challenging for the Alliance. By way of comparison, during the Cold War the plan was to deploy ten US and Canadian divisions to Europe over ten days.

NATO-EU: Much of the effort in reinforcing the NATO-EU strategic partnership is focussed on NATO’s South. Efforts include enhanced defence co-operation, and the reinforcing of both EU FRONTEX, and the EU’s anti-human trafficking mission EU SOPHIA. President Trump, is also demanding that the Alliance becomes more heavily engaged on counter-terrorism missions. However, NATO’s specific counter-terrorism mission remains unclear, as the military campaign against ISIS is currently being run as a US-led coalition, rather than as a NATO operation (although many Allies participate). NATO’s main role is preventive; building the defence capacity of Middle Eastern partners such as Iraq, Jordan, and possibly Libya. Much of the vital de-radicalisation effort is likely to remain the preserve of the nations and/or the EU.

Cyber Defence Pledge: Warsaw, “Cyber-attacks present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We agreed in Wales that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. Now, in Warsaw, we reaffirm NATO’s defensive mandate, and recognise cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea”. The Cyber Defence Pledge is designed to assist the nations to strengthen the resiliency of critical networks and infrastructures.
ONE ALLIANCE THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ADAPTED ALLIANCE

▶ **NATO’s East: Warsaw is clear**: “We have decided to establish an Enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to unambiguously demonstrate as part of our overall posture, Allies’ solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression”. The Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of the Alliance on NATO’s Eastern flank has been reinforced by Operation Atlantic Resolve and the return of US armour to Europe. NATO is also furnishing a so-called tailored Forward Presence in the south east of the Alliance, together with a Standing Naval presence. The next phase is to pre-position forces in key parts of Europe, and not just US forces. Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland have already been designated as sites for pre-positioned forces and resources, and a debate is now underway about whether to pre-position more forces further to the east of the Alliance.

In June 2017 battalions from the US, UK, Canada and Germany will forward deploy to Poland and the Baltic States, supported thereafter by fourteen other nations. In January, a force generation conference took place at the NATO regional headquarters in Szczeczin to stand up NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU), and ‘graduated response planning’ is underway so that the Alliance can respond quickly to any emerging threat. It is likely that the Trump administration will maintain and confirm the $3.4bn European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) or European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) as it has been renamed, which in part helps to fund much of the current effort. There is also significant effort underway to ensure NATO forces can degrade the Russian A2/AD (anti-access, area denial) ‘bubble’ in the event of hostilities, and a wider debate is underway about the threat posed by Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave, and the increasingly militarised Crimean Peninsula.

▶ **Ukraine and Russia**: Warsaw states unequivocally that: “An independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic Security”. And that, “Despite its declared commitment to the Minsk Agreements, Russia continues its deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, in violation of international law”. NATO fully recognises that ‘business as usual’ with Russia is extremely difficult given the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine, Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and Russia’s interference in the democratic processes of Europe. However, there is also a genuine Alliance-wide desire to re-establish a level of dialogue between NATO and Moscow with the framework of the 1995 Vienna Document that could in time lead to more trusting relationships.

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) will continue to meet, with efforts underway to reinforce risk-reduction mechanisms to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to air and sea disasters. At present the talks are focused on practical matters, such as de-confliction of forces, re-establishing Russia’s snap military exercises within a trusted notification framework, and promoting air safety in the Baltic Sea. Even though some modest progress on these issues was made at a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on 30 March, 2017 the challenges should not be under-estimated.

▶ **NATO’s South**: NATO’s Framework for the South has led to the establishment of a regional hub for the south at Joint Force Command, Naples. JFC Naples is engaged on a series of exercises all of which are designed to ensure the intelligence picture is sufficiently nuanced so that resorting to the use of armed force takes place as late as possible in the conflict cycle. These exercises aim to match the adversary at every level of escalation, be it a state or a major terrorist/criminal entity such as AQ or ISIS. Particular emphasis is placed on economy of force in what is today called Phase Zero of a conflict, as well as the use of non-military instruments in support of civil authorities, such as the rescuing and transfer of refugees and irregular migrants in the Mediterranean.

▶ **Projecting Stability**: NATO continues to support a large military-led training mission in Afghanistan, as well as afford AWACS support to the coalition fighting ISIS. NATO is also supporting Georgian and Moldovan forces with training to the east of the Alliance, and the forces of Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia to the south. It is also working on a defence institution-building programme with Libya.
Resilience: NATO will be unable to project power and influence if it is unable to play a full role in the protection of Alliance citizens. In 2016 NATO set benchmarks that each nation should meet to promote resilience. NATO is also engaged in an effort to understand where and how it can best contribute to the continuity of governance, emergency preparedness, infrastructure protection, and the effective management of refugees. The Alliance is also considering how best to bolster the internal security of NATO nations to better enable them to deal with threats posed by terrorists and transnational organised criminal networks. All crises generate human misery and refugee flows, and NATO is also looking at how its planning power could be used to assist nations to better manage and process such flows.

NATO’s North: Moscow believes that in the near future the so-called Northeast Passage will become navigable, and there are potentially more hydro-carbons under contested waters in the Arctic than known Saudi oil and gas reserves. Whilst there is a Demarcation Agreement between Norway and Russia that is meant to help avoid conflict Russia has markedly increased its forces in the Arctic region over recent years. Norway’s North Cape is also vital for the egress and ingress of the powerful Russian Northern Fleet (Red Banner Northern Fleet) based in and around the Kola Peninsula. Russia’s new and expanding nuclear hunter-killer or attack submarines are based in the region for easy access to the Atlantic for routine patrols, or to put quickly to sea to interdict North American reinforcement of NATO in the event of war. The bulk of Russia’s strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarine forces are also stationed in the High North to enable access the so-called ‘bastions’ or havens in the Barents Sea from which Russian ballistic missile submarines could launch in relative safety.

Conventional and nuclear deterrent postures: NATO is also considering how best to maintain the credibility of both the Alliance’s conventional and nuclear deterrents, as well as the development of a more cohesive and credible deterrent relationship between them. The current debate within the Alliance primarily concerns force posture and whether there is any need to change it. There are specific doubts in some quarters about the ability of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to perform their sub-strategic nuclear role, and whether they would be capable of penetrating Russia’s air defences, or can be held at a sufficiently high state of readiness for such a role. Given that NATO’s sub-strategic nuclear arsenal sees ageing aircraft pitted against missile-delivered systems the capacity of Alliance forces to deliver payloads against a sophisticated air defence is now a serious concern. Efforts are also being made to strengthen NATO’s nuclear messaging as part of its deterrence posture, as well as enhanced exercising to underpin such strategic communications, all of which were discussed at an important February 2017 NATO Nuclear Consultation Meeting.

NATO’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: ANALYSIS

The Core
Moscow in certain respects wants to turn the clock back by re-establishing the unquestioned control and power of the state. To some extent, such ‘reaction’ is also implicit in Brexit, which if handled without due care and attention could lead to a break-down of political and strategic relations in Europe with profound implications for the political cohesion of the Alliance. There are similar, what some have termed ‘nativist’ reactions across Europe, evident most recently in the French presidential elections, prior to the election of Emmanuel Macron. However, reaction is not confined to Europe. The election of President Donald J. Trump in the US, and his ‘America First’ pledge, also suggest a desire to return to an age when the ideas of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ were unquestionably the source of both power and legitimacy of action. One paradox is that, while there is a demand to return to a time when the nation-state was dominant, when Realpolitik and the national interest were the drivers of policy and the use of force, in the ‘West’ today there are large parts of society which harbour profound doubts about and over the place, use, and utility of force in pursuit of peace and stability. The West suffers from a potentially critical weakness; the ‘End of History’ syndrome. Having preserved peace with the ending of the Cold War many in the West came to believe that they no longer had to compete because the world was no longer comprised of predators and prey. Sadly, the world still contains predators.

There are several factors which may explain this paradox. The changing nature of Western societies with significant numbers of people with multiple loyalties means the state can no longer assume consensus over what constitutes the ‘national interest.’ Continuing economic insecurity, leading to an extended period of austerity in
Europe, is also creating new seams within societies (and between the Allies) that adversaries and enemies seek to exploit, not least through the use of hybrid warfare, radicalisation campaigns, and ‘fake news’ strategies to destabilise and divide through applied strategic disinformation communications.

The East

Russia today under President Putin is an aggressive, revisionist power built upon a fragile political and economic base with ‘over-mighty’ security and defence institutions surrounded by weak post-Soviet successor states. Moscow seeks to re-establish a sphere of influence along its extended border, with a particular focus on the High North, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Even though Russia is dependent on Europe to purchase the bulk of its energy products and shares a similar level of threat from Salafi Islamist-inspired terrorism, it identifies NATO as its primary threat. Moscow is seeking to establish a de facto ‘security buffer’ between its western border and NATO.

The threat posed by Russia comes in both direct and indirect forms. Many in the Alliance believe NATO is well-placed to deter Russia’s conventional threat because of ‘muscle memory’ of the Cold War. However, the use by Moscow of an implied threat to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict to offset what Russia implies is NATO conventional superiority might also suggest that the formal nuclear balance that petrified the Cold War into a form of stability might also be a thing of the past.

Russian forces continue to threaten NATO’s Eastern and South-Eastern flanks. There are some 300,000 troops stationed in Moscow’s Western Military District, which abuts the Alliance. The Enhanced Forward Presence and tailored Forward Presence agreed at the Warsaw Summit are a response to this threat. President Putin continues to support secessionists in Eastern Ukraine, both directly and indirectly, making any resolution to the civil war in Ukraine unlikely for the moment. His illegal 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine was a breach of international law that led to the imposition of a range of sanctions on Russia that are likely to continue. In Syria, not only does Russia’s support for President Assad maintain a genocidal despot in power, President Putin has used Syria as a demonstration of Russian strategic systems and conventional firepower that has undoubtedly raised concerns amongst traditional allies in the region about the resolve and, indeed, the relative military capability of the West. Russia now bears direct responsibility for the continuing humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by backing Assad, and allying with Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other Shi’a extremist elements.

Russia has also established a new concept of ‘soft power’ through its clever use of indirect means to exploit the many social and political seams that now exist within Allied societies, and between Allies. Much of the effort is focused on so-called Hybrid Warfare, which the Russians call Irregular Warfare or Strategic Maskirovka. At the heart of these strategies is the use of offensive cyber warfare to threaten critical national infrastructures in Allied nations, both civil and military, as well as social media campaigns using state-backed mass media such as RT and Sputnik to sow ‘fake news’, which is further propagated and amplified by Russian surrogates and so-called “Trolls”.

These efforts are the latter-day heirs to campaigns by the then Soviet Union to sow dissent and uncertainty in the West. Today, as then, Russia employs a sophisticated diplomatic machine to attempt to divide the West, supports dissenting groups with financial aid, particularly on the right of the political spectrum in Europe, and uses energy supplies and the threat that they might be cut off as political leverage.

The aim of the policy seems to be twofold. First, to re-establish an impression that Russia is the ‘indispensable frenemy’ of the United States and, by extension, convince Washington that only the US and Russia together can shape Europe, and indeed much of the world beyond. Second, that there can be no European security unless Russia enjoys a de facto veto over and above the heads of other Europeans.

Moscow’s strategy suffers from several profound weaknesses. The Russian economy is less than half the size of the British economy. Indeed, Britain, France and Germany all enjoy markedly bigger and far more robust economies than Russia. For all its use of hybrid warfare Unlike Britain, France, and Germany, Russia has very limited innate soft power to utilise in pursuit of its policy goals – be they political, cultural or economic. Russia is also an isolated power that, whilst a member of important international institutions, such as the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operative Security (OSCE), as well as a few regimes such as the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), sees itself as apart from the institutional international order. Russia’s
population also faces social and economic challenges, one of which is the growing burden of a large and growing security and military industrial complex.

Russia’s foreign and security policy seems committed to over-turning much of the established European security order. It relies, doctrinally, on nuclear weapons to offset what Moscow claims to perceive as a relative weakness in Russia’s conventional forces in relation to NATO. The recent deployment of an operational battalion of SSC-8 missiles is in clear breach of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and Russia has withdrawn from the 1991 amended Conventional Forces Europe Treaty. Its use of so-called ‘snap’ exercises, as well as the large-scale Zapad exercises, continue to intimidate its neighbours, whilst the use of military flights that repeatedly and illegally enter the airspace of NATO allies, often with aircraft that have turned off their transponders, not only threatens to trigger dangerous international incidents, but threaten the safety of civilian air travel across the Alliance airspace.

At the same time, Russia is not universally aggressive at all times, and in all sectors. For example, Russia continues to co-operate in space science and exploration, with its launch vehicles a vital component of that effort. Moreover, the Russo-German development of the Nordstream gas pipeline demonstrates the vital importance to the Russian economy of energy co-operation with Europe, as well as the deep ambivalence of some European countries towards sanctions on Russia. It can be argued that Nordstream is in fact a Russo-German political project designed to isolate Ukraine, by bypassing pipelines that traverse Ukrainian territory.

However, it would be a mistake to think that Russia is a weak state that, at some point, will collapse under the weight of its own political, economic, and military-industrial inertia. Russia has a long and ignoble tradition of poor and corrupt governance and the Russian people, for all the burdens they must bear, today enjoy better living standards than hitherto, and widely support Vladimir Putin as a result.

In conclusion Moscow controls a traditional illiberal state employing new techniques and technologies in pursuit of an age-old Russian aim of buttressing the power and authority of the state at home, and expanding its sphere of influence abroad.

The South
There has been a dramatic failure of government and governance across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that has profound implications for the security and defence of the Alliance, particularly the Allies in the south. This failure of governance is further complicated by regional-strategic conflicts, most notably the multifaceted ‘cold war’ between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the several civil wars and frozen conflicts that have been exploited by Sunni Salafi Islamists, most notably Al Qaeda and ISIS. The stabilising of MENA will require reform over a very long period, allied to the extremely carefully combined and tailored-use of aid and development resources, as well as on occasions the clever and considered use of force. The ill-considered consequence of the use of NATO force is apparent on the Alliance’s strategic doorstep. An ill-governed Libya remains an open door for irregular migration into Europe. The challenge and possible threat posed by the South to the Alliance is thus generational, and possibly existential in both scope and nature, and can thus be said to be at least as great as that posed by a revisionist Russia.

The pressures across MENA are further intensified by the demographic bulge within it, particularly the burgeoning youth population. Link this bulge, and the inability of states in the region to provide education or employment, to similar pressure in sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa, and the reasons for mass migration become apparent and will become more alarming over time. Indeed, whilst the war in Syria is seen as the cause celebre of recent mass migration into Europe the causes and drivers of it represent the possible beginning of a structural shift in populations, further exacerbated by violent extremism and economic factors such as climate change, most notably desertification.

States in the region could also pose a threat to the Alliance, most notably Iran. However, it is the non-state threat that is the greater danger today, especially if actors such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and their affiliates, work in harness with organised criminals and criminal networks. Such groups now control spaces beyond the reach of organized government across much of the region and threaten to penetrate and further destabilise European society through drug and human-trafficking, as well as repatriating AQ and ISIS ‘fighters’ into Europe. There is also a more insidious threat to Europe and beyond that posed by states in the region that are funding mosques,
madrassas (Islamic schools) and often radical clerics. Finally, there is the danger that the Shia-Sunni confessional divide, which is now well-established in Europe, could become ‘weaponised’. In some places, Europe is already witnessing a struggle of conversion within the Muslim population of Shism over being Sunni.

One traditionally associates ‘deterrence’ with conventional and nuclear force balances. However, the ability of Salafi Islamists to radicalise members of Europe’s growing Muslim populations could also act as a deterrent to the West involving itself in MENA. Unfortunately, since the so-called Arab Spring began, the West has had no option but to involve itself in MENA because critical and vital interests are at stake, but rarely to effect.

In conclusion, it must not be assumed that US and European interests are necessarily aligned across MENA. One consequence of the Obama years was that whilst the Eastern Mediterranean remains an area of vital US interest, the Central and Western Mediterranean is today less so. Whilst the latter is a vital interest to Europeans recent events have demonstrated that European simply lack the civil and military capabilities and capacities, as well as the necessary strategic guile and political will to act effectively if the US chooses not to, even if their own vital interests are at stake.

The North
Climate change and the opening of the so-called Northeast Passage, allied to the discovery of huge reserves of hydrocarbons within the Arctic Circle, could turn NATO’s High North into a contested region.

The retreat of the ice cap looks likely to open a new strategic sea route across the north of the globe that would shorten the route between Asia and Europe by some three hundred nautical miles. Moscow has reinforced its forces of late to NATO’s north, partly to control this vital sea-lane of communication (SLOC). Moscow also lays claim to much of the seabed in the region and the minerals and hydrocarbons that lay under it. Russia is also strengthening its Northern Red Banner Fleet, particularly its nuclear submarine hunter-killer or attack (SSN) and nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) forces. As indicated above, Russia regards the Barents Sea as vital to the maintenance of the so-called ‘Bastions’ from which Russian submarines could launch a relatively ‘safe’ first or second-strike nuclear attack on the West. Moscow also regards the ingress and egress of its Northern Fleet via the Norwegian Sea and through the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap as vital to its defence strategy.

Recent tensions in and over the island of Svalbard, which is an autonomous Norwegian archipelago, reinforce the view that Moscow again sees the Arctic region as a zone of vital interest. Even though there are various ‘demarcations agreements’ in place to share the sea-bed it is likely Russia will contest both space and access and once again Norway’s North Cape will become an area of vital interest to both the Allies and Russia.

Emphasis at this stage must be to avoid the militarisation of the contest, and rather promote the search for a peaceful and equitable balance. Indeed, there is some evidence Moscow might be open to such a ‘deal’.

The NATO-EU Strategic Partnership
The Alliance will need a range of partners, but the EU will be the indispensable partner. However, both NATO and the EU are facing centripetal forces. There is popular discontent with the ‘European Project’, whilst eight years of economic austerity and low growth, much of it blamed on the European sovereign debt and Eurozone crises, has weakened the trust between European people and the European elite. A weak EU also makes NATO vulnerable.

At the same time, both NATO and the EU have made significant progress towards deeper and more systematic co-operation. And, whilst the EU still retains ambitions in the defence sphere, NATO no longer regards such ambitions as a threat to the Alliance. Indeed, if the EU can assist in increasing European military capabilities and capacity the Alliance now welcomes such efforts. In time the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its subordinate Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) could become the European pillar of the Alliance. This is made more likely by the pending departure of Britain from the EU, London having long-regarded the creation of a European Defence Union (EDU), along the lines proposed inter alia by Berlin, as potentially weakening the Alliance.

However, there are also frictions that remain. For example, implicit in an EDU is the creation of a European Strategic Headquarters, which creates a dilemma for NATO. The creation of such new military infrastructure
is expensive and could divert vital funds away from the NATO Defence Investment Pledge. Equally, a new EU headquarters might be the necessary political price to pay to convince certain European states and their leaders to properly invest in defence. EDU also poses an important question about future EU-NATO relations that go beyond the now obsolete Berlin-Plus arrangements. Then there is an issue of flags-to-posts. With Britain leaving the EU should the British continue to retain the post of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR)? In the event of a ‘European operation’ DSACEUR would take command of such an operation because the post is ‘dual-hatted’. Could a Briton still fulfil that role? All of this suggests that further and deeper co-operation will also need to see further and deeper harmonisation of EU and NATO defence planning.

A central premise of this paper is that the projection of stability, influence and power is unlikely to take place to effect without a demonstrable ability to protect the people of Europe. Whilst NATO will remain in the lead on questions of hard power, particularly at the higher ends of the conflict spectrum, it is self-evident that the EU will have an ever-more important role to play in what might be termed European homeland security. This role will be particularly important in countering malicious non-state actors and terrorists.

Furthermore, NATO will be unable to deal with complex threats and contingencies in and of itself. The NATO-EU partnership will be particularly important in the combatting of what might be called the ‘new threats’; hybrid warfare, cyber-warfare, and malicious strategic communications. Some consideration might be given to an EU-NATO Cyber-Resilience Centre, although to realise such an initiative contentions such as those between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey will need to be carefully and sensitively managed. The EU will also have to accept that during a major crisis NATO would have to play a pivotal role, not least as part of consequence management and military support to civil authorities in the wake of a catastrophe. The technical and industrial bases of the EU will also be indispensable, indeed critical, to NATO’s anticipation of the hyper war challenges ahead.

The Warsaw Summit states that: "We have taken steps to ensure our ability to effectively address the challenges posed by hybrid warfare, where a broad, complex, and adaptive combination of conventional and non-conventional means, and overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are taken in a highly-integrated design by state and non-state actors to achieve their objectives". Of the forty-two points in the NATO-EU Joint Action Plan agreed at the Warsaw Summit, some fourteen of them were devoted to combatting hybrid warfare. The EU is standing up an EU Hybrid Warfare Intelligence and Analysis Centre that will work closely with the Alliance in its own efforts to improve and enhance analysis and assessment, and generate the early indicators vital to preventing and combatting such attacks.

In conclusion, NATO and the EU need each other. However, if Brexit leads to a profound political split between Britain and many of its European partners then the implications for the Adapted Alliance would be profound. This would be especially the case if the British people are asked to defend Allies they believe are trying to punish Britain for leaving the EU. The ‘softening’ of the security and defence commitment to the Alliance of Europe’s most formidable Intelligence power and leading military actor would undermine Europe’s security and defence. Equally, the NATO EU strategic partnership has never been more important to European security and defence, and there can be no question that NATO and its mission would be far better enabled by an effective EU.

**New Technologies and the Twenty-First Century Character of War**

NATO faces three offset ‘threats’. The first offset threat to NATO is Russia’s growing reliance on nuclear weapons to offset what Moscow sees as NATO’s on-paper conventional military superiority. The second offset threat is that posed by Al Qaeda and Islamic State and related groups to Allied societies, and with it the danger that terrorism will erode the protection of the home base, and thus profoundly weaken the ability of the Alliance to project security and stability beyond its borders. However, there is a third offset threat posed by America’s own offset strategy. Technology drives and shapes policy and strategy often as much as it is shaped by them. There is now a very real danger now that technologically-driven US military strategy will advance so far ahead of allies that military interoperability, and in time political cohesion, will become impossible to maintain.

Russia’s offset strategy is far more narrowly drawn than that of the US. Russian military strategy today emphasises the possible use of nuclear weapons (‘escalate to de-escalate’), the need to gain local military superiority, and by keeping adversaries politically and socially off-balance render them unable to mount a cohesive defence, let

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12 These figures were relayed to the Steering Committee by a senior NATO official under the Chatham House rule.
alone a credible offence. The specific focus of Russian ‘offset’ efforts include the development of autonomous, robotic and remotely-controlled systems; new generation electronic warfare and expanded offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, advanced command and control systems, including the extensive use of battlefield internet, and enhanced ultra-range air defence and missile defence systems, including anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. The aim of the strategy is to offset advantages in Allied air power, and thus gain strategic and tactical air superiority.

Russia is rapidly developing advanced fighters designed specifically to counter the West’s 5th Generation aircraft, such as F22 Raptor and F35 Lightning II. Russia is also developing a new generation of armoured vehicles that will enhance battlefield mobility and reduce the vulnerability of deployed Russian forces. Like the Americans, the Russians are developing hyper-sonic weapons, but unlike the Americans looking to develop new nuclear warheads to deploy atop its next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are in turn being future-proofed against next generation missile defence systems. Moscow is also looking to develop directed energy weapons. Finally, much of this capability will rely on artificial intelligence and deep learning, an area of advantage yet to be fully embraced by the US, much less NATO.

Al Qaeda and Islamic State also employ offset strategies. The most obvious of these strategies is their use of open borders and Western nationals to circumvent the intelligence and police forces of Western states. The success of this strategy is most apparent in the use of so-called ‘lone-wolf’ attacks on soft targets in the West, particularly, but not exclusively, in Europe. The scope, nature and extent of media coverage generated by such attacks means they also generate influence and impact far beyond the scale of the mayhem they actually cause, however nasty that may be. This helps further undermine trust in the credibility of elites and establishments in Alliance nations.

If Russia and other adversaries use the internet to sow disinformation, both Al Qaeda and Islamic State use the internet not only to sow disinformation, but also to radicalise and recruit activists from within Western societies. The increasing number of secure, encrypted phone applications enable these adversaries to co-ordinate and activate them through unheard of operationally secure communications. Such groups also use the resources available to them within an open society to build bombs and acquire munitions, with the internet the medium of choice to offer instruction in bomb-building. It is a threat close to home. Only a few kilometres from NATO HQ hand guns and automatic weapons were allegedly purchased on the black market close to Brussels Midi station shortly before the August 2015 attack on a Thalys train travelling between Brussels and Paris. This raises the additional challenge of the increasing cooperation and synergy between terror groups and highly sophisticated criminal networks with global reach. It is a reality that argues even more forcefully for a close EU/NATO security relationship.

Islamic State has already exploited the European migration crisis to insert foreign fighters into Europe, and re-insert returning Salafist jihadis into European societies. Indeed, the refusal of much of Europe’s leaders to properly recognise a link between the terrorist threat and the migration crisis has helped to further undermine popular trust in political elites, accounting in no small measure for the rise of populist, nativist political parties. These are the very same causes that have been supported by Russian cyber and influence campaigns which aim to undermine the cohesion of the EU, a critical objective of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy.

In November 2014 then US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the Third Offset Strategy via the creation of a future US joint force that could simultaneously, and in parallel, defend the homeland, conduct a global counter-terrorism campaign, assure allies, and deter adversaries in multiple regions the world over. Maintaining an Alliance that is by and large in line with ‘adapted’ US military strategy, with Canadian and European armed forces sufficiently advanced to be able to operate to effect alongside their American counterparts, is a main driver of Adaptation. It will also prove a profound challenge even if paradoxically the US offset ‘threat’ to NATO is posed by American efforts to ‘offset’ the very adversaries and enemies the Alliance must defend against.

The US is looking to develop a range of capabilities and capacities the consequences of which will widen the already significant chasm between the capabilities of US forces and those of its European Allies. At the high-

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end of the conflict spectrum such developments include new nuclear and space-based capabilities, advanced
sensors, extreme range stand-off weapons and communication systems designed for engaging in far distant
contested theatres, the development of advanced missile defences, as well as offensive and defensive cyber
capabilities.

The US is also looking to the future of warfare by seeking to decisively exploit new technologies. These
technologies include autonomous systems, unmanned undersea vehicles, advanced sea-mines, high-speed
strike weapons, advanced aeronautics, electromagnetic rail-guns, and high-energy lasers. The US Long-Range
Research and Development Planning Program is also looking into areas such as robotics, system autonomy,
miniaturisation, scaling big data, artificial intelligence and deep-learning. To that end, the Pentagon is keen to
develop a more innovative relationship with US industry, to better exploit the entire national supply chain (not
simply the defence supply chain) through a form of entrepreneurial security and defence procurement, locking
both innovation and competition into the provision of the future force.

Meanwhile, the convergence of artificial intelligence, deep learning, natural language processing, computer
vision and autonomous systems portends a profound change in the character of war, where the speed of
conflict shrinks the decision-action loop to heretofore unprecedented dimensions. Dubbed “hyper war”, for
the enormous compression of time and effect in conflict it portends, the technological requirements to wage
offensive operations or to defend in an environment of hyper war, are both dramatic and expensive. Given the
investments Russia and China are making at this uber high-end of conflict, perhaps soon to be vastly enhanced
with the mastery and integration of quantum computing, the reality of future war is daunting to say the least.
NATO must be capable of operating simultaneously at both ends of the conflict spectrum. However, whilst
NATO struggles with the challenges of hybrid warfare, it could potentially be surprised by hyper war, with little
capacity either to defend against or defeat a concerted attack.

In conclusion, defence innovation is key to creating a new defence and force strategy that could maximise
strengths and offset weaknesses across and throughout the conflict spectrum. Innovation is also the key to
the maintenance of Allied comparative strategic advantage via enhanced intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, allied to technological superiority. The need is critical precisely because adversaries of all
stripes are systematically studying US and Allied weaknesses, and vulnerabilities and how to exploit them.
Therefore, NATO Adaptation must engage the Alliance as a whole in the innovation arms race.

**Defence Investment**

Europeans are far behind in considering, let alone investing in, the new technologies and science that will drive
and define the character of war and conflict in the twenty-first century. Without a clear plan for spending, based
upon a clearly established NATO requirements system, the additional resources from meeting the 2 percent
GDP per annum Defence Investment Pledge, together with 20 percent of that invested in new equipment, will
be meaningless unless such efforts are co-ordinated across the entirety of the requirements identified. This
effort, and Adaptation with it, must be based on a NATO strategy designed from the outset to deal honestly and
credibly with a dangerous strategic environment. Put simply, if the Alliance is not resourced, and/or squanders
accumulated resources for want of an alliance-wide spending plan, then any chance the Alliance will be properly
adapted to meet the threats and challenges of the strategic environment of today and tomorrow will come to
nought.

For many years, European defence spending, and the defence policy within which it resides, has been driven by
industrial and employment policy, not defence policy. Such convolutions as ‘juste retour’, ‘cost plus’, ‘workshare’,
and even ‘Smart Defence’, have helped drive cost, inefficiency and ineffectiveness into acquisition and
procurement, supply chains, and the life-cycle management of defence equipment. Such practices have also
helped push defence cost inflation significantly above general inflation, and reduced the scale and quality of
equipment available to Alliance forces and made delivery a long and tortuous process. Using defence as a form
of subsidised barrier against competitiveness and reform has also seen the maintenance of too many low-tech
‘metal bashers’ and undermined much-needed investment in vital ‘systems integrators’.

Better and quicker decision-making on spending will be vital also to speed up chronically slow fielding times.
In Europe it is hard to escape the need for root-and-branch reform of the entire European Defence and
Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB). However, the US also needs to reform its procurement and acquisition
practices. Whilst aspects of the F-35/JSF programme have suggested a new approach to collaboration within the Alliance, with Britain in particular a partner rather than a client from the outset of the programme, the co-operation has at best been lumpy. Within the F35 programme the US has tried to resist British access to so-called ‘black box’ technologies, even when British technologies have been an important element in the black box. Worse, US export control licenses often get in the way of Allied defence-industrial collaboration because they are driven as much by parochial political concerns as they are the risk that sensitive US defence technologies might fall into the wrong hands.

Furthermore, a lot of the effort for defence industrial integration in Europe will fall to the EU, even if much of the effort to establish requirements and to maintain defence industrial interoperability lies with NATO. In Europe, a far deeper level of integration is needed across the procurement cycle from concept to retirement. Indeed, without deeper integration in Europe and improved harmonisation across the Atlantic it is hard to see how all-important military interoperability will be maintained into the future.

In effect, the adapted Alliance needs an outcome-led defence investment strategy. In an ideal world, defence investments would be driven purely by the policy and strategy that emerge from a considered analysis of the strategic environment. In reality, such investments are invariably an unhappy marriage of strategy and affordability. For the Alliance, given the nature of the emerging threats, that means a conscious effort and rationalised process to identify the military instruments it will require to mount a credible deterrence and defence posture. Policy and strategy would be reinforced by a proper understanding of the full spectrum of force and resources the Alliance will need.

Indeed, by shifting to an outcomes-led strategy, which a focus on military instruments would entail, it is far more likely that the Alliance and the Allies could realise better choices and better strategy. The need is pressing. Even if the Allies realise only 50% of the increased defence spending explicit in the Defence Investment Pledge that would mean an additional $50bn by 2024. However, experience also suggests that in the absence of reasoned and considered strategy sharp, politically-motivated increases in public spending tend simply to lead to a large waste of substantial amounts of public money, particularly in the defence sector. Hence the political penchant for input rather than outcome-led measures of performance. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) would have an important role to play in establishing the basis for rational defence choices by the Allies. However, the NDPP must be made more central to the defence planning of Allies to perform such a function.

To conclude, if the US wants allies with which it can work, and which will be vital to keeping over-stretched US forces strong where they will need to be strong, then ‘America Together’ might be a better mantra than ‘America First’, particularly when it comes to defence-industrial collaboration between the Allies and the sharing of sensitive technologies.

In the past NATO and its nations have tended to enjoy the ‘luxury’ of being able to confront threats in isolation, or at least sequentially, firm in the belief they enjoy comparative technological advantage. Today, whilst there might be no formal alliance between illiberal states, global-reach criminal networks, and the likes of Al Qaeda and Islamic State, there are clearly links. NATO must be able to deter and defend successfully against a range of such threats across the conflict spectrum, in multiple domains, and possibly at one and the same time, and in whatever complex form they take. This is an enormous demand upon an Alliance with a decision-making model structured around consensus. A further challenge is that the need for new strategy also takes place during a time of economic duress, particularly in Europe. Oftentimes paucity has driven innovation. However, the parallel focus of many NATO members on strict austerity policies has effectively paralysed innovation across much of the defence space, particularly in Europe.

Adaptation will only work if the adapted NATO’s ends, ways and means are in sync with a sustained, systematic, and holistic Allied strategy to offset attempts by China, Russia, and indeed AQ and Islamic State, to offset what they perceive to be allied (usually American strengths). Worse, there is a very real danger that efforts by adversaries and enemies to offset US strengths, will render an already far weaker and far more vulnerable Europe, critically vulnerable to attack. That, to say the least, would be a paradox.
CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to scope the challenges, risk, threats and opportunities faced by the Alliance, and which drive the GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative. The May meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government has implicitly endorsed the approach of the project to Adaptation with its focus on improved burden-sharing, the strengthening of the so-called ‘Transatlantic Bond’, and the need for an enhanced NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy. The meeting also considered the many seams, gaps, and vulnerabilities faced by the Alliance today, and the need for a mind-set change on the part of all the Allies if NATO is to be adapted to meet the challenges faced by all of the Allies.

NATO remains the cornerstone alliance not only for Europe’s security, but for much of the world beyond. However, NATO is but one component and to be successful in its mission the Alliance will need not only to become part of a network of stabilising institutions the world over, but far more ‘comprehensive’ in the way it considers its own role in contemporary and future security and defence.

In 1932 the British Imperial General Staff scrapped the so-called ‘Ten Year Rule’ by which London assumed it would not be involved in another major war for at least a decade. In so doing London immediately changed the basis for the defence policy it made thereafter. If today’s Alliance is to meet the challenges of today’s and tomorrow’s security environment, which this paper describes, then the Allies must end the unstated, but nevertheless very real Ten Year Rule which continues to reside in the minds of leaders in many Allied nations, albeit a Ten Year Rule with a twist. Not only do many within the Alliance refuse to believe a major war involving themselves and their nations could happen within a decade, they are unwilling to engage in the kind of ten year plus strategy that stabilising NATO’s south will require. Be it to NATO’s East, South, or North; deterrence, stabilisation, engagement, and, if needs be, conflict will demand a step change in thinking and acting which can only come first from a better and common understanding of NATO’s place in the world.

Something really bad really could happen. Deciding and acting in an environment of uncertainty demands an inherent willingness to accept risk, and in an alliance to share risk. If Allies are risk averse then they are, in and of themselves, self-defeating. In such an environment, the very uncertainty that drives their risk aversion will ultimately immobilise processes paralyse decision-making, a ‘paralysing factor’ that will ensure failure and defeat. The ultimate bellwether is of course money and the willingness or otherwise of Allies to commit to defence spending in the face of a host of competing demands, and an increasingly diverse threat environment. The paradox is that sound investment in an age of uncertainty is the very commodity that by promoting security dilutes and in time banishes uncertainty. Conversely, failure to invest accelerates and exaggerates uncertainty and thus guarantees negative strategic political consequences simply by ceding the field to others.

It is for that reason this project is committed to writing Harmel 2.0. For, without such ambition NATO Adaptation will fall short in a strategic environment that is at best unforgiving, and at worst catastrophic.

Some ages past forgave mediocrity. This is no such age.

THE GLOBSEC NATO ADAPTATION INITIATIVE STEERING COMMITTEE
May 2017
GLOBSEC NATO ADAPTATION INITIATIVE

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ONE ALLIANCE  THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ADAPTED ALLIANCE

SUPPORTING PAPER

THE POLITICAL ADAPTATION OF THE ALLIANCE

By Alexander Vershbow¹

“In light of the changed and evolving security environment, further adaptation is needed. Therefore, we have decided to further strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture.”

— The Warsaw Summit Communique, 8–9 July 2018

THE ALLIES MUST FACE POLITICAL REALITY

America’s NATO allies have been breathing easier in recent weeks. Amidst the confusion of the new administration’s first weeks, President Donald Trump has said that he views the North Atlantic Alliance as of “fundamental importance” in his conversations with NATO leaders.

But this is no time for complacency in European capitals. The President has made clear on numerous occasions that he considers NATO obsolete and that it is not doing enough to address what is, for him, the #1 threat; international terrorism. His comments during the presidential campaign raised serious doubts about his commitment to Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty, when he linked the US defence guarantee to allies spending more on defence.

Whatever his ultimate stance, it’s clear that President Trump will take a transactional approach to the Alliance, and that he believes that allies are not holding up their end of the deal. He seems to be posing the question in these terms: “I know what you expect me to do for NATO. But what is NATO doing for me?”

Allies should view this not as a threat, but as an opportunity – an opportunity to demonstrate NATO’s practical value to the United States and global security. Indeed, rather than waiting for the next tweet from the White House, allies should start talking about a bolder agenda for the Alliance – one that the new administration can take up and defend as a “new deal” for the Alliance, for the United States, and for transatlantic relations. Make NATO the “indispensable Alliance” – militarily and politically – for the Trump era.

SHARE MORE OF THE MILITARY BURDEN, INCLUDING COUNTER-TERRORISM...

What might such a “new deal” entail? On the military side, the Alliance is already heading in the right direction. Since Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine three years ago, Allies have done much better than is often recognized in rebuilding NATO’s defence and deterrence posture – the biggest increase since the height of the Cold War – and in reversing years of cuts in defence budgets. Of particular note, European allies and Canada have taken the leading role in NATO’s enhanced forward presence in the Baltic States, and in providing the forces for NATO’s rapidly deployable “spearhead” force. But there’s more work to be done. Going forward, allies need to do their share in fielding the follow-on forces – ground, air and naval – and the critical enablers needed to back up these “first responders.” Right now, the US provides the lion’s share of these forces, and allies should commit to shouldering at least 50% of the burden.

On the military fight against terrorism, allies are also doing more than is often appreciated. All 28 allies participate in the anti-ISIS coalition, even though it is not a NATO operation as such, and several are conducting air strikes in Iraq and Syria. Allies continue to match US force contributions in Afghanistan aimed at boosting the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Afghan security forces. So part of the answer to President Trump is to maintain these military commitments, and be prepared to increase them as needed to deliver a decisive blow to ISIS

¹ A version of this paper first appeared on the NATO Source blog of the Atlantic Council, 14 February 2017
and other terrorist groups. NATO’s effectiveness in countering terrorism can be further enhanced by standing up a new “strategic hub” for the South within NATO’s Command Structure, as was agreed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit.

NATO could also contribute more to efforts aimed at preventing terrorist attacks within the territory of its members. While this is primarily a national and EU responsibility, with law enforcement and interior ministries in the lead, NATO’s newly upgraded intelligence division, with its secure communications links to Allied capitals, could become a clearinghouse for exchanging classified terrorist threat information among allied internal security agencies on a real-time basis. The EU lacks the secure networks to exchange classified intelligence information in real time, so NATO would be filling a real gap while helping to make its people safer.

When it comes to defence and counter-terrorism capabilities, the biggest challenge is resources, and this is where President Trump has good reason to complain. The huge (70:30) gap in spending between the United States and the rest of the Alliance is simply unacceptable and politically unsustainable. Although total defence spending across NATO is beginning to rise, there is more the European allies and Canada could do to rectify the imbalance. For example, allies could take the initiative by making an unconditional commitment to reach the 2% of GDP target (now met by only five allies) by 2019, five years ahead of the Wales Summit deadline, and to aim for 2.5% of GDP by 2022. And they could pledge to meet the equally important target of devoting 20% of defence budgets to new equipment and R&D – a benchmark met by only ten allies – by 2019 as well. These commitments could be the centre-piece of the NATO Summit scheduled for the end of May. Thinking transactionally, allies could indicate that, in return, they expect a similarly unconditional commitment by President Trump to the Article 5 security guarantee and to a robust US presence in Europe. They could point out that Article 5 benefits the United States as much as the other allies (after all, the only time it has been invoked was after the US was attacked on 9/11, and allied aircraft patrolled US skies). Moreover, a strong NATO, grounded in an unequivocal commitment by all allies to Article 5, is the prerequisite for any serious effort to reengage Russia based on “peace through strength.” If President Trump wants a new deal with President Putin, he should proceed on the basis of a unified alliance approach, removing any ambiguity in Putin’s mind that he can get away with reckless behaviour or wedge-driving against NATO.

...BUT DO EVEN MORE TO EXPAND NATO’S POLITICAL ROLE...

If allies are heading in the right direction on the military side, the same cannot be said about NATO’s political mission. The threats to the Alliance in recent years have become increasingly diverse, including, to the South; jihadist terrorism, regional instability, failing states and uncontrolled migration; while to the East; cyber-attacks, influence operations and other “hybrid” threats, to name a few. These are less easily addressed by military means. They call for increased efforts by NATO and its members to strengthen their own resilience and to build the resilience of key partners on their eastern and southern frontiers. Bolstering neighbours’ ability to provide for their own security can reduce the need for more costly military interventions down the road.

At the Warsaw Summit last July, NATO leaders announced a new series of programs along these lines, under the banner of “projecting stability.” These included military training and capacity building for countries like Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Georgia, Moldova and possibly Libya. They also renewed their decision to provide maritime surveillance to assist EU and national efforts to control illegal migration. This all sounds good, but the scale of these initiatives is painfully small. In reality NATO is playing a marginal role in addressing what allied publics see as the most immediate threats to their security: terrorism and the uncontrolled migration that has followed in its wake. Allies are too quick to offer excuses why this must remain the case: lack of resources; a desire to avoid provoking Russia or antagonizing Arab publics who allegedly dislike NATO; an unwillingness to involve NATO in areas where the EU is already engaged.

Here too, rather than waiting for the Trump Administration to act, allies should come forward with a more ambitious political agenda for NATO and commit the financial resources to make it effective.

This could include a more direct Alliance role in the international coalition to counter ISIS. For example, NATO could offer to take the lead in coordinating long-term training and capacity-building for the Iraqi security forces following the re-conquest of Mosul, permitting the United States to shift its combat forces to other fronts in the
war against ISIS. Making NATO the “trainer in chief” would build on the Alliance’s experience in Afghanistan and the earlier NATO Training Mission in Iraq. It would put the political weight of the whole Alliance behind efforts to press Iraqi Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds to work together, thereby helping to prevent a resurgence of ISIS and ensuring that the U.S. would not need to intervene in Iraq for a third time. Beyond Iraq, allies could propose a major expansion of NATO defence capacity building programmes in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa and in Eastern Europe, which now represent a fraction of what the United States does bilaterally. Helping Ukraine, Georgia and other Eastern neighbours to defend themselves is the best way to discourage further aggression by Russia. And helping Middle Eastern neighbours build reliable defence institutions, secure their borders, and fight terrorism in their own regions is the best way to prevent them from becoming failed states and safe havens for ISIS. It would be a tangible way for NATO to address the root causes of the migration crisis and home-grown terrorism. In some areas, such as North Africa, this could be done in partnership with the EU. It makes no sense to compete with one another, when there is more than enough work to go around for both organizations. Finally, allies should support a bigger NATO role in responding to efforts to undermine political institutions in member states, in countering radicalization and violent extremism within our own populations, and in defending against highly sophisticated influence operations, disinformation and “active measures” by Russia, such as the recent hacking attacks to influence the US election. These are not traditionally problems within NATO’s mandate, but they are just as important as defending our borders. Here too, close collaboration with the EU makes sense – in countering propaganda and disinformation, in sharing intelligence about cyber and other hybrid threats, and in conducting joint exercises to ensure that “little green men” are not able to do to our countries what they did to Ukraine.

...AND MAINTAIN A UNIFIED ALLIED APPROACH TO RUSSIA AND UKRAINE.

The last, and most challenging, piece of a new political strategy for NATO is how to engage with Russia, even as we seek to deter and counter the multiple threats it poses. Relations with Moscow are at their lowest point in decades, and President Trump is certainly right in wanting to explore possibilities for reducing the risk of conflict, lowering tensions and finding areas for mutually beneficial cooperation. But allies should insist that any engagement with Russia be based on a unified Alliance approach, one that addresses head-on the fundamental reason why relations have deteriorated in the first place – Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its violation of the rules that have kept the peace in Europe in the decades since the end of World War II. Most importantly, allies should urge that the Trump administration stick to the transatlantic consensus that any easing of the sanctions on Russia, and any return to practical cooperation between NATO and Russia, should be contingent on full implementation of the Minsk agreements and restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over the Donbas, including control of its international borders. Anything less would reward Russian aggression and only embolden Putin to further destabilize his neighbours. Holding firm on sanctions and maintaining a strong NATO defense posture will provide the foundation of strength that is needed to engage Russia in a dialogue that brings benefits to both sides.

THE POLITICAL ADAPTATION OF THE ALLIANCE

In sum, if the Trump Administration is going to view NATO in transactional terms, then the other allies should think transactionally as well: They should make clear that allies are ready to “go big” by increasing NATO’s practical value to the United States and to transatlantic security. They should indicate their readiness to support a NATO that does more – politically as well as militarily – on today’s biggest threats and challenges, and serves as the foundation for a principled, mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. In this way, allies can ensure that NATO becomes as indispensable to the United States in the Trump era as it has been for the past 68 years.

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SUPPORTING PAPER

THE MILITARY ADAPTATION OF THE ALLIANCE

By Karl-Heinz Kamp and Wolf Langheld

“Through the longer term Adaptation Measures of the Readiness Action Plan, we have...Enhanced the NATO Response Force (NRF), increasing its readiness and substantially enlarging its size, making it a more capable and flexible joint force comprised of a division-size land element with air, maritime, and special operations forces components.”

— The Warsaw Summit Communique, 8–9 July, 2016

INTRODUCTION

Over the coming years NATO must be the primary instrument in changing the role of the bulk of European armed forces from being mere stabilisation and nation-building forces lacking a sufficient level of warfighting capability into a more integrated force which is verifiably trained and able to fight brigade or division-size units inside and outside of NATO territory. NATO forces must be capable of fighting high-intensity battles with both robustness and endurance, generate a demonstrable ability to effectively counter and withstand large-scale conventional attacks, operate in a nuclear environment, and be able to progressively engage new and currently little understood threats arising from cyber-attacks in what is a new domain of warfare. In other words, NATO must change from being a post-Cold War crisis management institution into a last resort “go-to-war” Alliance reinforced by an appropriately robust mind-set among its political and military leaders. Under Adaptation there are four critical areas of NATO’s military posture which require particular attention; the NATO Command Structure, the NATO Force Structure, Force Generation, and the re-creation of military manoeuvre.

Colonel J. F. C. Fuller created what he called the Master Principle of Military Doctrine. (FN) NATO’s Master Principle must be to require and support Alliance nations to generate and maintain a critical (and lasting) military advantage across nine domains of security and defence: air, land, sea, space, cyber, knowledge, education/training and resilience. One of the critical enablers, particularly with respect to the Russian threat in Europe and a credible defence and deterrence posture, will be logistics. This requirement goes far beyond the pure availability of transportation capabilities as the rapid movement of large-scale Alliance forces in an emergency will require serious changes to EU and national legislation to permit such a movement of forces across borders.

A ROBUST ALLIANCE?

In other words, NATO must change from being a post-Cold War crisis management institution into a last resort “go-to-war” Alliance reinforced by an appropriately robust mind-set among its political and military leaders. Specifically, this aim will require NATO to generate and maintain a critical (and lasting) military advantage across nine domains of security and defence: air, land, sea, space, cyber, knowledge, education/training and resilience. One of the critical enablers, particularly with respect to the Russian threat in Europe and a credible defence and deterrence posture, will be logistics. This requirement goes far beyond the pure availability of transportation capabilities as the rapid movement of large-scale Alliance forces in an emergency will require serious changes to EU and national legislation to permit such a movement of forces across borders.

NATO’S FOUR MILITARY ADAPTATIONS

Under Adaptation four critical areas of NATO’s military posture require particular attention; the NATO Command Structure, the NATO Force Structure, Force Generation, and the re-creation of military manoeuvre, and NATO Command Structure (NCS): In light of the deteriorating security environment post 2014, NATO agreed at the
Warsaw Summit to again review its command structure. However, a simple review will be inadequate as a driver of the agreed Adaptation because the current Alliance command structure is based on the Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved in November 2010. And, although the triple missions of collective defence, crisis management, and co-operative security remain intellectually valid the strategic context demands a rebalancing of efforts between the three missions. This document was intended to last about a decade, but lost significant relevance either as political guidance or a planning driver with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Further blows to the lasting and enduring validity of NATO’s strategy comes from the ongoing destabilization of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which requires the Alliance to refocus and re-balance its attention not only to the east, but also to the south. Consequently, given these pressures and the policy and strategy Adaptation they are driving many NATO Allies now argue in favour of developing a new, updated Strategic Concept relevant to the essential challenges and changes in the security landscape. However, the earliest option for tasking NATO with initiating a new strategy debate would be the so-called “Mini Summit” in May 2017, which is traditionally reserved for providing a transatlantic forum for the newly elected US President.

However, even if the Alliance’s Heads of State and Government used the occasion to launch a new Strategic Concept, or rather the process towards the drafting of it, it would take far too long to provide NATO with appropriate structures for rapid and successful military action. Rather, NATO urgently needs to structurally include the commitment to military adaptation enshrined in Paragraph 37 of the Warsaw Summit Declaration into its military posture. These elements would necessarily include the various elements of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), including the further strengthening of the enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF), and the Enhanced Forward Presence in Eastern Europe. In other words, if the Alliance is to successfully realise a ‘360 Degree Approach’ NATO must swiftly develop and adapt structures for the simultaneous command of collective defence and collective security operations, not only to the east and eventually to the south, but also to the high north or deep into the Atlantic. Like it or not, and even if politically sensitive, NATO is unlikely to be able to avoid a form of command regionalisation, at least in the sense of prioritising the areas of main interest and concentrated military focus.

NATO Force Structure (NFS) and Force Generation: NATO’s force structure has never adequately implemented the framework provided for by the command structure, as both were mutually insufficient. There have been several problems. NATO nations provide headquarters or forces of varying quality and quantity. Moreover, the availability and readiness of these forces during times of crisis is highly questionable. Instead, too often both the command structure and force structure were seen by most nations as ‘stone pits’ for them to further cut their respective capabilities and expenditures. NATO has thus provided an alibi for, and a tacit acceptance of, cuts to both the command and force structures. These cuts were partly justified because in the security environment prior to 2014 territorial defence operations under Article-5 scenarios appeared to be extremely unlikely. Consequently, training and exercising of the entire command structure has been carelessly neglected over many years; a form of defence negligence that can no longer be acceptable if the defence and deterrence posture is to remain credible. For example, from 2015 NATO increased its training activities and has step-by-step begun to include realistic conflict scenarios. However, NATO exercising and training is still a very long way from the kind of sobering but authentic scenarios for which the Alliance trained (as an Alliance) in the old days of the WINTEX exercises (Winter Exercise) during the Cold War.

Exercising and training are not only a pre-condition for sending credible deterrence messages to any imaginable opponent; they are also a pre-condition for effective Adaptation. Trained structures are swiftly adaptable to changed contingencies, whereas untrained forces require undue time which might not be available in the case of emergency. This is particularly true given that the various units of the NATO Response Force will have to operate hand-in-hand with heavier follow-on units, or with other elements of the NATO force structure. Furthermore, there is a difference between exercising and training; only well-trained forces can perform successfully in realistic exercises. Hence, there is a need to train the entire NATO chain of command (including at the nuclear level), followed thereafter by exercises to rehearse authentic contingencies. ‘Train as you fight’ must be the guiding principle.

Re-establishment of Manoeuvre Capability: NATO’s recent focus on crisis management or counter insurgency operations has profoundly changed the way Alliance military operations are conducted. In the campaigns in the Balkans and/or Afghanistan, which focused on stabilisation and nation-building, even combat operations
were undertaken by relatively small units. NATO forces in effect have spent two decades “unlearning” the Cold War ‘art and science’ of manoeuvring in battalions, brigades or divisions as these formations have been neither practiced nor exercised for what is now a long time. The effect on the military leadership level, as well as on the efficiency of military staffs in all NATO countries (even to some extent the US) has been severe.

The problem has been recognized by some Allies, such as Germany and the Netherlands which created multi-national, brigade-size units. However, the re-establishment of NATO’s manoeuvre capability is proving to be slow. NATO still lacks an appropriate and modern command and control system that is compatible and interoperable with the military forces of all of its member nations. A similar set of challenges also holds true for major weapons systems; NATO Allies lack key components of the force inventory, such as sufficient main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, helicopters, intelligence, or transport capabilities.

For the Alliance to swiftly generate compatible and interoperable forces capable of achieving an appropriate level of readiness rapidly and thus able to rotate throughout the course of an Article 5 contingency all member states must engage. At the very least, NATO should re-establish a robust system of “tactical evaluation”, i.e. undertake a mutual assessment of capabilities across all Allied militaries. In principle, such an exercise would need to be undertaken across all force levels. However, priorities will need to be chosen, developed and enforced. Equally, at the very least, old problems such as a lack of standardized equipment across the Alliance force base must be seriously tackled by all NATO members as a matter of urgency.

**DOCTRINES AND STANDARD OPERATION PROCEDURES (SOPs)**

With the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the beginning of the campaigns in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, military doctrines (the way armed forces do business) have altered significantly. For good reason, counter insurgency operations (COIN) has dominated military thinking. Today, given the renewed relevance of a possible Article 5 contingency, NATO must be ready to act across the full spectrum of military employments, demanding the full spectrum of military capabilities, ranging from crisis-management operations to counter insurgency campaign, and beyond to enduring combat if needs be as part of territorial defence.

Modernization of the Nuclear Posture: Russia’s revisionist policies since 2014 not only require a fundamental reassessment of NATO’s conventional capabilities, but also the Alliance’s nuclear posture. This holds all the more true as Moscow not only broke international law in Ukraine, but under the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine and the concept of ‘nuclear de-escalation’ Russia has been using its growing short, intermediate, and strategic nuclear arsenal to intimidate if not threaten its neighbours. Moreover, by conducting illegal over-flights with nuclear bombers, and by simulating nuclear strikes against Sweden and Poland, Russia would appear to be extending its supposed sphere of influence well into EU and NATO territory, and in so doing threatening the Alliance and its members.

Equally, for all the apparent similarities with the nuclear confrontation of the Cold War, in fact the nuclear environment and NATO’s future deterrence requirements differ in at least two important respects from those of the old East-West conflict. First, today’s Russia cannot be compared to the former Soviet Union in scope, reach, or power. Whilst the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War to some extent out-matched NATO in terms of conventional military capability, Moscow’s conventional capabilities today are clearly inferior to those of the United States and its Allies; a fact of which Russia is well aware. Russian military planning for a potential conflict in Europe is thus focused on preventing US support of its NATO Allies and blocking the deployment of US armed forces across the Atlantic, hence the Russian military focus on A2/AD or Anti Access/Area Denial. Russia also considers its nuclear arsenal as a useful military substitute for its lack of an extensive and deep conventional weapons capability. In other words, Russia could at best sustain a short war, and even that might prove ruinous for a fragile Russian economy that is roughly half the size of that of the United Kingdom. The irony is that Russia’s force posture is to a significant extent the reverse of that during the Cold War when it was NATO that relied on nuclear deterrence to make up for conventional shortcomings and shortfalls on the old Central Front.

Second, nuclear deterrence is no longer primarily a bilateral and symbiotic US-Soviet matter, much though Moscow would like it to again become. Rather nuclear deterrence is a set of multilateral relationships involving a number of nuclear players and multiple decision-making
centres. The most concerning of those centres is North Korea, which is fast developing into a global sources of instability, irrationality and danger. While Pyongyang’s first nuclear test was conducted as early as 2006, it remained unclear for a long time whether the regime would actually be capable of producing functioning nuclear weapons that could be miniaturised sufficiently to be deployed atop an intercontinental ballistic missile capability. After three more nuclear tests in 2009, 2013 and 2016, there is now hardly any doubt. Although knowledge about the status and extent of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme remains fragmented, it is not unreasonable to assume that Pyongyang could in a few years possess more nuclear warheads than either France or the United Kingdom. A largely erratic actor consumed by the paranoid fear of losing power has thus joined the nuclear club. And, nuclear escalation in the Far East would definitively and critically affect the vital security and defence interests of all NATO Allies. Moreover, a concrete and real North Korean nuclear threat could also encourage key players in the region to develop their own nuclear capabilities – a development that may well have been accelerated by the often lurid talk of presidential candidate Trump during the 2016 US presidential campaign.

These differing factors raise a number of radically new issues regarding the future role of nuclear weapons as part of the Alliance’s defence and deterrence posture. An obvious question concerns how to deter today’s Russia; a country which is also a declining power as it has no economic basis to back up its aspirations to become again an actor of global significance that in the wider strategic scheme is also inferior in military terms. Russia’s weakness is less a result of low energy prices than of its decades-long failure to take the necessary economic, political and social steps towards modernisation. It is possible that Russia will not be able to fulfil the needs of its people a few years hence, which might well lead to destabilization or even disintegration. Practicing nuclear deterrence with declining powers is generally difficult because it cannot be excluded that an inferior adversary panics or becomes irrational as state decline turns into state failure.

**NATO’S FUTURE NUCLEAR POSTURE**

Another question that will affect NATO considerations over its future nuclear posture is whether any treaty-based nuclear arms control will endure into the Third Nuclear Age. After all, arms control, unlike disarmament, is part of defence policy. If successful it enables states to build-down armed forces, both conventional and nuclear. Russia not only sees its nuclear weapons as a functional part of its armed forces that can be used to compensate for deficiencies in its conventional posture, but an essential part of the ‘prestige’ underpinning the Putin regime domestically. Therefore, for the time-being Moscow is unlikely to have any real interest in reducing its nuclear capabilities. Paradoxically, since a number of outdated, Cold War nuclear systems are due to be phased out, there may still be some decrease in the respective sizes of the strategic nuclear arsenals of both the United States and Russia. Russia is also undertaking a significant programme for nuclear force modernisation (FN). And, non-proliferation (be it vertical or horizontal) is another area of potential collaboration that Russia now rejects, with Moscow refusing to cooperate or share information.

In November 2014, Russia declared that it would no longer participate in the annual Russian-American summit meetings on nuclear safety. One month later, Russia announced its withdrawal from the bilateral cooperation programme designed to increase nuclear safety under the so-called Nunn-Lugar Act. Since 1991, the US has provided considerable financial and material support for the safe scrapping and disposal of Russia’s surplus nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines. The purpose of this programme, which was designed by US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, was to prevent radioactive substances, nuclear weapon components and nuclear expertise from falling into the wrong hands.

However, the deteriorating nuclear relationship is most acute where it concerns tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Today, the chances of concluding new treaties that could bring about further reductions are now virtually zero, primarily because Russia sees such weapons as a “usable” part of its armed forces necessary to balance what it sees as NATO’s conventional superiority. Instead there are signs that Russia is circumventing the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) by stationing new treaty-illegal systems, such as Topol M, Iskandr M and Iskandr Kalibr systems. Consequently, NATO countries in Eastern Europe have little interest in a withdrawal of the few American nuclear weapons that are now stationed in Europe, as they are seen as a symbol of America’s Alliance commitments. These states became concerned when during the US election campaign, then presidential candidate Trump put the US nuclear commitment for NATO into question.
ONE ALLIANCE THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ADAPTED ALLIANCE

ADAPTING NATO’S NUCLEAR POSTURE

How can future Alliance deterrence strategies be effectively combined with sustainable crisis communication? If Russia continues to launch nuclear bomber aircraft as an implicit threat or in order to extend its supposed and self-declared sphere of influence, to send nuclear submarines to foreign coastal waters, or simulate nuclear strikes against neighbouring countries, then the risk of misunderstanding and accidents will increase. In 2014 alone, there were fourteen risk or high-risk incidents (i.e. entailing a considerable risk of escalation) counted between Russian and Western aircraft or ships. The need for renewed and shared security measures is pressing. For example, any of these incidents were caused by Russian aircraft turning off transponders and in all fairness, Western military aircraft also regularly fly with their transponders switched off. What security precautions must be taken in order to prevent an inadvertent military confrontation or accident – be it conventional or even nuclear?

Finally, there is a pressing need for a debate about how nuclear co-operation between NATO’s three nuclear powers, the United States, Britain and France, can be improved in order to re-establish a coherent deterrence strategy. Since the late 1950 there has been close nuclear co-operation between Washington and London, and of late Britain and France have considerably stepped up their nuclear relations since the Lancaster House agreement of 2010 (FN JLF Chatham House paper). France and the United States also discreetly co-operate on nuclear matters. What is missing from NATO’s nuclear equation is sustained and systematic trilateral coordination that goes beyond an occasional exchange on nuclear forensics. France, while apparently not generally opposed to such co-operation, at the same time does not want it to be conducted in the relevant NATO bodies, such as the Nuclear Planning Group.

Faced with a changed nuclear reality and a multitude of unanswered questions in an uncertain and to some extent deteriorating strategic environment NATO will have to put nuclear deterrence back on the agenda. Therefore, three immediate steps are of particular urgency: a) to clarify the mushrooming nuclear terminology of recent years; b) agree on a new NATO nuclear strategy; and c) adapt NATO’s nuclear posture accordingly.

With respect to the nuclear terminology, the post-Cold War period has led to conceptual differences within the Alliance and to a host of ambiguous nuclear terms. By and large most western and southern members of NATO regard nuclear weapons as a relic of the past and insisted on very generic wording in NATO’s nuclear policies. According to this narrative, NATO’s nuclear capabilities are not directed against a specific threat or a specific opponent. Many Eastern European Allies, though, have always regarded NATO’s nuclear deterrence as being directed against the residual threat from Russia. These conceptual ambiguities have led to a number of equivocal terms such as “tailored deterrence”, “comprehensive deterrence”, or even “complex deterrence”, which blur an important line between conventional and nuclear deterrence. Conceptually, it may even be inappropriate to use the term “Weapons of Mass Destruction”, which is meant to subsume into one concept nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons. What is needed is a precise debate on deterrence requirements that can distinguish between nuclear weapons and all others.

With regard to the specifics of NATO’s nuclear strategy, it is worth noting that the Alliance enshrines its nuclear deterrence concept in a document with the cumbersome title, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR). However, this document was approved at the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012, and is based on two fundamental assumptions that no longer apply today: Russia is a partner of NATO, and will not threaten to use its nuclear weapons against NATO. Since 2012 Moscow has ended its partnership with NATO and, moreover, is simulating the use of nuclear weapons against neighbouring countries during almost all of its major military exercises. Therefore, NATO will inevitably be forced to redraft its nuclear strategy.

Some might argue that a new nuclear concept could only be developed after NATO has agreed on a new Strategic Concept. However, this is not necessarily true. The DDPR of 2012 was not written because NATO agreed on a new Strategic Concept in 2010. Instead, it was the reaction to an initiative from the then German Foreign Minister Westerwelle who sought to withdraw all US nuclear weapons from German soil. Given that a new nuclear consensus in NATO is desperately needed, a nuclear debate could, and frankly should start independently from any discussion on a future Strategic Concept.
NATO’S MILITARY ADAPTATION: GETTING THE MIX RIGHT

Any Alliance debate on nuclear deterrence requirements in the context of Article 5 will necessarily imply a discussion on NATO’s nuclear posture and on the question of stationing. In DDPR, NATO declared that it is committed to maintaining an “appropriate mix” of conventional and nuclear weapons. It further stated that the “existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development are sound”. If this was the case in 2012, then it cannot be the case today, since the Alliance confirmed at its Warsaw Summit in 2016 that the security situation has fundamentally changed. NATO has thus to agree upon a new mix of nuclear, conventional and presumably defensive means (including missile defence). In any such strategic re-assessment of how to deter whom and by what means, the stationing of US nuclear weapons, currently deployed in a number of European states, will have to come under scrutiny, as will the deterrence value of the two other NATO nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom.

Equally, this is no reason for nuclear alarmism. Despite the tensions with Russia, nuclear weapons will not regain the significance they had as a currency of power during the Cold War. Their numbers have been dramatically reduced over the past decades, at least in the relations between Russia and the United States, and it is unlikely that there will be a new nuclear arms race. Moreover, nuclear deterrence is also now only a small part in the overall spectrum of the military effort. Effective and deployable conventional armed forces are arguably more important for the stability of Europe and beyond. Still, the nuclear question is certainly back on the Adaptation agenda.

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**ONE ALLIANCE THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ADAPTED ALLIANCE**

**SUPPORTING PAPER**

**COMPREHENSIVE NATO**

*By John R. Allen and Stefano Stefanini*

**INTRODUCTION**

If comprehensive means “including or dealing with all or nearly all elements or aspects of something” and that something is the international security environment, the Atlantic Alliance choice is not whether or not, but to what extent, to be comprehensive.

NATO exists today, and in the near future, at an inflection point. How it reacts to this “moment” in history will define the security of the Alliance and the stability and security of much of the rest of the world over the long term. The case for NATO to be a “comprehensive” alliance, politically as well as militarily, is based on its unique capacity to bring together countries whose values and interests are inextricably intertwined in confronting conventional threats from aggressive powers as well as transnational threats to citizens’ security. No single nation can meet these challenges on its own, thus NATO allows its members to do so together. But the geostrategic environment will not leave NATO alone to look inward. Or, to put it differently, NATO must look outward to deter aggression, to enhance partnerships, to expand relationships, and to export stability. The need for a more comprehensive NATO has never been greater, and with this need, so too the stakes for NATO have never been greater.

**“CONTAINED” VERSUS “COMPREHENSIVE”**

According to the prevailing school of thought, NATO should mainly limit itself to the conventional and territorial elements of Euro-Atlantic security. This conviction is shared by a substantial number of Allies who point to the Alliance’s previous successes in doing so and at its mixed results in dealing with more complex aspects and threats. This view cannot be dismissed out of hand as its advocates are a vital component of the Alliance.

The case against it is based on two counter-arguments. First, such limitations would set NATO apart from the issues that trigger insecurity in large bodies of public opinion and, increasingly, among political leadership: international terrorism, the spread of ISIL, increasing instability in the southern tier, and uncontrolled immigration. In addition, a “contained” NATO would be ill equipped to deal with the entire new body of threats emanating from cyberspace and info-operations, new technologies (such as drones, artificial intelligence, electromagnetic pulse etc.). It is an area that requires enhanced strategic and operational awareness and faster decision-making within NATO. It cannot be confronted in isolation.

Second, if this philosophy is adopted, one would have to live with the consequences: the rest of the security sphere will have to be taken care of outside the structure of NATO. The Alliance would not be obsolete but limited in scope: only a partial security guarantor. Against the backdrop of Brexit and of the new American administration, the political impact on Atlantic solidarity and Western cohesion would be unpredictable.

If instead NATO chooses to be more, rather than less, comprehensive, it needs to look beyond the traditional European security horizon. This could be the main adaptation challenge with which NATO is confronted today. In the conventional area, the power balance is shifting in the Asia-Pacific region; China and India are rising military powers to be reckoned with. In the less conventional area, citizens’ threat perception has expanded to non-state actors and asymmetric attacks. As NATO adaptation moves forward, the need to address homeland security must become a key reality. International terrorism and state failures have ripple effects in exporting instability across borders and well beyond the crisis area. Refugee flows and uncontrolled immigration are a case in point and are having a strategic impact on Europe. Across the transatlantic space, the overall non-

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1 Oxford Dictionary
2 At the Warsaw summit of July 2016 “the Allies recognised cyberspace as an operational domain, joining land, air and sea” (Warsaw Summit Key Decisions, NATO Fact Sheet, February 2017)
conventional impact has created strong public demand for security. It is up to the Alliance whether or not to respond to it.

Comprehensiveness starts at home, especially for a large family of 29 nations. There is clearly a need for enhanced intra-Alliance and cross-Atlantic political dialogue. NATO lives by consensus and consensus crumbles in the face of fissures within a large and increasing membership on out-of-area engagements or the handling of Russia. These differences can only be addressed by strengthening internal discussion and consultation.

A comprehensive NATO needs to have a global security outlook, but this does not inherently mean the Alliance must become a “global NATO”. The Alliance cannot and should not do everything. However, by engaging with the rest of the world, NATO would maximize available resources and share security burdens with other interested parties, either nations or international and regional organizations. Such engagement should be measured against the capacity of the Alliance to fulfill its core tasks: collective defense; crisis management; and cooperative security. None of these tasks can be pursued in isolation. Cooperative security requires defusing crises and projecting stability, actions that in turn reinforce the Alliance’s collective self-defense. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways, means, tools – and limitations – that could render NATO truly comprehensive and thus capable of meeting its missions as it adapts to the new security environment.

**WHY SHOULD NATO BE COMPREHENSIVE?**

The Atlantic Alliance was not born in international isolation. On the contrary, the preamble of the Washington Treaty refers to the members as, “Parties reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. NATO is thus a part of a wider multilateral system, which emerged after World War II — alongside the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the European Union — which has been responsible for assuring seven decades of peace, stability and prosperity, especially in the Atlantic and European space. The Treaty’s goals, collective defense and security and the preservation of peace, were envisaged to exist in connection with, not in isolation from, the rest of the world.

The issue of Alliance adaptation to the evolving international environment has been with NATO since the early days. It was the gist of the “Three Wise Men” report of December 13, 1956. During its first forty years cold war dynamics forced NATO to concentrate on two strategic directions that involved minimal external outreach: solidarity among Allies and deterrence of the Soviet military threat in Europe. By containing the Soviet Union, NATO also made a positive contribution to European integration (the same rationale would subsequently apply to post-cold war enlargement). For the first time in its history Europe was not going to war with itself but lay protected behind NATO’s shield. And, the United States was no longer the ‘rescue force’ to stop continental war between the states of Western Europe.

During that period confrontation, crises and wars in other theaters (Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Middle East, Afghanistan) were not notably on NATO’s agenda as they were not perceived as threats to the collective security of Allies. The four nations that joined the 1949 founders of the Alliance, Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), Spain (1982) were inside the Western perimeter. What mattered was to preserve and strengthen inner solidarity and integration.

The scenario changed radically after 1989. With the crumbling of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the reunification of Germany, the center of gravity of the security threat to the Alliance shifted first from the Fulda Gap and the Luneburg Heath to the power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, and then to the Balkan wars, to instability and fundamentalism in the Mediterranean and in the Greater Middle East, to terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, lastly (and most recently) cyber warfare. The threat shifted first from conventional to hybrid; more recently the ‘threat’ increasingly defies accurate description, detection, identification and attribution. For the first (and only) time in NATO’s history September 11 led to the triggering

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3 “The Report of the Committee of the Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO” by Foreign Ministers Halvard Lange (Norway), Lester B. Pearson (Canada) and Gaetano Martino (Italy). The report, which came also in response to the Suez crisis, stressed enhanced political and economic cooperation (Art. 2 and 4 of Washington Treaty) among Allies, in addition to the military alliance. The subtext was the NATO had to become less rigid in confronting new challenges already arising in the Mediterranean. The point was made that NATO had to adapt to remain relevant.
of Article 5 on September 12, 2001 and brought the bitter awareness that neither distance nor the isolation of oceans could provide a foolproof shield from the reach of terror.

Globalization does not spare security. In the new environment, NATO has had no option but engage the rest of the world, and engage it did. In more recent years, the resurgence of an aggressive Russia in the post-Soviet European space, China’s military expenditure and territorial claims in the South China Sea, the North Korean and Iranian challenges in the fields of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation signal the return of more traditional challenges from states to the Alliance. This more complex picture does not, however, change the need for NATO to adopt an inclusive and far reaching approach to security. Outreach, political engagement, and military cooperation complement deterrence, military preparedness and capabilities. Therefore, to remain relevant in a global security environment NATO needs to adapt globally.

To this end, NATO has already developed a well-supplied toolbox which encompasses five main areas: enlargement; partnerships; the relationship with Russia; the strategic partnership with the EU; and building cooperation with other international and regional organizations. Rather than re-inventing itself the Alliance would be better advised to take a critical look at it each one of these ‘tools’ and make full use of their potential.

ENLARGEMENT

The “open door” policy became a central tenet of post-cold war NATO in the mid-90s. There is little doubting the success of the policy as thirteen countries, including Montenegro⁴, have joined the Alliance since 1999. NATO enlargement has been crucial in stabilizing Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The European Union followed in NATO’s footsteps, and together NATO and EU enlargements have helped forge the region’s transition to democratic accountability, the rule of law and the development of market economies [which has also been the gateway to their Euro-Atlantic integration].

Without the NATO and EU umbrellas the entire region would look very different than it does today: more fractured, more nationalistic, and less prosperous. The wars in former Yugoslavia abated only when NATO stepped in with military muscle first, and then with the promise of eventual membership. It is no coincidence that, in spite of potential rivalries and disputes, there are no frozen conflicts in the Balkan region. Or, for that matter, outside the area of the former Soviet Union. In joining NATO new members sought, and obtained, the ultimate security insurance policy and they willingly paid the price in reforms that then paved the way to more complex EU membership. In what has been a win-win process NATO and the EU have helped achieve stability on their borders. The results, albeit still incomplete in the Western Balkans, prove the wisdom of enlargement policies.

Has enlargement stalled? It is certainly facing a number of hurdles. It is clearly an unfinished job in the Western Balkans, where any addition to NATO or EU membership shifts the overall balance from instability to (more) stability. And yet a substantial number of countries (Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) have not yet reached either threshold. EU enlargement is in slow motion, whilst NATO is left with two problematic candidates; Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only the issue of the name of the state prevented NATO from inviting Skopje to join at the 2008 Bucharest summit. Since then Skopje has made no progress. In spite of maintaining a good and constructive relationship with the Alliance, Macedonia has been sliding backwards domestically accomplishing few reforms. BiH’s challenges are far more complex, and with its non-recognition of Kosovo it cannot be a partner, let alone a candidate to membership. Serbia, the center of gravity of the Western Balkans, is a lukewarm NATO partner with no aspiration to be a candidate in sight, whilst its prospects for future stability rely mainly on successfully completing EU membership.

The prospects for rapid future Balkan enlargements are therefore dim. The exception is Macedonia should there finally be the political will to find a compromise on the name. However, NATO simply cannot afford to close the Western Balkan door, nor the EU. In addition to smoldering fires of recent history, there is now an active anti-Western Russian turf war in the region, and to maintain stability NATO and the EU at the very least need to remain engaged in the Western Balkans. Where NATO membership is not a realistic option, the Alliance should envisage ad hoc relationships that reassure countries both in terms of military cooperation and political bonds.

⁴ Pending ratification.
There is no doubt that just by keeping membership on the table, NATO contributes to the stability of the Western Balkans. Does the same apply to the countries of the former Soviet Union? The region is a shared neighborhood between NATO and the EU to the West and South, and with Russia to the East and to the North. The region finds itself in a precarious geopolitical environment that has resulted in several frozen conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Transnistria) and, since 2014, in a full blown international crisis in Ukraine. By taking sides in these frozen conflicts, illegally annexing Crimea, and supporting rebels in Eastern Ukraine, Russia has and is trying to project and strengthen its influence in the region by fostering division, disputes and active local hostilities. NATO must thus aim at restoring and enhancing stability in spite of Russia disruptive policies.

Continuing engagement is key to NATO’s approach to the region through partnership and special relationships, most notably with Georgia and Ukraine, even if the prospect of NATO membership is not yet conducive to stability and peace. NATO should also take a deep breath and confront a bitter truth; the promise made at the 2008 Bucharest summit that Ukraine and Georgia “will be NATO members” has become a recipe for paralysis, resistance and unfulfilled expectations. With the benefit of hindsight Bucharest had a triple negative effect: a) it is an unfulfilled prophecy that undermines NATO’s credibility; b) it has contributed to making both countries less, rather than more stable and secure; and c) it would import into the Alliance existing territorial disputes and frozen conflicts. Moreover there is no consensus among Allies over policy. Indeed, the opposition from a number of European countries to granting Kiev and Tbilisi the first concrete step toward membership (the Membership Action Plan – MAP) is actually hardening. Taking membership although not strong engagement off the table for now would not be rewarding Russia’s opposition and active disruption, but simply recognizing the geopolitical reality of the region. This constraint cannot be ignored in the interest of the region’s peace and stability, or of the steadiness and security of the countries concerned.

The time has come to think out of the box7 with regard to Ukraine and Georgia. In the present circumstances NATO’s best approach is to build on and strengthen its existing ties6 with Tbilisi and Kiev, short of beginning the membership process5. Nor should NATO withdraw from engagement with the other countries of the former USSR that have maintained a more or less close relationship with the Alliance within the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) – Azerbaijan and Moldova in particular come to mind. A healthy and strong relationship with Ukraine and Georgia will send a two-fold message to Moscow: while not seeking expansion per se, nor aiming at establishing a military presence toward the Russian border, the Alliance is not withdrawing from engagement or active cooperation with any willing partner.

Tension with Russia for NATO’s perceived encroachment in the “near abroad” will remain. It must not be exaggerated. Moscow, albeit unenthusiastically, accepted enlargement in 199910, 200411 and 200912. At the time of the first enlargement, NATO13 and the Clinton administration took a lot of pains to explain the “projecting stability” rationale, and to balance it with parallel enhancement of the NATO-Russia relationship. This ‘dual track’ was maintained during the George W. Bush administration, although with little effort to further discuss enlargement with Moscow because of the “no Russian veto” mantra. The balance broke over Georgia and Ukraine and Moscow’s conduct in 2008 and 2014 opened a chasm with the Alliance. As a result, while Russia barely flinched over Albania’s and Croatia’s membership in 2008–9, in an identical geopolitical context it is an unfulfilled prophecy that undermines NATO’s credibility; b) it has contributed to making both countries less, rather than more stable and secure; and c) it would import into the Alliance existing territorial disputes and frozen conflicts. Moreover there is no consensus among Allies over policy. Indeed, the opposition from a number of European countries to granting Kiev and Tbilisi the first concrete step toward membership (the Membership Action Plan – MAP) is actually hardening. Taking membership although not strong engagement off the table for now would not be rewarding Russia’s opposition and active disruption, but simply recognizing the geopolitical reality of the region. This constraint cannot be ignored in the interest of the region’s peace and stability, or of the steadiness and security of the countries concerned.

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6 At the time one of the authors convincingly supported it.
8 In particular, the NATO-Georgia Council (NGC) and the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC).
9 Reiterating a promise that cannot be delivered weakens NATO and its capacity to reassure Georgia and Ukraine. It makes both countries more not less vulnerable to destabilization. Even strong supporters of NATO engagement in Ukraine acknowledge that “NATO enlargement in the post-Soviet space is off the table for the foreseeable future” (Steve Pifer, A European security architecture that won’t work, Brookings, March 1, 2017).
10 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland.
12 Albania, Croatia.
13 Special credit must be given to then Secretary General Javier Solana.
On the other hand, and irrespective of Russian opposition, enlargement cannot be an open-ended process. NATO is a Euro-Atlantic organization and membership carries an Article 5 guarantee that must be politically credible and military reliable. Therefore, NATO should acknowledge that its “Open Door” meets geographical and geopolitical boundaries. They apply to membership – not to threats and operations to counter them. To reach out beyond those limits NATO must resort to other options in its toolbox.

**PARTNERSHIPS**

The Alliance has developed a network of partnerships encompassing 40 countries in four groupings: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP); Mediterranean Dialogue (MD); Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI); Partners across the globe. It is actually a composite and diverse patchwork of relations that grew over the last quarter of a century, effectively epitomizing the Alliance’s adaptation capacity to the new and changing security environment, challenges and tasks. Partnerships do not respond to a single rationale. At their roots four main interwoven threads are identifiable: security vacuums to fill (Central and Eastern Europe; Balkans; Mediterranean); the need for regional cooperation in areas of instability (Mediterranean, Gulf and Greater Middle East); participation in operations (Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya) to meet common challenges; and preparation for membership (EU and NATO).

Only the last is almost mission accomplished. Thirteen former partners have successfully made the transition to members. Others, like Finland or Sweden, could easily enter the Alliance if they choose to do so. The few remaining, as previously discussed, are in the Western Balkans. Security vacuums, regional instability, and operations are still there, both in Europe (see above regarding the former Soviet space) and in its Mediterranean and Middle Eastern periphery. They combine in maintaining and reinforcing partnerships’ raison d’être. Out-of-area operations have temporarily declined in size and resources but will continue to provide the drive and glue to NATO-partners joint commitment and military co-operation. Beyond this common ground, when it occurs, partners share very little common denominator perspectives. Diversity prevails also within each one of the four groups, except the ICI and the Mediterranean Dialogue which are bound by a strong regional connotation. The EAPC, which includes Russia (to be discussed in a separate section), spreads its wings from Ireland to Kyrgyzstan, with levels of interaction from very intense (Sweden, Georgia) to next to nothing (Belarus, Tajikistan). “Partners across the globe” is simply a residual definition; it captures any individual relationship with NATO outside the three partnerships, from Afghanistan that is a beneficiary of NATO assistance to Australia that contributes to it.

There are political reasons for specificity in EAPC, MD, and ICI; partners are keen to maintain it; in each group agendas and procedures differ. The same applies to individual relationships with the Alliance. MD’s and ICI’s regional connotation is conducive to widening, for instance, to Libya in the Mediterranean, and to Saudi Arabia and Oman in the Gulf, witness the ongoing dialogue between NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The status quo is functional and it is not going to change any time soon. However, that should not prevent the conceptualization of different “tiers” of partners, irrespective of the group to which they belong.

The first cluster should include ally-like partners, or in other words countries that have the same background of shared values (democracy, rule of law, human rights) and possess similar capabilities and resources. These partners, irrespective of their geographical location, would aim at full political engagement and military interoperability with NATO in exchange for their willingness to contribute to the security environment, and to participate in operations. A second group would be based mainly on regional cooperation between NATO and

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14 Considering NATO’s three core missions a tentative line could be drawn between “collective defense” on one side, “crisis management” and “cooperative security” on the other. The former applies to members only and is territorially restricted; the second and third task require an out-of-area, potentially global reach. The distinction can often be blurred as by projecting stability out of area (crisis management and cooperative security) NATO also protects itself (collective defense) from threats that are either non-territorial in nature (terrorism) or can strike from strategic distance (weapons of mass destruction). Dealing with rogue States, as North Korea or “Non State actors with State-like capabilities and ambitions”, as ISIS, encompasses both projecting stability and collective defense.

15 Not counting Montenegro on its way to membership.

16 NATO’s official documents list as partners also three international organizations: United Nations; European Union; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However they should be separated from State partners, in a broader context of NATO’s international outreach.

17 A similar approach is behind the “gold card” partners’ definition. Whatever the terminology, it must be clear that it not a short-cut or substitute for membership, the more so for partners who could become members if they wanted to, nor does it establish a level of exclusivity in cooperating with NATO that other partners cannot attain. Rather, it defines a relationship among equals where NATO does for partners as much as partners do for NATO.
partners, through political dialogue, defense capability-building, military training and, if necessary, operational support. MD and ICI partners would be prime candidates for this kind of reciprocal engagement to project stability and security in volatile and crisis-prone areas. Maximal individual flexibility should allow single partners to deepen the relationship to the extent both sides deem optimal.

The third tier would be most challenging. Some partners, currently Afghanistan and Iraq, Libya and Somalia, are fragile states teetering on the brink of fragmentation and/or collapse. NATO’s assistance can make the difference between failure and recovery, but needs to have a critical mass and be sustained over the medium to long term. However, by being engaged in preventing their failure the Alliance simply protects itself from the consequence, be it new hotbeds of terrorism, resurgence of ISIS (or successor entities), massive refugee flows – or all of the above. Such partnerships fall squarely under the cooperative security tasks of the Alliance and, indirectly, contribute to its collective defense. They require readiness to undertake preventive and preemptive missions and sustained military assistance in counterinsurgency, as well as training and defense capacity building.

Partnering with NATO will always have a political and military dimension. The first tier operates mostly at the political level, with military cooperation as a mutually beneficial fallout. The balance shifts partly in the second group that includes some NATO-led security assistance, witness for instance the new training center in Kuwait within ICI. The third tier relies mostly on NATO’s traditional military value. Therefore, it will require the Alliance’s political willingness and military capacity to quickly move assets to locations across the globe to shore up security in distant countries, as it does today toward the Eastern or Northern Flank. NATO will have to start systematically planning for such contingencies.

Such tiers only prioritize needs and goals. They do not compartmentalize partners. Each one of three encompasses different shades of relationship and geopolitical situations. Countries such as Georgia and Ukraine will continue to develop their unique relationship with NATO. Others may, at times, require shoring-up preventively (or even preemptively) against the threat of terrorism and the risk of state failure. This three-tier prism further underlines diversity. Yet, there is also potential common ground within the overarching notions of countering terrorism, preventing WMD proliferation, upholding international law, and fostering regional and global order.

Trying to encompass all partnerships in a single framework would be impossible and probably counter-productive, but all partners could perhaps be given access to a basic NATO toolbox. This could include an Article 4-like mechanism to allow partners to request political consultations in case of a political or security emergency. In the present security environment, the Alliance could also proactively promote its partnership network as a primary forum for effective and operational counter-terrorism cooperation. After all, the sum of the 29 Allies and 40 partners represents a unique critical mass of political will, intelligence, expertise, military and non-military capabilities and assets.

Fighting terrorism matters because “self-defense” is, “…recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations”, not just for international or regional stability. To all intents international terrorism is “an armed attack against one or more of” the Allies as indicated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as witnessed on September 11, 2001. If NATO does not take the lead against such terrorism other institutions or ad hoc arrangements will fill the security vacuum. In which case the Alliance would simply cease to be the main guarantor of collective defense. It would not be the end of NATO certainly, but it would see a downsizing of the Alliance’s relevance and credibility in the security business.

Enhanced partnerships are NATO’s best asset for confronting challenges and threats that originate “out of area” but impact security “inside the area”, such as homeland and cyber security. However, consensus on partnerships is still evasive inside the Alliance. Three contentions, in particular, need to be dealt with. First, the idea, as discussed above, that “NATO should go back to basics” and that collective defense, cyber domain notwithstanding, remains almost exclusively territorial. It is a belief shared to different degrees by most Eastern Allies. The second contention is the resistance in some European quarters (France and Germany come to mind) to NATO’s engagement in new “out of area” crises, especially in Africa. Other Allies, such as Italy, advocate a NATO Southern strategy, but hesitate to actually call on it to act, for example in the Mediterranean and Libya. The United States, together with a number of Allies and partners, has chosen to operate in Syria and Iraq against ISIS without the NATO brand. The third obstacle is financial. Budget caps put severe constraints on the resources available for defense capacity-building; a partial answer can be provided by encouraging Allies and
partners to strengthen and widen the use of Trust Funds, such as the UK initiated Defense Capability Building Trust Fund. Commitments to Afghanistan (Operation Resolute Support) and Iraq (NATO training and capacity-building) and potential new similar engagements in Libya and Somalia require adequate funding.

These issues all call for an open and frank debate, both within the Alliance and with partners. There is a “trade off” that needs to be discussed: “what NATO can do for partners” in exchange of “what partners can do for NATO”. The potential is enormous, but the terms must be clear to both sides. If NATO is indeed to be “flexible by design”, partnerships are themselves the most flexible tool available to the Alliance. It is up to Allies and partners do decide how and to what extent to use such partnerships.

RUSSIA

Russia is an adversary to the extent that it chooses to be an adversary. Russian meddling in the democracies of Europe is alarming, its aggressive posture in Central Europe and its conduct in the Ukrainian crisis, including the illegal annexation of Crimea, have implications for Alliance security on the Eastern Flank that cannot be ignored. The High North is another area of potential confrontation. Moscow has also chosen competition over cooperation in Syria, and is beefing up its presence in the Mediterranean, and it not at all clear which role it intends to play in the Libyan crisis. Yet in confronting other urgent threats, such as terrorism, violent extremism, proliferation, Russia is on the receiving end of the threat as much as NATO.

Therefore, the real challenge of the Russian relationship is to avoid an adversary turning into an enemy, which means NATO must first deter Russia’s aggressive behavior in Europe. The measures adopted by the Alliance at the Wales and Warsaw summit, especially Enhanced Forward Presence, serve exactly that defensive purpose and need to be scrupulously implemented. Russia’s presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean makes engagement necessary to solve the Syrian crisis and project stability in Libya. Finally, ISIS is a common threat against which efforts should, at the very least, be coordinated.

The balance of the NATO-Russia relationship shifts inevitably between deterrence and dialogue; NATO must actively seek that to establish and maintain that balance through a considered and incremental full reactivation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). This paper does not intend to discuss the overall spectrum of NATO’s Russia policy, but rather to frame it in the context of the Alliance’s external outreach, suffice it to say that today deterrence is partly in place and partly a work in progress. Decisions made in the Wales and Warsaw 2014 and 2016 summits are being carried out as agreed and planned. However, in light of the Russian doctrine of increased reliance on nuclear tactical weapons, the Alliance should also consider reviewing and updating its nuclear deterrence posture to better link it to NATO’s conventional deterrence. NATO should also aim at articulating a fully integrated concept that links streamlined decision-making at a political level with conventional and nuclear capacity.

The Alliance has been long divided over Russia. In the wake of Russian aggression in Ukraine it has come together over deterrence, but not over dialogue with Russia. Allies, some halfheartedly, have agreed not to suspend the NRC, but it has at best faltered. The dramatic deterioration of the NATO-Russia relationship makes engagement all the more desirable and necessary18.

First, there is practical necessity to establish channels of communication between NATO and the Russian military to avoid incidents19 in Europe, and in any other place, such as Syria, where coalition and Russian forces operate at close quarters. The more adversarial the relationship, the more important is the communication. The political rationale is that, bilaterally and/or in other formats, negotiations with Moscow will occur with or without NATO involvement in the process. NATO’s relevance in shaping the West’s Russia policy thus depends on dialogue, rather than dialogue with Russia depending on NATO.

18 As former Israel’s President, Shimon Peres, used to say: “of course I talk to the ones who disagree with me; what would be the point of talking to the ones who already agree?”

The majority of the Allies are keenly aware of the risk of being confronted with the fait accompli of a bilateral US-Russia “deal” over their heads. This awareness is particularly acute in the aftermath of the election of President Donald J. Trump who perceives himself uniquely positioned to create some form of special relationship with Vladimir Putin (though since the US cruise missile strike in Syria, US-Russian relations are again badly strained). The best way to prevent such exclusion is to maintain a parallel Russia-NATO open dialogue. For Moscow and Washington, or for small groups acting for example through the so-called Normandy format on the Ukrainian crisis, the NRC is not an alternative forum for real negotiations, but could be a way for the rest of the Allies to influence the ongoing process. After all, the NRC is the only room that accommodates the entire membership and Russia, and which could also act as a buffer against the consequences of “either a bargain or fall-out” between the United States and Russia.

Second, initial goals should be realistic. NATO should thus aim at engaging Russia in a bottom-up approach focused on re-establishing military to military communication, transparency in military exercises, and rules of engagement and restraint. It might be useful for the NRC to delegate practical work on these matters at a less structured ad hoc expert level where discussions could be strictly action-oriented and limit political grandstanding. The first task, though, must be to rebuild a minimum level of confidence and trust.

Finally, neither NATO nor Russia are ready to pursue the full goals the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 or of the 2002 Rome (Pratica di Mare) Declaration). Cooperative security in the Euro-Atlantic area remains the ultimate target, but dialogue will have to move carefully and progressively. A case could be made for joint efforts in the fight against terrorism and in finding common ground in stabilizing Syria and Libya. Such an approach would require that both NATO and Russia compartmentalize differences in Europe in order to cooperate in other areas. It is certainly a bridge that the Alliance should be prepared to cross, if and when the relationship reaches such a level of constructiveness. It might not be mean avoiding disagreements, let alone appeasing Russian behavior in Ukraine, but simply keeping those areas separate from others where security interests converge. If the US and the international coalition against ISIS – which includes all NATO members and most EU members – are prepared to cooperate with Russia on the ground and, hopefully, in negotiating peace in Syria, NATO should not be put at a comparative disadvantage with its own national members, or indeed with other negotiating formats by a self-imposed constraint.

Obviously, it takes two to tango. Dialogue, and its effectiveness, will depend on Moscow’s willingness to engage NATO. If not, Russia’s preference for other fora, such as OSCE, or interlocutors, such as the EU or more restricted formats, such as the “Normandy group” or for simply bilateral talks, should be a cause for concern for NATO as whole. This is especially so for the Allies who would find themselves out of the room when deals are made.

**CHINA**

Neither an adversary nor a partner China barely flickers on NATO’s screen. Yet it is a major actor in the international security environment and a growing military power. Moreover, disputes over the South China Sea have disruptive potential that would impact Europe and the Atlantic region as a whole. Beijing could also play a supportive role in stabilizing Afghanistan.

The Alliance stumbled in the Hindu Kush in 2001, and 16 years on it is no longer a stranger to the region. It knows that Afghanistan’s long-term stability depends also on its neighbors: Pakistan is already a NATO partner, though its role in Afghanistan has largely been problematic; Russia has been engaged (on and off), and fluctuates between support (in its own interest) and criticism; and Central Asian countries have also been waverin,
Unfortunately, an overall regional strategy that includes India, Iran and China has been missing and China could make a positive contribution to that effort. After all, Beijing has a vested interest in stabilizing Afghanistan and avoiding a failing or failed Muslim majority state on its border. And, China does not perceive NATO’s residual presence in Afghanistan as a threat. While a fully comprehensive regional strategy is beyond NATO’s scope, China is a major player and could make a positive contribution to it. Thus, the Alliance needs to be able at least to “talk” to the Chinese about it, a conversation could yet yield heretofore unexplored and unexpected opportunities.

Out of the 5 trillion dollars’ worth of commercial traffic that goes through the South China Sea, an estimated 1.1 trillion is trade between Europe and East and South East Asia. European Allies have a vested interest in maintaining freedom of navigation. China also has deep and growing ties in both Asia and Africa, which are home to many of the at-risk states NATO wants to stabilize. It would certainly make political and economic (resource-wise) sense to start thinking how NATO and China might cooperate at several levels in crisis areas across the Great Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. As Chinese economic and infrastructure initiatives continue to unfold across Asia; as in the One Belt, One Road initiative; a strategic EU-NATO should be attentive to the opportunities and challenges that will inevitably emerge.

An inward-focused NATO might consider Asia out-of-area. An outward-focused NATO, one which recognized the real world, would not view Asia as strictly out-of-area. China is nowhere a threat to the Euro-Atlantic space, but it is a growing presence. Would the Chinese be interested in connecting with NATO? Only Beijing can answer that, if asked. The prospect should at least be raised and handled with thoughtful diplomacy.

China is too important to be ignored. In any event the Alliance would be better off engaging Beijing before Beijing engages NATO, although it would need to make it clear that the intent of the Alliance is not to counter Russia. A NATO-China relationship carries its own logic and has a scope and dynamic of its own and should not be defined solely by the Russia factor. There is also fertile ground for NATO-Beijing dialogue on shared challenges and issues that do not affect the NATO-Russia relationship, although Moscow would certainly take note of a NATO-China dialogue. Nor would such a dialogue hurt NATO’s standing in Moscow. Time will tell if there is space for a “NCC” (NATO-China Commission). It is not in the cards yet, but it should not be ruled out by an outward focused NATO if and when both parties are ready for it.

EUROPEAN UNION

We approach the end of this study of a comprehensive NATO where it began: in Europe. The EU is NATO’s fellow traveler on the international scene and its indispensable security partner. Although, a ‘perfect match’ has never quite happened despite the largely overlapping membership. It is sadly ironic that the Warsaw Joint Declaration of July 8, 2016 raised the EU-NATO relationship to a new level just as the moment the British referendum opened a major fissure in the Union. The UK has often acted as a lynchpin between Europe and the Atlantic; the EU and NATO were coming together, while Europe was fracturing.

The two organizations have quickly moved from the declaration to the implementation phase by presenting a set of “pragmatic yet ambitious measures” to EU and NATO Ministers on December 6, 2016. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and High Representative Federica Mogherini deserve credit for proactively pushing forward what had hitherto been a lethargic NATO-EU cooperation agenda.

Conceptually the EU-NATO partnership rests on three interlocking pillars: synergies (joint undertakings); a division of responsibilities and labor (separate but coordinated operations); and burden sharing. The Joint Declaration both takes stock and looks forward. The innovative part concerns cyberspace which has become

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26 For instance, it is not well known that China peacefully and effectively evacuated tens of thousands of its nationals from Libya in 2011. It did this successfully but without wider international cooperation and on strict national perspective.

27 www.nato.int/cps/en/natoq/official_texts_133163.htm

a centerpiece of NATO-EU cooperation and ranges from actually countering cyber threats, building resilience, to disinformation campaigns and crises triggered by hybrid attacks.

The “interactive area” of cooperation could be taken one step further by positing the strategic partnership within the overall framework of homeland security and intelligence collaboration. Europe badly needs to enhance its capacity for internal defense against the increasing cyber warfare assaults taking place on critical civilian infrastructures or financial and commercial networks. More importantly, NATO and the EU should also consider what actions could be undertaken together to address overt and clandestine efforts to interfere in the democratic institutions and electoral processes of the member states. The rise of extremist terrorism in Europe, traditionally more in the domain of law enforcement, blurs the line between the safety of citizens traditionally entrusted to police forces and hard defense which has traditionally been the preserve of the armed forces. Does the EU and/or the individual nations have all the capacity they need?

For a long time NATO’s consolidated policy has been to stay clear of law enforcement and counterterrorism inside Europe. The Alliance is now confronted with a grey zone by hybrid warfare, used by state or non-state actors able to strike directly inside Europe without scratching the external frontier, and yet still cause enormous economic and human damage. This begs a serious question; what good is it to be defending the East or the South of the perimeter from external attack when the center remains vulnerable and under active attack? When an enemy, such as ISIS, in spite of being under coalition attack at some strategic distance from NATO, can claim credit for assaults in the heart of Europe or North America, as in London, Brussels, Paris, or San Bernardino? Therefore, if NATO is to adapt and to inject fresh thinking in its approach to both collective defense of its members and ways to partner with the EU, the hybrid internal threat area and the rise of extremist terrorism should be addressed as a matter of urgency.

The second tier of NATO-EU partnership, a division of responsibilities, means first and foremost the early establishment of divisions of labor in out-of-area operations. The good news is that it is already happening. The EU has built-up considerable expertise in small-scale, flexible missions that mix military presence with civilian assistance. The EU cannot match NATO’s resources and capabilities in mounting and sustaining over time, large-scale operations in hostile environments, or the Alliance’s accumulated experience in training and interoperability. However, consideration might be given to a geographical division of responsibilities, with the EU possibly taking the lead in the Western Mediterranean and Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the EU’s capacity to project hard power remains limited for the foreseeable future, particularly with the departure of the United Kingdom (and the EU should be realistic about that). To assume full responsibility for selected geographical areas Europeans will still have to count on NATO support – if needs be. There is nothing new here. In many ways these ideas cast one back to the rarely activated Berlin Plus agreement of December 16, 2002. Since then the security environment has deteriorated and the transatlantic context has changed, but at least the Berlin Plus model still remains a valid model and precedent for effective EU-NATO cooperation. It would be useful to review and update the Berlin Plus arrangements to meet the challenges of the current situation.

In the traditional security sphere the EU remains the junior partner. Period. It could significantly contribute to prevent NATO being overloaded, but could not credibly undertake major tasks such as fighting ISIS or deterring Russia. The impending loss of the United Kingdom adds to the military imbalance between NATO and the EU. With the UK’s exit the EU loses between 25 and 30% of its military capabilities, whilst in NATO, the defense spending of the remaining EU countries will amount to just one fifth of the total. There is no “European defense” ‘fantasy’ that can make up for such a loss.

Nevertheless, boosting EU military capabilities through the realization of European defense would still be important for two reasons. The first reason would be to tackle the third component of the NATO-EU relationship; the “burden sharing” stumbling block. The Trump administration has delivered a clear message to the European

29 On April 11, 2017, in Helsinki, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, France, Germany and the United States, with the participation of representatives of the European External Action Service and NATO, signed the Memorandum of Understanding for establishing the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. (http://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/10616/eurooppalainen-hybridihuikien-osaamiskeskus-perustettiin-helsinkiin)
30 EU operations Concordia in Macedonia and Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina.
allies. The 2% defense spending target is likely to be a central issue at the May special meeting of NATO leaders in Brussels. It is an issue of contention that will not go away thereafter. One problem is that a number of EU allies simply cannot meet the so-called Defence Investment Pledge any time soon without breaching the European Growth and Stability Pact (GSP) that sets a 3% budget deficit limit. Unless both sides find an acceptable compromise, the two rigidities could well be conflated into a train wreck. The consequences for the Atlantic Alliance could be disastrous.

The European contribution to Atlantic security cannot be measured solely in figures, but figures do matter. The only way the EU (and Germany) may introduce some flexibility into the 3% budget cap would be to allow a waiver for expenditures allocated to the building up the EU European Defense initiative. The concern that it might become a competitor with NATO has all but disappeared, especially with Brexit. And, irrespective of American pressure, Europe will soon have to confront the current adverse trends in its military spending. The Trump administration has announced a 10% increase for the Pentagon budget. Other powers, like China and India, will not stand idly by. Even with the inclusion of the UK, Europe as a whole risks becoming a military dwarf among world powers.

Second, a NATO associated European defense could be an enticing option for the re-engagement of a post-Brexit UK in the EU security and defense loop. If Brexit is a major loss to EU military capabilities, isolation from the EU would leave London with limited options in operations other than those led by NATO. Outside of NATO or ad hoc American-led coalitions, such as the Counter-ISIS coalition, the UK would find itself forced to go it alone unless it remains part of the fabric of EU operations. If that happened both the UK and the EU stand to lose from Brexit, unless they manage to maintain security and military cooperation. The closer the EU-NATO partnership, the easier it would be for London to maintain defense and security engagement with the EU.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

NATO’s engagement with other international organizations has been slower than with individual countries. As opposed to 40 individual countries which are listed as partners, official documents list only three international organizations as partners: the United Nations; the European Union; and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Those three represent the Alliance’s natural anchorage, and, by extension, its dual global and regional nature, and yet exhaust neither the potential, nor the actual, network the Alliance can and should aim to develop.

The relationship with the EU is discussed above. At its very inception, as already discussed, the Atlantic Alliance was framed within the context of the UN Charter. With the exception of Operation Allied Force in 1999, NATO operations have always been specifically mandated by UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and three NATO countries (US, France, UK) are permanent members of the UNSC. The two organizations should share common ground for cooperation in crisis management and cooperative security. However it was only in September 2008 that the then two secretaries general, Ban Ki Moon and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer for the UN and NATO respectively, were able to sign a Framework Declaration on UN-NATO cooperation. Within the general political constraints of the UN’s large membership, and of the particular constraints of the other two UNSC permanent members (China and Russia), there is now some room for cooperation between the UN and NATO.

12 “I owe it to you to give you clarity on the political reality in the United States, and to state the fair demand from my country’s people in concrete terms. America will meet its responsibilities, but if your nations do not want to see America moderate its commitment to this Alliance, each of your capitals needs to show support for our common defense. ... We must adopt a plan this year, including milestone dates, to make steady progress toward meeting Warsaw and Wales commitments. ... If your nation meets the two percent target, we need your help to get other allies there. If you have a plan to get there, our Alliance is counting on you to accelerate your efforts and show bottom-line results. And if you do not yet have a plan, it is important to establish one soon.” (Statement to media by US Defense Secretary James Mattis, February 15, 2017).

13 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Hans Binnedijk suggest reaching the 2% target in five rather than ten years (Our NATO Partners Should Engage Trump in Brussels, Newsweek, February 25, 2017; http://www.newsweek.com/our-nato-partners-should-engage-trump-brussels-559632), together with other “bold” steps to “reconstitute the Trans-Atlantic security bargain”. Reaching the 2% target in five years is a tall order, but the overall approach could be the only way out of the deadlock.

14 For a NATO epilogue scenario, see This is How NATO Ends, Jeremy Shapiro, Foreign Policy, February 15, 2017

15 Julianne Smith makes a convincing case in We need to talk about NATO, Politico, December 11, 2016. But it will not be enough.

16 On the eve of the Brexit negotiations, both the UK government and the EU negotiators are calling for future EU-UK cooperation on security and defense.
The OSCE is the natural complement to NATO in Europe. After all, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) membership basically mirrors that of the OSCE. Moreover, the two organizations have a good track record of teamwork and divisions of labor and shared responsibilities in the Balkans and Central Europe. Disputes with Russia limit cooperation in frozen conflicts and in the Ukrainian crisis, but channels of communication are always open and constructive.

NATO’s other frontiers are the regional organizations outside Europe. There has already been some positive interaction, especially with the African Union (AU) and with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The rationale is the same that applies to NATO’s other partnerships: political engagement; military-to-military dialogue; capacity-building; and countering common threats. Regional organizations, such as the AU have a primary role in preventing state failure and projecting stability in its own area, but often lack resources, expertise and capabilities. In Africa, NATO, the EU or individual Western countries, such as France in Mali, may have to act in response to emergencies and to counter terrorism, piracy and trafficking. But, on the whole, African stabilization is an African affair. NATO’s strategy for Africa should thus aim at empowering the AU and making it the umbrella for international cooperative security efforts in that region. NATO, and/or the EU, may step in to support stabilization, for instance in Libya or Somalia, but the ownership remains and must remain African.

In the Mediterranean and the Middle East, in addition to the existing partnership networks (e.g. the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) the Alliance can interact with the Arab League and with the GCC. Asia’s landscape is quite different. It lacks an umbrella organization and a cooperative security architecture. In continental Asia thought might be given to NATO connecting with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO would certainly confront the Alliance with a challenging, and even disruptive, environment. On the other hand, it could be beneficial both to NATO’s partnership with Afghanistan and to improved atmospherics with Moscow. Meanwhile, NATO’s reluctance to engage with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is justified. The CSTO is a post-Soviet intergovernmental military alliance that is entirely capability-dependent on Russia. There is thus little rationale for any NATO-CSTO interaction, at least until the current status of NATO-Russia relations are clarified.

The Asia-Pacific region is established on a classical balance of power amongst a number of state actors with the US as the ultimate stability guarantor. The situation is in a state of flux: China has become far more militarily active and assertive, whilst the US has been oscillating between the “Pivot to Asia” and scaling back its commitment to the region. As yet it is not clear what will be the new administration’s direction of travel. Meanwhile Salafi Jihadist terrorism continues to expand and ISIL offshoots can unexpectedly emerge anywhere. To that end, in East Asia, there is a growing and nearly universally-expressed concern over the growing “Arabization” of Islam in Southeast Asia and the radicalization this has spawned. For NATO, the obvious counterpart is ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and its Regional Forum (ARF, which is the closest entity to being an ASEAN security forum). The EU has for a long time been an observer, which is logical given its many composite interests in the region. Therefore, in light of the increasing security challenges it might be time for NATO to consider seeking a similar observer status in ASEAN.

CONCLUSION

As a comprehensive NATO embraces the challenges of adaptation in this new geostrategic environment certain imperatives are clear: being comprehensive is far more than simply being about the membership of NATO. It is of course about that too, but it is also a great deal more. First of all it is about maintaining NATO’s unique role in enhancing intra-Alliance, and above all, Trans-Atlantic political dialogue. However, to be relevant, inside the Alliance there has to be a dialogue as well about the world outside the Alliance.

Second, NATO is the indispensable connecting link between North America and Europe. Brexit notwithstanding, only the European Union can deliver Europe. As a start, NATO and the EU must redefine their fundamental relationship, not only to share key tasks and burdens, but on a more fundamental level. In other words, to bring
the capacity of NATO to bear to protect the populations of Europe from the increasing threats that are eroding the internal security environment of the region, NATO and the EU must work in close partnership. Some of the threats are state sponsored, some are non-state entities, some are criminal in nature, and some emerge from the general deterioration of the nation-state beyond NATO’s borders. In toto, they demand NATO and the EU reconsider and enhance their relationship.

Equally, NATO enlargement is not an end in itself; stability enlargement is. There are real sensitivities in some quarters to the continued expansion of NATO: the Alliance should certainly be circumspect in its plans for continued enlargement, but should continue with the Open Door policy. In the end NATO’s enlargement has always been about enhancing stability while providing for greater security and, whilst it is right that NATO should be circumspect in managing the specifics of its enlargement, there should be no suggestion that Russia has been rewarded for its intimidation and its bad behavior by NATO’s diverting from continued consideration of additional members. NATO should also seek closer ties with, and explore areas and means for, cooperation with companion international organizations that are fellow travelers in the security environment of the 21st Century. Enhancing partnerships or creating relationships with such organizations as the OSCE, AU, the Arab League, the GCC, ASEAN/ARF, and even the SCO provide for a far more comprehensive NATO perspective on, and capacity to exert influence in, areas where additional cooperation could be useful, even vital.

NATO should strengthen and/or create bilateral partnerships with states which carry strategic significance for NATO and their respective regions, and must begin to think more broadly strategically, by reaching out to and prioritizing support to fragile and/or failing states, sometimes located well beyond NATO’s periphery. NATO’s approach, in league with the EU and other IOs, as well humanitarian and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector should be to apply coordinated and judicious capacity-building and security assistance, alongside these development partners, to arrest the decline or collapse of these important states. This would help prevent the inevitable large scale flight or refugee movements that feed the vast reservoirs of recruits for the extremist networks ravaging the world today.

As regards Russia, while NATO must comprehensively deter Russia, it should seek ways to rehabilitate the NRC that does not signal in any way NATO’s acceptance of its illegal aggression in Crimea and more broadly in Ukraine. Part of NATO’s capacity to adapt and to remain relevant must be its confidence and strength to both deter and to talk to Russia simultaneously. Without the former, Russia’s aggression is encouraged. Without the latter, both parties are subject to miscalculation and unintentional provocation. Both are necessary. Both are essential.

And finally, China. There is strategic logic in NATO seeking a relationship with China. It is time. China’s reach into the developing world is substantial and growing, making China a potential partner for the careful stabilization campaign already addressed. Not only should NATO explore the efficacy of a NATO/China Commission (NCC), which could grow from the areas of common interest such as countering radicalization, countering terrorism, and state-level capacity-building, NATO should even consider the creation of a special relationship with the SCO.

All the points in this conclusion should be undertaken concurrently and comprehensively. And there will be costs associated with this approach, but the challenges of this era are so great that NATO has no alternative. A comprehensive NATO built on the strength of Atlantic Alliance carries with it unparalleled capacity not only to defend the Alliance, from without and within, in a period of growing uncertainty and instability, it also has the capacity to influence partners, nations, and events beyond its traditional ken, thereby positioning NATO as one of the principal proponents of peace and stability in this new, but violent and dangerous century.

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INTEGRATED DETERRENCE:

NATO’s ‘First Reset’ Strategy

SUPPORTING PAPER
INTRODUCTION

Deterrence is no mystery; it is a feature of many human activities, behaviours and relationships, ranging from the private matter of bringing up children, to society’s attempts to control crime. At any level, and in any sector, deterrence is a promise to impose a cost on a given action in order that the potential perpetrator is convinced that any perceived benefits of the action will be outweighed by the costs incurred, and will thus choose not to act as planned or threatened.

Several ingredients must be in place for deterrence to function, often described as the ‘three Cs’. First, the deterrer must have the capability to impose the costs he has promised or threatened. Second, the deterrer’s promise must seem credible to the potential miscreant. As well as the appropriate capability, credible deterrence also requires that the deterrer has the will – personal, political or moral – to carry out her promise, and that this can be communicated to, and understood by, the wrong-doer. Deterrence is therefore a relational activity, in which both sides must employ a broadly compatible rationality.

Deterrence is particularly well known as a feature of politico-military strategy. The basic ingredients remain: a potential aggressor’s cost-benefit calculation might be influenced by the threat of a punitive response, or by the realisation that the defender’s preparations are so advanced and effective that the costs of carrying out the aggression would be too great, whether politically, financially, militarily or even reputationally. Throughout human history, when an aggressor has taken stock and decided not to proceed, it is possible – but not certain – that deterrence will have played a part in that decision. This uncertainty is discussed briefly below.

Yet politico-military strategic deterrence is far from what it was. The practical and intellectual underpinnings of this crucial idea have been fading fast from the popular and political memory – just when the need for deterrence could scarcely be greater. Alarmingly, this damning judgement might even be said of NATO, a politico-military alliance whose raison d’être was – and must continue to be – deterrence. If deterrence is failing, then the same must be said of politico-military strategy – including that offered by the Alliance.

The intention of this paper is, first, to ask how it is that we have arrived at this point; how it is that the logic of deterrence has declined so markedly in strategic and popular culture. The aim then is to describe a way out of this dilemma. The paper begins with an account of the development of deterrence during the Cold War, before describing the ‘crisis of scepticism’ that has beset deterrence thinking and practice in the 21st century. This wave of scepticism might not be significant, were it not for the fact that Russia, having detected the loss of faith among NATO’s nations, has grasped the opportunity to challenge NATO’s strategic deterrence in the manner that no deterrence posture should be expected to tolerate. Russia is calling NATO’s bluff.

This paper makes three main arguments. First, NATO should work urgently to revive its deterrence posture; a posture which should be integrated vertically, horizontally and functionally. Second, a ‘future-proofed’ deterrence posture should be a central component of the programme of adaptation set in motion at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit. Third, the paper argues that a revived and integrated deterrence posture should have no other purpose than deterrence itself. The revival of NATO deterrence is not an opportunity to compensate for some defence deficiency or another, under the guise of an ‘Offset Strategy’ of some sort. Instead, this is the moment for a ‘First Reset Strategy’ – a co-ordinated effort to rediscover and then achieve the fundamental goal of deterrence: the establishment of order, even in an adversarial environment. The paper concludes by recommending five concrete actions to be taken as soon as possible by NATO in order to launch the First Reset Strategy.
COLD WAR DETERRENCE

With the invention of atomic and nuclear weapons in the mid-20th century, and the beginning of the Cold War, it became critically important that deterrence should work – always. But the evolution of nuclear deterrence was not quite as automatic as might be supposed. After their use against Japan in August 1945, there was for some years a tendency to see atomic weapons as ‘super-bombs’, and as a means to extend and amplify existing doctrines of strategic air power. Atomic weapons also offered more ‘bang for the buck’ than an expensive conventional force posture and could offset weaknesses in conventional defences, particularly at a time when the conventional strength of the Soviet Union was thought to have remained overwhelming while the US and its European allies had demobilised rapidly after the war. The notion that one technology or another can ‘offset’, or compensate for, conventional weakness is still alive in the security and strategy debate today, in the form of the Third Offset Strategy.

An offset strategy is the use of technological superiority to compensate for perceived imbalances and weaknesses in conventional military strength. In a sense, the ‘offset’ is an attempt to re-establish the capability, credibility and communications upon which any successful deterrence posture must be based. The first such strategy was developed in the early 1950s, in the form of Eisenhower’s New Look Strategy whereby increases in nuclear capability (including at the tactical and operational levels) would offset Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional military advantages. The Second Offset Strategy was a product of the 1970s and 1980s when doctrinal and technological developments such as ‘Follow-On Forces Attack’ and ‘Airland Battle 2000’ would enable non-nuclear attack against Soviet and Warsaw Pact echelons deep in their own territory. Developed under the Obama Administration, the goal of the Third Offset Strategy is to acquire ‘the means to offset advantages or advances in anti-access area denial weapons and other advanced technologies that we see proliferating around the world.’

As the Cold War advanced, atomic and then nuclear deterrence became far more elaborate. Capability alone was not sufficient; with weapons of this scale, credibility and will also mattered. And as the vulnerability to attack became mutual, so communication became ever more important. Atomic and nuclear deterrence could no longer be considered a component of one side’s politico-military strategy; mutual deterrence became the central purpose of the Cold War as a whole. Paradoxically, this critically important idea could never be analysed too closely, for fear of revealing its fragility; it could not fail, but neither could it be tested. In his seminal Strategy in the Missile Age (1959), Bernard Brodie pointed to the difficulties of deterrence in the nuclear era; ‘We expect the system to be always ready to spring while going permanently unused.’

Perhaps inaction speaks louder than words. It is often claimed that for four decades after its creation in 1949 NATO’s deterrent posture ‘worked’, since the Cold War in Europe never became ‘hot’. The Soviet Union and its allies in, what was intended to be the counterpart to NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (or ‘Warsaw Pact’ as it was commonly termed) never attacked the NATO treaty area. The difficulty with this claim, and with deterrence thinking generally, is the problem of negative proof. It will always be difficult, practically and logically, to isolate the reasons why aggression or war did not take place and equally difficult, therefore, to be confident that deterrence had succeeded as the cause, so to speak, of a non-event. Conversely, the frequency and extent of war in human history suggest that it might be easier to find evidence of deterrence having failed, or not having been attempted.

The end of the Cold War has been described as the ‘bonfire of the certainties’ – a particularly apt expression when it comes to the consideration of deterrence in Europe. A body of ideas, capabilities and untestable assumptions that for several decades had nevertheless been at the heart of security policy in and for Europe, deterrence was unceremoniously consigned to history in the early 1990s. It was not only that the highly elaborate, mutual strategic deterrence of the Cold War was considered suddenly to have become irrelevant but that politico-military deterrence itself was thought to be obsolete. In retrospect, this judgement was both complacent and ahistoric. The past 25 years have shown that in certain respects, mutual strategic deterrence is


2 ‘Bonfire of the certainties’ – an expression coined by George Robertson (now Lord Robertson) in a speech at Chatham House in 1990.
still required; and there should have been no reason to suppose that the basics of deterrence had become any less valid with the end of the Cold War than they had been throughout the previous millennia of human history. Nevertheless, almost overnight European deterrence arguably became a mere façade, swaying ominously even the lightest of strategic breezes with no clear sense of how and where it is anchored.

Former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey observed succinctly that ‘As an alliance [i.e. NATO] we’ve taken deterrence for granted for 20 years now, but we can’t do that anymore.’ Deterrence is in a crisis of scepticism; a situation that should be a cause of concern in NATO, for NATO governments and for European security in general.

21ST CENTURY DETERRENCE: THE CRISIS OF SCEPTICISM

Since the signature of the Washington Treaty in 1949, the core task of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has been to defend the territory and interests of the treaty signatories in North America, in Europe and in the north Atlantic Ocean. In spite of any uncertainty prompted by the problem of ‘negative proof’ discussed earlier, it seems likely, at the very least, that deterrence forms part of the explanation for the stability of the NATO area between 1949 and the end of the Cold War some forty years later. But if it is reasonable to conclude that deterrence did what was expected of it during the Cold War, why is it now in a state of crisis?

Part of the explanation is that the European security order is challenged in so many ways and on so many levels that Cold War style deterrence thinking now appears scarcely relevant; little more than an historical artefact. On the one hand, the shibboleths of Cold War deterrence seem too narrow and monolithic, too concerned with a very specific, militarised conception of order and security. On the other hand, these ideas are seen by some to run the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Advocates of deterrence use the language of order and stability. But in practice, runs the argument, deterrence is manifestly a preparation for everything but order and stability. For those western European polities that emerged from the Cold War in the early 1990s, the so-called ‘peace dividend’ was a far preferable alternative to the continuation of Cold War levels of defence spending and preparations for conventional war in Europe.

Another part of the explanation lies in the form of a category error; a confusion between underlying principle and contingent effect. Carl von Clausewitz, a nineteenth century Prussian general and a philosopher of war, suggested that ‘war can be thought of in two different ways – its absolute form or one of the variant forms that it actually takes.’ Current scholarship tends to interpret this to mean that, for Clausewitz, war had both an unchanging nature and an ever-changing character. Taking a broadly Clausewitzian line it could be said that deterrence, like war, also has an unchanging nature and that it too can take on as many forms as history and circumstance demand. It seems all-too easy, however, to confuse the enduring with the contingent. In the UK and elsewhere some military practitioners and analysts came to the mistaken view that desert warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed the fundamental nature of modern war rather than serving as a mere illustration of its ever-changing character. Similarly, it would be a mistake to confuse one, contingent form of deterrence with its unchanging nature and then to assume that form must therefore be universally applicable and unfailingly durable. Thus, any expectation that Cold War deterrence thinking and practice could be transferred unaltered to post-Cold War circumstances was always doomed to end in disappointment. After all, how straightforward and productive could it ever be to take one set of highly context-specific deterrence ideas and principles and transfer them, entire, to a completely different context – particularly when that new context is still evolving? But the consequences of this category error could scarcely be more serious for geostrategic stability and security. Because the Cold War forms of deterrence have been found wanting in the current strategic environment, so it is assumed that the core principles of deterrence have nothing to offer; the all-important ‘baby’ has been thrown away with its cold and unwanted ‘bathwater’.

4 By one account, Clausewitz was the philosopher of war. In the late 1970s the English philosopher Philip Windsor described Clausewitz’s On War as ‘the only work of philosophic stature to have been written about war in the modern period.’ P. Windsor, ‘The Clock, the Context and Clausewitz. Millennium (Vol. 6, No. 2, 1977), p.193.
Loss of interest in the principles of deterrence is happening at a time when the need to understand and then to operationalise these principles could scarcely be more pressing. It is for this reason that the current moment is described as a crisis. The stability and security of Europe requires a rediscovery and rearticulation of deterrence to meet a broad range of challenges, both traditional and novel. Some of the questions to be asked of deterrence are familiar, others much less so. But it is precisely this combination of the old with the new which poses a general challenge to European deterrence theory, policy and practice. In early 21st century Europe, what forms should deterrence take and how should it be achieved? Is mutual nuclear deterrence credible after the Cold War? How much conventional military deterrence is needed? How can terrorists and criminals be deterred? Is it possible to deter or prevent the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons by non-state actors? Can cyber deterrence be a meaningful activity? And can deterrence be achieved through other, non-military means such as sanctions and soft power?

There have been occasional attempts to revisit, revise and update the deterrence debate, but these have so far made little impression on a post-Cold War European security consensus which has proved to be complacent and lacking in vitality where deterrence is concerned. In 2003 the European Union published a European Security Strategy in which the words ‘deterrent’ and ‘deterrence’ did not appear. The 2016 European Union Global Strategy makes a slightly better effort: ‘As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats.’ Although this sentence is printed in a prominent, eye-catching way in the published document, it would be difficult to see in this form of words anything more than a passing acquaintance with a body of complex and important ideas.

In the UK’s case, although the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (NSS & SDSR) of 2015 dwelt at some length on the need for a comprehensive, cross-governmental approach to deterrence, the document fell short of providing a publicly accessible understanding of 21st century deterrence; a conceptual framework in which policy, strategy, ethics, technology and psychology are all intertwined. Instead, the UK National Strategy took little more than a declaratory line, using language that offered no more than a basic understanding of the topic: ‘Deterrence means that any potential aggressors know that any benefits they may seek to gain by attacking the UK will be outweighed by the consequences for them.’ Similarly, the most recent French White Paper on Defence and National Security (the Livre Blanc, published in 2013) also covered deterrence to some depth, but almost exclusively in terms of the preservation of France’s national nuclear deterrent capability.

Deterrence faces a crisis of scepticism as to its relevance and its strategic significance. The cause of this scepticism is, in part, the Cold War-weariness that set in across Europe in the early 1990s and by the desire to spend public money in more immediately gratifying ways than on military personnel and equipment. But this loss of interest in deterrence is also caused by a widespread failure to understand that while deterrence is manifested in certain ways, at certain times and in certain geostrategic circumstances, these are simply examples of the application of an enduring set of principles. Different forms of politico-military strategic deterrence might come and go, but the principles remain unaltered, waiting to be applied in new circumstances as they arise. If the enduring principles of deterrence are not re-examined and re-applied as the strategic environment changes, the result can be just as bad as having no deterrence at all. The next section presents what amounts to case study in the damage that can be caused by the loss of what might best be termed a ‘culture of deterrence’.

**CALLING NATO’S BLUFF: RUSSIA’S STRATEGY OF DISRUPTION**

In late February 2014, in the aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution, pro-Russian protests in Crimea led to Russian forces and their proxies occupying strategically important areas of the Crimean Peninsula. Crimea had been...
transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by Khrushchev in 1954 and subsequently became an Autonomous Republic of independent Ukraine in 1991. Crimea was, in other words, an internationally recognised part of Ukrainian territory. In March 2014, however, a referendum (held while under conditions of military occupation) provided the questionable rationale for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The annexation was, and remains, in breach of international law, but that detail mattered little in Moscow. Pro-Russian demonstrations in the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine then prompted further Russian intervention. By late 2014 several thousand Russian troops were deployed inside Ukraine – an internationally recognised, independent, sovereign state – with many more poised on the Russian side of the border.

The challenge to the European order was stark: contrary to decades of expectation, European borders had once again been changed by armed force. The challenge to NATO was especially vivid. Although the West had, arguably, misunderstood and mishandled Russia since the end of the Cold War, and although Ukraine was not a member of the Alliance, Russia’s readiness to use armed force against its neighbour called NATO’s credibility into question. NATO had reinvented itself since the end of the Cold War as the sponsor of strategic stability in Europe, working with former adversaries. This claim no longer carried much weight.

What also impressed NATO’s strategic analysts and decision-makers was the manner in which Russia used coercive force in Crimea and Donbass. Terms such as ‘asymmetric’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘ambiguous’ warfare have for some years captured the imagination of strategic analysts. But Russia appeared to go one or two steps further in its use of so-called ‘new generation warfare’ – a combination of civil action and intimidation with the deniable use of conventional military forces, all orchestrated by a strategic communication campaign drawing heavily on the high-minded rhetoric of democratisation and humanitarian intervention. All in all, Russian actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine appeared to leave NATO with little, if anything to say or do; the Alliance’s bluff seemed to have been called.

Although some saw in these events the beginning of a ‘new Cold War’, NATO’s response was very much more cautious than might have been seen during the Cold War. Alliance air forces flew surveillance missions to monitor Russian military activity and an ‘air policing’ operation was launched over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Naval vessels were deployed to the Baltic and the Mediterranean and military exercises took place in northern and central Europe. Yet in spite of these various deployments, decisions and initiatives, the Alliance seemed to have been wrong-footed by Russia. Russian intentions towards Ukraine continued to dominate NATO’s geostrategic analysis during 2015. Following the failure of the September 2014 Minsk Protocol, in February 2015 Russian President Vladimir Putin met his Ukrainian counterpart, Petro Poroshenko in yet another attempt to resolve conflict in the Donbass region. The outcome, known as Minsk II, was an elaborate agreement which, by the end of 2015 had largely failed to achieve its goals. It was significant that NATO had little or no involvement in a strategic ceasefire agreement being negotiated on the edge of its treaty area. But the Ukraine crisis prompted rather more fundamental – even existential – questions about the Alliance. What was NATO actually for? What could NATO do well and effectively as a strategic politico-military alliance? How should NATO be configured to meet European and international security challenges? And did NATO, somehow, become ‘self-deterred’ in the face of Russian intervention?

For some politicians and strategic analysts, the continuation of Russia’s aggressive and unpredictable behaviour along its borders was ample proof that NATO had miscalculated as to the nature of the strategic threat to Europe. Terrorism and organised crime would, of course, continue to be significant security challenges but the real threat had now become clear; territorial aggression within Europe. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and

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10 Asymmetric warfare is best understood as war between one side which is militarily weak yet determined and ingenious, and another side which is militarily powerful yet complacent and inattentive. See Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, ‘Complex security and strategic latency: the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015’, International Affairs (Vol. 91, No.2, 2015), p.357. The scope of hybrid warfare has been defined as follows: ‘Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives’. Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Hybrid vs. compound war. The Janus choice: defining today’s multifaceted conflict’, Armed Forces Journal, October 2009, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/hybridvs-compound-war/.

11 ‘New generation’ (or ‘permanent’) warfare is widely considered to be a Russian innovation. It has been defined as follows: ‘The Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battle-space is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country’. Jānis Bērzinš, Russia’s new generation warfare in Ukraine: implications for Latvian defense policy (Riga: National Defence Academy of Latvia, Policy Paper No. 2, April 2014), p. 5.
then the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO leaders had assumed, not unreasonably, that the Alliance’s long-standing commitment to territorial self-defence in western Europe need no longer be the focus of defence planning and expenditure. Perceptions of Russian adventurism, however, in Ukraine and elsewhere, prompted anxious questions as to whether NATO should seek to re-acquaint itself with Cold War-style conventional warfare in Europe, perhaps even to the extent of reinvesting in heavy armour formations (battle tanks, tracked infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery and so on). Was NATO’s purpose therefore to provide for defence (in the traditional sense), or for security (in the post-Cold War sense)? Or perhaps both?

NATO’s summit meeting in Warsaw from 8–9 July 2016 was an opportunity for the Alliance to show that its 28 member nations not only understood the gravity of the situation in which they found themselves but that they could also do something meaningful about it. As so often in NATO’s recent past, however, the first of these tasks proved easier to manage than the second. Earlier in the year NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had warned against ‘a more assertive Russia. Intimidating its neighbours. And changing borders by force.’12 The language of the Warsaw communiqué was similarly stark. The document echoed Stoltenberg’s words, referring repeatedly to Russia’s ‘aggressive actions.’13 Although the Russian Question loomed very large at Warsaw, the communiqué took a wider view, describing an ‘arc of insecurity and instability along NATO’s periphery and beyond’ and noting that turbulence in the Middle East and North Africa could have ‘direct implications for the security of NATO’.14 But the signatories of the communiqué also sought to convey a sense of mature self-confidence. Approaching the 70th anniversary of its founding treaty, this was a highly experienced politico-military organisation wishing to appear firm and decisive yet at the same time calm, non-confrontational and, above all, in control of its strategic environment. NATO leaders knew their script well enough; just as during the decades of the Cold War, adversaries and aggressors must be met with a convincing deterrent posture and an equally convincing defensive structure. And just as deeply embedded in the Alliance’s strategic culture is the importance of talking to adversaries, particularly when times are tense. The Warsaw summit therefore centred around three familiar themes: deterrence, defence and dialogue.

These three themes are closely intertwined – strategic dialogue is conducted not only through diplomatic channels but also through military preparations and deployments. At their previous summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO leaders had agreed a Readiness Action Plan and established a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.15 The Warsaw summit then tried to send even clearer signals with the decision to establish a ‘forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance’;16 four multinational battlegroups, headed by the UK, Canada, Germany and United States would be deployed to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland respectively.17 Importantly, this commitment – described in Warsaw as a ‘robust multinational presence’ – would be open-ended. Yet it was nevertheless a very small military commitment. To those unfamiliar with military organisations, the expression ‘battlegroup’ might suggest a large, highly capable formation. But the battlegroup is a tactical unit, typically involving 600–1,000 infantry and armoured troops as well as combat support elements such as reconnaissance, artillery, engineers and logistics. The battlegroup is not, therefore, a large, operationally capable formation and is not usually considered sufficient for independent deployment. Using language coined during the Cold War, some have described these deployments as a ‘trip-wire’.18 But a trip-wire only functions as such if it is being watched closely and if something decisive (and usually explosive) happens when it is tripped. In the absence of very significant reinforcements – equipped, trained and poised to react when needed – these battalion-based deployments could not qualify as a military trip-wire; the most that could be said of them is that they might serve as a ‘political trip-wire’ of some sort.

14 Ibid., paras. 5, 25.
16 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, para. 11.
17 Ibid., para. 40.
In order to make this limited forward presence appear more meaningful as a military trip-wire, towards the end of 2016 unnamed ‘NATO commanders’ were reported to be arguing for the response time of the Alliance’s ‘follow-on-force’ of c.300,000 troops to be reduced from six months to about two months. If achievable, this change in response time would be a marked improvement upon previous, rather tentative and unconvincing assertions about NATO force readiness, and the strategic significance of such a step-change would not be lost on Russia. But will the follow-on force always be available in these numbers and will a reaction time of two months be fast enough in any case? For Estonia, for example, the deployment of a NATO battlegroup in Spring/Summer 2017 will almost certainly be welcomed as a symbol of Alliance cohesion, but probably not much more; in the two months that NATO would need to come to Estonia’s defence, Russian forces could very rapidly and easily have achieved any geopolitical goals they might have. According to an assessment published in 2016 by senior research analysts at the RAND Corporation, Russian ground forces in the Western Military District (adjacent to the Baltic Republics) comprise as many as 22 manoeuvre battalions, ten artillery battalions, four missile battalions and six attack helicopter battalions, with further naval infantry and missile units available on reserve in Kaliningrad. The authors of the RAND study estimate that these forces could reach the outskirts of the capitals of Estonia and Latvia in just 60 hours.

The unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from this case study of the Russian strategic challenge to NATO is that having at least reminded itself of the idea of deterrence at the 2016 Warsaw summit, the Alliance nevertheless still has some way to go if it wishes to bring the idea back to life. Military deployments are, certainly, an important method of communication to an actual or potential adversary. But communication alone is not sufficient; successful deterrence requires the ‘three Cs’ – the communication of politically credible strategic capability. NATO must – and can – improve the quality and coherence of its response.

**NATO’S RESPONSE: INTEGRATED DETERRENCE**

Contemporary challenges to the European security order require an intelligent reapplication of principles and techniques which have long been familiar. The basic principles of deterrence are unchanging; the imposition of intolerable cost, whether through defence and denial or by the threat of a punitive response, to dissuade an actual or potential adversary from adventurism or aggression. The ‘three Cs’ remain a valid description of the conditions that a deterrent posture – any deterrent posture – must satisfy if it is to be effective and if an adversary’s cost-benefit analysis is therefore to be influenced appropriately. But effective, durable deterrence has become more than strong defences and much more than a declared promise to inflict violence with one capability or another; 21st century European deterrence requires a range of capabilities (passive and active, military and non-military) in a posture which is both coherent and credible and which can be communicated unambiguously to any potential adversary.

To borrow Clausewitz’s distinction once again, if its nature is unchanging then what is the character of 21st century strategic deterrence? Essentially it is that deterrence has not one character, or form, but several. NATO’s deterrent challenge, therefore, is threefold. First, NATO must identify where and how deterrence is needed. What are the current and likely challenges to NATO’s territory and interests, from what source and at what level? What do potential adversaries have at stake; how much risk are they willing to bear in mounting those challenges? Second, the governments of NATO nations must ensure that its deterrent needs, having been identified, are then properly funded and turned into capability. Third and finally, NATO and its member governments must decide how to integrate these different deterrence capabilities into one coherent whole. Without an overarching, unifying concept, a complex deterrence posture of the sort needed to meet a wide variety of challenges will be unlikely to succeed; deterrence is expensive and time-consuming and requires a grand rationale if the necessary commitments are to be made and sustained.

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That capstone concept is Integrated Deterrence. Integrated Deterrence is the optimal response to hybridised, cross-spectrum strategic challenges. It has four elements: vertical integration, horizontal integration, functional integration and temporal integration.

Vertical Integration concerns the coherence of all military components of deterrence, from the nuclear to the conventional and from the strategic to the operational and tactical levels of war, including the capability and effect of individual commanders and troops.

In brief, the argument for the maintenance of nuclear deterrence ideas, structures and capabilities can be made on two levels: ‘deterrence in principle’ and ‘deterrence in practice’. The first is to argue for nuclear deterrence as a valid and necessary concept, and for it to be maintained by established nuclear weapon states as a form of international stewardship. The possibility of further nuclear proliferation suggests that the long-standing taboo against nuclear weapons might be eroding, that the repugnance surrounding the prospect of nuclear use might not be shared by all states, and that nuclear use might therefore once again become thinkable. If such conceptual drift is indeed taking place, then it must be countered by the argument that nuclear weapons are — and can only be — a ‘non-weapon’ or ‘political weapon’. Absurd or self-evident as these two expressions might respectively appear, they lie at the heart of the argument for mutual nuclear deterrence. The second, ‘deterrence in practice’ is the relational argument, concerned with those circumstances in which only a nuclear deterrent capability could modify the assumptions and perhaps even the adversarial behaviour of another nuclear-armed power.

But if a nuclear deterrent can be said to be a necessary component of an overall strategic deterrence posture, it cannot be said to be sufficient. As during the Cold War, if a strategic deterrence posture consists only of nuclear weapons then it is unlikely that anything below all-out nuclear war could successfully be deterred. Equally, without there being non-nuclear deterrence options, it is unlikely that nuclear deterrence would be considered credible in all circumstances.

A vertically integrated deterrence posture follows a circular logic which requires the posture to be capable, credible and communicable on all levels, not just the strategic nuclear. The rationale for nuclear deterrence is that it is part of a graduated response, a last resort once conventional deterrence has failed. And the rationale for conventional deterrence is that an adversary will understand that its bluff must not be called, precisely because there is a nuclear last resort. Yet NATO’s deterrence posture — on all levels — has been allowed to atrophy and as a result the vital connection between nuclear and conventional has been broken. The same cannot be said of Russia. With the recent articulation of the so-called ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’, the Russians have clearly thought very deeply about the vertical integration of their force posture, including the position of the nuclear threshold. They have modernized their command and control systems and their conventional warfighting capabilities. And they have also modernized their nuclear weapons, as evidenced by the provocative deployment of SSC-8 cruise missiles, in contravention of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. NATO’s deterrence posture is left dangerously exposed by this turn of events.

NATO should seek urgently to reconnect its nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities, both doctrinally and in terms of capabilities. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and its 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review are both in need of refreshment. The Alliance’s nuclear weapon holdings and delivery systems should be subjected to an uncompromising re-evaluation. And on the conventional side, since NATO Europe no longer has the extensive military capabilities it once had, and given that European governments are persistently reluctant to increase levels of defence spending, ways must be found to use limited forces at the tactical and operational levels more selectively and cleverly, to bolster the strategic deterrent effect. For example, Anti-access/Area Denial (A2AD), described earlier as something to be prepared against (or ‘offset’) could be considered the basis of operational-level deterrence; more of an opportunity than a threat, in other words.

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21 This passage is taken from Paul Cornish, Perspectives on the Trident Successor Decision: Context, Purpose, Ethics and Cost, Submission to the Labour Party International Policy Commission, 8 June 2016: http://www.policyforum.labour.org.uk/.


At the tactical level, more thought could be given to the idea of ‘devolved’ or ‘mobile’ deterrence as the modern equivalent of the ‘fleet in being’. The operating concept behind the ‘fleet in being’ was that a naval force, simply through knowledge of its existence, could exert a containing influence upon its adversaries, even without leaving port.\textsuperscript{24} In a similar way, the ‘army in being’ (or perhaps what some have called ‘Continuous On Land Deterrence’ – a deliberate emulation of the long-established and more plainly understood submarine-based deterrent posture known as ‘Continuous At Sea Deterrence’ (CASD)) would be required to demonstrate its existence, its capability and its determination without having to deploy the entire force. This might involve the very rapid deployment of troops and equipment, even at relatively low levels (such as a battlegroup), wherever and whenever required. But these deployments would not be in the sense of a human trip-wire whose task is simply to wait passively until being broken by the heavy footfall of an invading force. Instead, an ‘army in being’ would also involve the devolution of authority, decision-making and risk-taking down to the lowest level. Perhaps better understood as ‘deterrence by mission command’, the goal would be for the commander on the ground – the individual with the clearest sense of dangers and possibilities – to decide the most appropriate combination of military and non-military responses to a given challenge and in that way to connect the deterrent posture as closely as possible to the adversary’s actions and intentions.

Horizontal Integration contributes to the integrity of deterrence by ensuring that all relevant governmental and non-governmental bodies are included, as required, in the deterrent effort. Most, if not all NATO governments should be familiar with the claim that ‘joined-up’ government can improve policy effectiveness and efficiency and that public and private sectors should interact when required. In the UK these ideas are currently expressed in the form of the ‘Full Spectrum Approach’, as explained by Prime Minister David Cameron in his foreword to the 2015 National Security Strategy: ‘we will continue to harness all the tools of national power available to us, coordinated through the National Security Council, to deliver a ‘full spectrum approach’.’\textsuperscript{25} In March 2016 the goals of the Full Spectrum Approach were set out more fully in an informal briefing note:

... to meet our priorities of deterring state-based threats, tackling terrorism, remaining a world leader in cyber security and ensuring we have the capability to respond rapidly to crises as they emerge. This push for flexibility and agility and the co-ordination of soft power, diplomatic, financial and other tools sits against the proliferation of new types of threats, including hybrid warfare and the rise of powerful non-state actors.\textsuperscript{26}

On this basis it is easy to understand why some in and around UK government describe the Full Spectrum Approach as the UK’s ‘answer’ to hybrid warfare.

Functional Integration takes the broad principles of horizontal integration but applies them to functions and activities rather than to departments of government and other, non-governmental organisations. Activities, like organisations, must be deconflicted; trade sanctions, for example, should not be allowed unwittingly to undermine diplomatic negotiations. But functional integration should also seek to ensure that deconflicted activities can then be combined to multiply the overall deterrent effect. Nowhere is this more essential than in the field of information and communications technology (ICT).

In the UK, the ‘critical national infrastructure’ (CNI) is a subset of thirteen national infrastructure sectors. The CNI comprises specific assets and facilities, ‘the loss or compromise of which would have a major detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.’ The CNI can be both physical (e.g. sites, installations, items of equipment) and logical (e.g. information networks, communications systems).\textsuperscript{27} A similar view informs the European Union Network and Information Security Directive:

Network and information systems and services play a vital role in society. Their reliability and security are essential to economic and societal activities, and in particular to the functioning of the internal market.\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{25} NSS & SDSR 2015, p.6.

\textsuperscript{26} Unpublished informal briefing material.


\textsuperscript{28} NIS Directive (EU) 2016/1148, 6 July 2016 p.1 para (l).
Cyberspace – an unsatisfactory shorthand term for the medium of digital communication and information exchange – is increasingly vital to human activity on every conceivable level: political, economic, cultural and individual. It is also increasingly vital to strategic affairs. And what most distinguishes the 21st century strategic environment from its Cold War predecessor is without doubt the development of cyberspace as an arena not only for communication but also for strategic competition. We have thus come to the point where one of the essential ‘3Cs’ of deterrence – communication – has itself become a battleground. What is essential, therefore, is to ensure that cyberspace retains its functional integrity.

Cyberspace can be protected offensively, through the ‘fusion’ of national levers of power in a form of punitive (and perhaps even anticipatory) deterrence. Strategic thinking seems to be shifting in this direction, evidenced by the more open use of such terms as ‘offensive cyber’ and ‘active cyber defence’. One of the most useful recent studies in this vein is that published by Kramer, Butler and Lotriente:

Offense will be a key element of effective operations. Prior to conflict, the United States should lead an expanded “fusion” effort, largely led by civil authorities, to bring to bear intelligence, cyber, financial, law enforcement, and other capabilities to disrupt the actions of state and state-associated entities undertaking adversarial cyber action.29

In cyberspace, the contemporary equivalent of defensive deterrence (or deterrence by denial) is to ensure that ICT systems in and around the CNI remain resistant to intrusion and attack. Indeed, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué declared cyberspace to be ‘part of NATO’s core task of collective defence’ and recognised cyberspace ‘as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.’30 Very similar ‘deterrence by denial’ thinking can be found in the most recent UK National Cyber Security Strategy:

We will pursue a comprehensive national approach to cyber security and deterrence that will make the UK a harder target, reducing the benefits and raising the costs to an adversary – be they political, diplomatic, economic or strategic. We must ensure our capability and intent to respond are understood by potential adversaries in order to influence their decision-making. We shall have the tools and capabilities we need: to deny our adversaries easy opportunities to compromise our networks and systems; to understand their intent and capabilities; to defeat commodity malware threats at scale; and to respond and protect the nation in cyberspace.31

As the foundation of Integrated Deterrence, cyberspace and ICT must be made resilient. The Concise Oxford Dictionary definition of ‘resilience’ is ‘recoiling; springing back; resuming its original shape after bending, stretching, compression etc.’ But in a world of fast-moving, asymmetric cyber threats, to ‘spring back’ to a position which has just been shown to be vulnerable to attack could, at best, be described as ‘dumb resilience’. Resilience must be more than resistance and restoration of the status quo ante. ‘Smart’ resilience is about ‘bouncing forward’ to a different, more advantageous position which allows the defender to regain some of the advantage just lost. This can be achieved, in part, through technical and managerial measures such as in-built redundancy and operational recovery plans.

But it might be possible for resilience to be ‘smarter’ still – perhaps even ‘dynamic’ – whereby the defender is more agile and adaptable and can regain and hold more of the initiative. Paradoxically, the winning move might be to think less about building a robust ‘adversary agnostic’ defence and more about identifying and managing vulnerabilities. It has been said that ‘in the information age, the people who know how to re-aggregate information will win.’ In pursuit of Integrated Deterrence this claim can be adapted as follows: ‘in the information age the people who know how to re-aggregate and redistribute vulnerability cannot lose.’ Dynamic resilience looks beyond the traditional model of deterrence as a largely static, stabilised relationship in which a limited set of known values (cities, ports, key communications nodes, military and logistic sites etc.) are held at mutual risk. Dynamic resilience allows the defender to reassess the value/vulnerability calculus to their advantage, whenever there is a case for doing so. In other words, the defender decides, on their terms, which risks they are

30 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, para. 70.
prepared to take. And this assessment is made unilaterally; the idea of resilience is used simply as a framework to enable the defender to understand their own risk and vulnerability better than the adversary does. The defender controls the resilience agenda by deciding on priorities and then retaining the ability and the initiative to change the analysis and reprioritise, as often as necessary. The starting point for dynamic resilience is for the defending side to have a clear and confident understanding of their own vulnerabilities and of the harms they might face in and from cyberspace.32

Temporal Integration is an exercise in ‘future proofing’ Integrated Deterrence in order that it can be maintained over time and as circumstances change. National security and defence strategy is concerned with the passage of time. A national strategic outlook is rooted in a political, cultural and geostrategic past, perhaps several centuries old. The more recent past offers a bank of military, intelligence and other experiences, connecting to the deeper historical context and providing much needed ‘lessons’ in the application of national power – both successes and failures. National strategy is also concerned with the present, with articulating a view of the world, its strategic challenges and opportunities, and with organising national resources to achieve the optimal balance of capabilities – diplomatic, policing, development aid, military, trade, intelligence, cultural outreach and so on. And national strategy is also, of course, concerned with the future, particularly when it comes to the role of deterrence in shaping an aggressor’s cost-benefit calculations.

The obvious difficulty, for deterrence and for national strategy itself, is that the future is by definition unknowable and therefore unpredictable. Rafe Sagarin argued that adaptability is essential when preparing for a complex, uncertain and urgent future:

Adaptability is fundamentally different from merely reacting to a crisis (which happens too late) or attempting to predict the next crisis (which is almost certain to fail when complex ecological systems and human behaviors are involved). Adaptability controls the sweet spot between reaction and prediction, providing an inherent ability to respond efficiently to a wide range of potential challenges, not just those that are known or anticipated.33

One way to achieve adaptability in deterrence is to ensure that latency is written into strategic plans and preparations. Strategic latency is generally associated with technological innovation and development. But it is also a habit of mind whereby national strategy is forced to look beyond the short-term, to anticipate plausible strategic futures and to ensure that the long-range capability plan is not geared too tightly to a relatively short-term risk picture such as that contained within a government’s security and defence review. When financial scarcity bites, strategic resilience and adaptability can suffer; arguably the worst position to be in when threats and challenges seem to multiply at an unprecedented rate. Strategic latency is therefore an argument for national strategic resilience; for maintaining a balanced mix of armed forces and other levers of national power and influence even though (or, rather, because) such a posture might not appear consistent with a compressed and foreshortened assessment of national strategic priorities. Described in this way, latency is the foundation of a future-proofed, integrated deterrent posture.34

CONCLUSION

Deterrence should continue to convey the message that the benefits expected from adventurism or aggression will be outweighed by the costs imposed. This expectation seems straightforward enough although, to paraphrase yet another Clausewitzian aphorism, ‘Everything in deterrence is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.’35

The long-established principles and techniques of deterrence can (and must) be reconceived and modernised in ways which are more appropriate to 21st century European security challenges. This must be much more than

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34 For further discussion of strategic latency see Cornish and Dorman, ‘Complex security and strategic latency: the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015’.
35 Clausewitz, On War, p.119.
an effort at strategic archaeology, however. Deterrence must not simply be rediscovered; it must be normalised with the European security discourse and on the broadest conceivable level, involving all functions and levers of government and including non-governmental bodies, the private sector and even individuals.

This paper has argued for Integrated Deterrence comprising four elements: vertical; horizontal; functional; and temporal integration. This is not intended to provide an exhaustive and exclusive account of 21st century deterrence. Far from it; Integrated Deterrence is best understood as a framework which can stand alone while allowing other ideas to be attached to it. If a broad understanding can be gained of the continued relevance and value of deterrence then the significance of other, perhaps more abstract ideas might also then be realised. There have recently been several noteworthy attempts to revive and reapply deterrence theory, such as extended deterrence,36 ‘triadic’ or indirect deterrence (i.e. deterrence of third party, non-state actors),37 normative deterrence (‘soft’ deterrence by the agreement on rules-based co-operation),38 associative deterrence (‘soft’ deterrence by the possibility of reputational damage);39 and ideational deterrence (or ‘deterrence by counter-narrative and delegitimisation’).40

Some react with either lack of interest, suspicion or even open hostility to the idea that deterrence should be rehabilitated in any way whatsoever; surely it is a symbol of Europe’s uncomfortable, divided late 20th century past and as such is best understood as an historical artefact, and preferably not one to be excavated? Even senior diplomats and government officials appear on occasion to take something like this view. But in doing so they reveal both their lack of familiarity with their own history and their misunderstanding of deterrence as an idea. Deterrence is fundamentally not about the fighting of war in order to achieve the aim of national security. It is, instead, about the avoidance of war, in order to achieve that aim. Neither should this paper be interpreted as an attempt to ‘securitise’ (and least of all to ‘militarise’) European geopolitics, in the process returning Europe to its 20th century past. In the words of UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, ‘Britain and its allies want no “new Cold War” with Russia.’41 Instead, the aim of Integrated Deterrence is to answer asymmetric aggression and adventurism with a coherent, durable, symmetrical and adaptable strategic posture. Finally, Integrated Deterrence should not be perceived as an attempt to compensate for a strategic shortfall of some sort. Integrated Deterrence is not, in other words, a ‘Fourth Offset Strategy’ intended to mitigate the apparent, and alarming, lack of understanding of strategic matters within many Western governments. Integrated Deterrence is, instead, better understood as the ‘First Reset Strategy’, intended to refocus deterrence on its enduring purpose; the achievement of a stable and secure strategic environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO’s strategic decision-making is too slow and tentative for the challenges the Alliance now faces. As well as having deterrent value in its own right, an adapted decision-making capability is essential if NATO’s strategic deterrence is to be both credible and communicable. NATO should therefore overhaul and re-energise its decision-making processes to be able to react to a fast-breaking crisis anywhere, at any time.

NATO should overhaul its command and control structures to enable the rapid deployment of credible forces anywhere around the Alliance’s periphery as well as beyond the NATO area as and when required.

NATO should revise and renew both the 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, with the explicit goal of cementing the connection between nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities.

Defence is a component of deterrence. In response to the Russian deployment of nuclear capable systems and weapons, NATO should pursue the closer integration of its air and missile defence systems. This initiative

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should seek to preserve the phased adaptive approach to the Middle East ballistic missile threat while ensuring that NATO develops the capability to defend against air and missile threats from Europe’s east.

NATO should reincorporate the c.180 US nuclear weapons (B61) deployed in Europe into a comprehensive and coherent nuclear policy. The B61 capability should undergo a modernisation programme to include storage and capacity. Nuclear Sharing countries should be required to confirm the readiness of their Dual-Capable Aircraft.

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GLOBSEC
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REANIMATING NATO’S WARFIGHTING MINDSET

Eight Steps to Increase the Alliance’s Political-Military Agility

SUPPORTING PAPER
The accelerating pace of events stands among the most challenging security dynamics confronting the NATO Alliance. Often called the “speed of war,” it is a product and driver of a threat environment that today features a complex mix of great power confrontation, failed states, violent extremist groups, and the profusion of new technologies leveraged by adversaries, great and small.

NATO’s relevance has never been solely defined by the tanks, ships, and aircraft it can field. It has also been determined by the speed with which this consensus based organization can make decisions necessary to leverage its political and military potential. This “speed of decision” is often as critical as firepower when it comes to controlling the flow of events in a crisis, deterring adversaries, and, when necessary, defeating them.

During the Cold War, NATO’s political decision making structures operated with a warfighting mindset that enabled the Alliance to effectively navigate crises with the Soviet Union so that they would not spin out of control into a nuclear Armageddon. Ultimately, that mindset contributed to the West’s historic victory, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire.

In the decades that followed, NATO’s warfighting mindset shifted from one of deterrence and defense into one of engagement. This reflected the Alliance’s adoption of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions in the Balkans, its capacity building tasks in Europe and the Middle East, and its distant (and nonetheless difficult) counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan.

Today, NATO faces a new set of challenges that directly threaten its territory and populations. Russia’s military build-up, invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, and provocative military actions against NATO Allies and partners are a direct attack on the post-War order. The proliferation of missiles and weapons-of-mass destruction are extending the reach of Iran and North Korea. Terrorists have repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to suddenly and savagely strike targets in Europe and North America. The domains of cyber and information warfare are providing all these adversaries a wider set of near instantaneous options to do harm. These many contingencies underscore the new speed of war and consequently the need for rapid NATO decision-making capacities.

THE SPEED OF WAR... AND PEACE

U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, Jr., recently described how technological change has “accelerated the speed of war, making conflict faster and more complex than any point in history.”1 Add to this the aforementioned geopolitical challenges, and it is only clearer that NATO faces a world where the pace at which peacetime can evolve to confrontation to crisis to conflict has accelerated significantly.

General Dunford, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, also identified a second consequence of this double barreled change: Compared to the past, the costs of failure at the initial stages of conflict are potentially much higher. It has become more difficult to recover from setbacks or defeats in the early phases of war. The

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1  General Joseph Dunford, Jr. “From the Chairman: The Pace of Change.” Joint Force Quarterly (1st Quarter, January 2017)
ability of adversaries to strike with missiles, cyber-attacks, and forces that can mobilize and deploy tens of thousands of troops within days if not hours presents a far more volatile and unforgiving threat environment.2

Compared to NATO’s past, this is a far more challenging environment in which to deter, and if necessary, to defend against and to defeat adversaries. For the Alliance to remain effective, it must not only have the necessary force structure, its political authorities must also have the ability to fully leverage intelligence (including sorting through intentionally disseminated misinformation) and to develop, promulgate and exercise the full spectrum of necessary strategies and plans. Above all, NATO’s political authorities must demonstrate the capacity for rapid decision-making to launch real-time responses amidst fast breaking crises and conflict.

Today, the Alliance continues to lag in these in capacities. During the Cold War, NATO outmatched its adversaries in these realms. NATO war plans were regularly updated and reviewed. Forces were massed forward and robustly exercised. Reinforcement drills were regularly conducted, including the annual REFORGER exercise that sent a division or more of US forces across the Atlantic to West Germany. NATO commanders were delegated authorities that enabled them to respond in kind to, if not preempt, provocative conduct by Soviet forces.

After the Cold War, these skill sets atrophied. This, in part, reflected NATO’s successful and rapid adaptation to new challenges. Operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan focused on peace-enforcement, peace-keeping, and counter-insurgency tasks that few had predicted would become NATO’s central preoccupation. But training for fast breaking, high-intensity conflict withered to near non-existence. Military exercises and contingency planning were curtailed by the desire to avoid diplomatic inconvenience – including the possible appearance of being provocative or threatening to Russia -- and reduce costs. Cold War authorities to deploy and engage NATO forces – even for training -- were withdrawn from the Alliance’s commanders. Today, NATO commanders only beginning to have those authorities returned, including for example the authority to mobilize vice deploy small elements of the NRF.

As a result, the Alliance’s Cold War mindset shifted from that of warfighting to one of engagement, a devolution in part driven by the optimism that flowed after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. An engagement mindset focuses on cooperation with current and potential adversaries and capacity building of partners rather than the preparations and actions necessary to deter and respond to fast-breaking conflict, including that which has the potential for rapid and dangerous escalation.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement – especially the management of conflict between and within states – is a demanding and complex undertaking, but its requirements are different from that of warfighting. In the former, one intervenes at one’s own leisure and can discontinue such operations at will, as was NATO’s case in Libya.

A warfighting mindset is much more challenging to develop and sustain. It fundamentally reflects true determination to decisively defeat an adversary and do so with immediacy by leveraging all available capacities. It is a mindset necessary to prevail at the initial stage of conflict. It is a fundamentally different ballgame than engagement.

If NATO is to remain relevant in this age of speed and complexity, the Alliance and its member states must meet General Dunford’s challenge. NATO has to reacquire a warfighting mindset and the requisite skills that leverage the full potential of member state political, economic and military capacities. This is necessary if the Alliance is to effectively manage crises, to deter aggression at all levels, and to decisively defeat those committing aggression.

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2 Ibid. General Dunford writes: “While the cost of failure at the outset of conflict has always been high, in past conflicts there were opportunities to recover if something went wrong. In World War I and II, despite slow starts by the Allies, we adapted throughout both wars and emerged victorious. The same was true in Korea. Today, the ability to recover from early missteps is greatly reduced. The speed of war has changed, and the nature of these changes makes the global security environment even more unpredictable, dangerous, and unforgiving. Decision space has collapsed and so our processes must adapt to keep pace with the speed of war.”
ONE ALLIANCE THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ADAPTED ALLIANCE

NATO’S INITIAL ADAPATIONS TO THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Today’s circumstances do not require a return to the 1980s, but some of the skills that facilitated success then and that have been lost since need to be reinvigorated.

USAREUR Commander General Ben Hodges has written about the need to increase the speed with which the Alliance can respond to, if not shape and preclude, fast-breaking crises. He cites three requirements:

The “speed of recognition”: The sharing and coordination of information that provide indicators of a pending or breaking crisis.

The “speed of decision”: The ability for an organization to leverage “the decision space” to prevent a crisis.

The “speed of assembly”: The ability to rapidly, if not in real time, deploy the military assets necessary to demonstrate capability and, if necessary, employ force.

NATO’s leaders have begun to respond to the challenges presented by the new security environment. European defense budgets have finally ended their two decade long downward spiral and have begun, albeit slowly, to increase. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reported that spending by European allies in 2016 was 3.8% higher than it was the year prior, a roughly $10bn increase.3 (At the urging of U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, the allies are readying national action plans to be presented at the May NATO Summit that will map their progress toward the 2% goal.)

NATO exercises are slowly reanimating a focus on large scale high intensity warfare, as evidenced, for example, by TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2015 that involved 36,000 personnel. But this exercise is dwarfed by numerous Russian exercises involving the deployment of over 100,000 troops and the simulated use of nuclear weapons.

The Alliance’s decision made at the July 2016 Warsaw summit to deploy a multinational battalion in each of the Baltic States and Poland to deter Russian aggression also reflects the reanimation of a deterrence and defense mindset. As part of this effort, Allies have begun to reduce and simplify national regulations governing the movement and deployment of forces across their national territories.

FURTHER STEPS TOWARD A WAR FIGHTING MINDSET

But these actions and changes in policy will have limited effect without a change in the institutional culture and processes at NATO’s political level:

▶ First, if the Allies were to be presented with the need to decide – within hours – on whether or not to use force, the representatives in Brussels and their capitals would struggle unless they already had a rough idea of the actors involved, their motivations, their likely counter-responses, and of the stakes involved. Without these ingredients, NATO countries could waste valuable time simply establishing who did what to whom.

▶ Second, a timely response also presupposes that NATO receives a notice of unfolding crisis as early as possible. The Alliance’s early warning system has already been updated since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and works well in some regards but can and should be improved further.

▶ Third, the internal rules that govern how NATO manages a crisis need to be further simplified. They still remain so complicated that in practice NATO countries tend to spend too much time simply trying to understand their own internal procedures. This could impede a quick response under even the least trying of crises.

Below, we offer ways to improve NATO's procedures and mind-set on each of the above three points.

1. MORE SYSTEMATIC CONTINGENCY PLANNING

To prepare themselves to make informed decisions with speed, NATO's national delegations and their relevant crisis management bodies at home (in the ministries and parliaments) need to take a systematic interest in the likely flashpoints. They need to study in advance those most likely to produce future crises, the main actors, their respective capabilities, and the potential consequences of the various policy responses at their disposal. While each situation is unique and no conflict is fully predictable in its complexity, violence never simply springs out of a vacuum. For example, while few foresaw the annexation of Crimea, the subsequent Russian aggression in Donbas was predictable – and indeed predicted.

This curiosity about the next potential spark – and the quest to understand its nature and what may set it off – should be hard-wired into the thinking of NATO nations and officials. To this end, NATO will need:

Regular NAC Intelligence Briefings on The Most Urgent/Likely Scenarios: This is where the Allies have made the most progress since 2014. Contingency briefings now are fairly routine and substantive. However, they are still limited in geographical scope (mainly confined to regions where NATO is already involved) and too tightly regulated by the agreed annual work-plan. To give Allies a foretaste of the most likely crises – irrespective of whether NATO expects to step in – the Alliance’s intelligence briefers should be given more autonomy to select briefing topics, and more opportunities to present their findings to the permanent representatives. A good list of potential crisis points should at least include the following: continued Russian aggression in Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria, and Moscow’s growing interventions in the Balkans and Libya. Other areas to be briefed should be fragile or failing states the collapse of which could significantly impact NATO security interests.

The notion that NATO needs to expand the geographical scope of briefings will be unpopular among some Allies who will assert that to study a problem means to prejudge an involvement. But there is no automaticity between the two: at NATO, nothing happens unless all 28 nations agree, and a country can veto action at any point. Besides, Allies frequently hear out ideas and proposals that do not materialize. But by not studying a potential crisis, NATO puts itself at a deliberate disadvantage: if and when it chooses to be involved, and if events on the ground move fast, the Allies' policy decision making risks not being able to keep up.

To better educate themselves on possible futures, the Alliance should also make an expanded use of the Strategic Assessment Cell (SAC) – its in-house team specifically tasked with peering into the future. All of their excellent papers should be distributed to the Allies (at present, some only go to the Secretary General). The papers do not always make for a comfortable reading nor, by definition, are SAC forecasts – like any forecasts – always right. But this should not lead to their distribution being curtailed. With appropriate ‘health warning’ the papers can be very useful in stretching the Allies’ imagination and preparing them for difficult possibilities.

Deeper Discussions at NATO of the Likely Policy Responses: Intelligence briefings and SAC papers should prompt informal – but (loosely) instructed and informed – debates of what NATO would actually do if the situation on hand were to escalate. This would allow the Alliance’s senior civilian and military leadership to gauge the appetite for involvement among the nations, and, in case of crises, to tailor their recommendations accordingly. The debates on likely policy responses should involve experts from SHAPE; so that they can explain available military options in a given scenario. And they should take place off-the-record, to allow for a free discussion that does not commit the countries to a particular course of action. But the talks should be informed by – and seek to reflect the views of – the capitals. The key to success is attaining as accurate a picture as possible of what the nations, not just the delegations, might do in a given crisis.

Improved Simulations and Exercises: NATO Headquarters, including the North Atlantic Council, have increased the use of simulations to help refine contingency planning to prepare for crisis management. They, including the annual crisis management exercise, have become much more realistic since the Ukraine crisis. But these fall short of sufficient realism. The scenarios are classified and thus cannot be discussed here in more detail but suffice it to say that some elements do not reflect the gravity and complexity of likely real-life crisis. There are situations that the Alliance chooses not to exercise because some countries see them as falling outside NATO's
purview. But that makes little sense: future crises will not conform to NATO’s pre-agreed procedures. NATO exercises should follow real life, not expect the reverse to happen. Exercises and simulations also offer an invaluable chance to test the interaction between the political level – the North Atlantic Council – and the Alliance’s operations command at SHAPE. In a real world crisis, the two must share a common understanding of the options before them and their consequences. This commonality should not be assumed; it must be repeatedly exercised and tested.

Closer Involvement of the Capitals: Too many NATO countries have delegated too much Alliance business to their permanent representatives. Ministerial meetings are regular, but infrequent. There is a tendency in some capitals to assume that, having approved policies at ministerial meetings, issues can be safely left to national delegations at NATO until the next ministerial meeting in six months or so. As a result, the staff in some capitals do not always keep up with the briefings given to their ambassadors at NATO. This risks slowing down the Alliance at times of crises, because decisions on the potential use of force far exceed the authority of the delegations based at NATO, and would be forwarded to capitals for their approval.

National authorities need to be as well-versed in the ins and outs of likely flashpoints as their representations in Brussels lest the capitals – and thus the Alliance as a whole – lose valuable time catching up on the particulars of the choices before them.

To this end, NATO should hold more regular crisis simulation exercises at the ministerial level, and make them more realistic. Those NATO countries that do not involve sufficiently senior staff from the capitals in the annual crisis management exercise should start doing so. This will be up to each delegation to decide; NATO’s leadership cannot dictate the level of participation – but it can and should clearly define the expectations.

The Alliance should also consider making available to Allied capitals a ‘red team’ capacity for their national crisis simulations. Their role would be to stress-test national responses by introducing new elements into national crisis simulations, thus making them less predictable – and more like real life. This could be a role for SHAPE. By plugging its experts into national exercises, SHAPE gains an additional important benefit – a better understanding of the national decision-making processes.

2. THE STARTING GUN

Ideas above are meant to streamline the decision-making process after Allies receive a warning of a crisis and start deliberating. But they will be of little benefit if NATO countries miss the starting gun – if they receive a notice of a crisis too late and lose valuable time.

The Alliance long ago recognized the importance of acting promptly, and to this end it has put in place an early warning system. It has been updated since the 2014 events in Ukraine to give the secretary-general better access to early indications of trouble – which he can use, if he deems the information serious enough, to convene the North Atlantic Council. But the underlying technology, and the warning indicators the Allies scan, have changed too little over the years, and need to be brought more fully in line with the demands and opportunities of the 21st century. In particular, ease of access and ability to discern hybrid threats stick out as challenges. To improve the system, the Allies should consider:

Putting the Information in the Hands of the Recipient: Like most other professionals, diplomats spend more and more time away from the desk and in meetings or on the road. So, an indication that a warning has been sent should reach them on their personal digital devices too. The content of warnings themselves are naturally classified and probably too sensitive to be entrusted to mobile phones (at least with the current state of technology). But an indication that a warning is available (and the recipient should therefore check the dedicated classified system) could and should be pushed out to wherever the recipient is. The secretary-general should have recourse to similar technology to convene crisis meetings of the North Atlantic Council. This action alone can enhance the speed with which the decision making process can begin.

Casting a Closer Look at Hybrid Challenges: NATO’s early warning system needs to devote as much attention to non-military trends as to military ones. The nature of challenges before NATO has changed. Some adversaries
(like ISIL) are not states and use terrorism along more conventional military tools. And state actors, like Russia, have grown adept at using hybrid tactics to disguise their intentions and confuse opponents.

Today, early signs of trouble may not come in the form of movements of armored columns but chatter on social media (or, just as tellingly, blackout of social media in a particular region). Utterances by regime insiders on TV may contain important clues. An unusual up-tick in cyber activities meant to test the resilience of NATO and Allies’ networks important for self-defense could signify looming trouble. And so could signals that outsiders are trying to agitate ethnic or social groups in NATO countries via disinformation. As well, key developments in strategically relevant states outside NATO, the failure of which could have consequences for NATO and its member states, should similarly be highlighted.

The Alliance’s early warning system needs to adapt accordingly, by expanding its focus beyond traditional tell-tales. It should seek to make fuller sense of publicly available data from social media, better understand the role of disinformation campaigns in seeking to paralyze national decision-making, and incorporate this knowledge in forecasting crises. The ebb and flow of enemy cyber activities needs to play a more important role in trying to spot trouble. All this requires that the sources that feed the early warning system may need to be expanded and NATO may need to consider means of collecting open source material, analysing the structured and unstructured data, and disseminating trends in a manner similar to the news alerts.

3. TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis management is a rolling process, not a one-off. It is possible to respond on time and start off prepared and yet still fall behind the pace of events if the speed of decision-making during the crisis proves too lumbering and cumbersome. To avoid such an outcome, the Allies should consider:

Simplifying NATO’s Crisis Management Handbook: This set of procedures has grown too detailed, a consequence of Allies trying to retain or reassert tight political control over each step of a crisis. This is an understandable instinct but if taken too far it can undermine the manual’s core purpose: ensuring successful management of crises. If NATO countries spend too much of their time simply trying to understand the manual’s provisions, they are guaranteed to miss important decision-points. This would limit the options before the Alliance, drive up the cost of any countermeasures and decrease the chances of a successful resolution.

There is no quick and easy way to improve the manual. Allies will always seek to strike a balance between efficiency on the one hand, and, on the other, the ability to retain a political control. But unless the manual is streamlined and simplified it will be at best ignored during a real crisis or, worse, it could become an impediment to a successful crisis resolution.

Delegating Authorities to NATO Commanders: During the Cold War, NATO military commanders were entrusted with authority to respond with force against provocations and aggression, including the most extreme – a massive invasion by Soviet forces. If we are going to expect NATO to marshal – in real time – military assets in the event of a provocation or worse, the Alliance must entrust its military commanders with the authority to posture assigned forces and engage opponents in specified contingencies. This requirement has only become more urgent as the Alliance stands up its Enhanced Forward Presence to deter Russian aggression against the Baltic States and Poland.

Toward these ends, NATO should grant its Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) the authority to mobilize, deploy, and posture elements of the NATO Response Force (NRF) anytime and anywhere within Alliance territory. The movement of a battalion or brigade level force (between 1000 and 4000 personnel), selected special operations assets, and/or a limited number of ships and aircraft poses no significant threat to any nation state along NATO’s frontiers – and certainly not Russia. Indeed, as long as Russia continues its efforts to intimidate its neighbors with its no notice snap military exercises, NATO commanders should do the same with elements of the NRF, if only to demonstrate readiness to reinforce the Enhanced Forward Presence battalions in real time.
Such delegated authority could be used to both test and underscore NRF capabilities. It would enhance the Alliance capacity to counter provocations, if not pre-empt them. This authority could be shared with the NATO Secretary General to further ensure that military actions are consistent with political guidance. Such joint authority governed the approval of targets during the air campaign of the Kosovo War. Approval of target lists by the North Atlantic Council proved to be too unwieldy and slow as proposed targets too often disappeared during the Council’s deliberations.

**REINFORCING TRUST AMONG NATO ALLIES**

In a world featuring an ever accelerating “speed of war,” the above steps taken at the political level would enhance NATO’s speeds of recognition, decision and assembly. NATO may never be able to match the pace of decision-making of a single actor, be it Russia or a non-state actor, but these steps would help reduce the risk of latency in a world of fast-breaking events, including failure at the outset of conflict. NATO’s opponents must be convinced the political decision making process and apparatus is tied irrevocably to NATO’s integrated nuclear and conventional deterrence structure, and that in a crisis, NATO has the capacity to operate across the political/military spectrum of the crisis at, or ahead of, the speed at which it is unfolding. This capacity would substantially increase the deterrent effect of NATO’s military deployments and improve the Alliance’s capacities for crisis control.

Above all, these steps would reinforce trust and confidence among Allies by increasing NATO preparedness against both foreseeable contingencies and those that cannot be predicted.

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TEN MESSAGES FOR AFFORDING AND EQUIPPING THE ADAPTED ALLIANCE

SUPPORTING PAPER
ONE ALLIANCE THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ADAPTED ALLIANCE

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TEN MESSAGES FOR AFFORDING AND EQUIPPING THE ADAPTED ALLIANCE

By Giampaolo Di Paola and Julian Lindley-French

“Taken together, the measures we are approving at this Summit will enhance the security of all Allies and ensure protection of Alliance territory, populations, airspace and sea-lines of communication, including across the Atlantic, against all threats from wherever they arise.”

— The Warsaw Summit Communiqué, July 8–9, 2016

SMART UP, NOT DUMB DOWN

Much of Adaptation is about forces and resources, and by extension capabilities and capacities. Affording and equipping the Adapted Alliance is a specifically European challenge, with due respect to Canada. Indeed, generating a more powerful NATO Europe is a specific US demand. So, how does NATO generate the capabilities and capacities to defend and deter “…all threats from wherever they arise”? The core message of this concept paper is that NATO needs to smart up, not dumb down defence procurement. Procurement adaptation will also need to overcome political barriers if inefficiencies imposed by political leaders, who too often see defence, employment and industrial policy as one and the same thing, are to be assuaged as a new balance is struck between equipping the future force and affording it. For the Adapted Alliance to become reality, there will also need to be more spending and better spending, as well as political agreement between those who are pushing for a more open defence market and those concerned about the loss of jobs that could incur from any such openness.

THE EQUIPPING-AFFORDING CHALLENGE

The European Defence Agency has established four collective benchmarks for defence investment that apply in effect to both the EU and NATO Europe. The 2015 estimates (latest figures) for each benchmark were as follows and demonstrate areas where Adaptation can help drive improvements in affordability:

- Equipment procurement (including research and development (R&D) and research and technology (R&T)) represented some 20% of total defence spending;
- European collaborative equipment procurement: 35% of total equipment spending;
- Defence R&T: 2% of total defence spending; and
- European collaborative defence R&T: 20% of total defence R&T spending (or 0.4% of total defence spending).1

INTRODUCTION

The GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Project is clear: NATO suffers from inadequate and unbalanced defence capabilities and capacities, particularly amongst the European allies, which have to cover too great a range of

missions and tasks, at too high a level of cost, with too few assets. Like all change, Adaptation costs money, demands compromise, and in the right circumstances, promotes innovation. Given the nature and scope of emerging threats the Alliance will need new systems, platforms and technologies, if NATO is to really become the Adapted Alliance. Equally, affording and equipping a future-proofed Alliance also creates a profound dilemma; without proper AGREED understanding of the inherent risks and threats in the strategic environment, the priorities it generates, and the funding levels and equipment choices it must drive, the Alliance will continue to find it hard to agree what level of capabilities it needs, and at what mass of capacity. Equally, the contemporary strategic environment is also being ‘invaded’ by such novel levers of potential disruption and destruction, as artificial intelligence (AI), disinformation, cyber, and other exotic technologies to create a new spectrum of conflict. Therefore, not all Adapted tools will be military.

Adaptation and Innovation: The need to recapitalise and re-equip European forces as a consequence of Adaptation also affords the Alliance an opportunity to properly consider innovation. Or, to be more precise, what balance to strike between efficiency and effectiveness, and by extension, between collective capability, i.e. owned and funded by members of the Alliance, and common capability, which is ‘owned’ by the Alliance or, as will be often the case in future, the EU.

PART ONE: EQUIPPING THE ADAPTED ALLIANCE

MESSAGE ONE: NATO ADAPTATION MUST HELP FIX NATIONAL PROCUREMENT

Alliance members do not generate anything like the return on defence procurement investment they should for the amount of money they invest. Irrespective of any future shared threat assessment, a first aim must thus be to drive down the cost of procurement, increase the speed of procurement cycles, and deliver more assets per dollar, euro, pound, krone et al invested. For Adaptation to be afforded there can be no more Horizon/Type 45, Eurofighter/Rafale, A400M, or F35 Lightning II procurements in which an unbearable cost override is imposed on the taxpayer by a toxic mixture of division, duplication and defence-industrial rent-seeking, reinforced by low production runs at great cost over too long periods from which European defence procurement suffers, and has done for far too long.

There are several barriers to sound investment in Europe: over-protected national defence-industrial champions; an over-supply of platform-generating ‘metal-bashers’, and in Europe in particular a paucity of systems-integrators; an inability to agree transnational specifications that in turn prevent effective collaboration; the conflation of industrial policy and employment policy with defence policy; the hanging of too many systems on too few platforms due to small production runs; excessive complexity of poorly-performing platforms that in turn drive up unit cost and defence cost inflation; over-selling by defence industrial giants that see the taxpayer as a subsidy generator; and too many ‘flagship’ political defence projects that de-stabilise defence budgets by preventing the purchase of cheaper alternatives, including off-the-shelf.

MESSAGE TWO: ADAPTATION MUST DRIVE NEW THINKING ON PROCUREMENT

The need for challenging new thinking is vital to question at the outset capability requirement assumptions and choices, before expensive and dangerous mistakes are made. New thinking on procurement must also be an essential driver of Adaptation, which is a process not an event. That means systematic, independent and robust ‘red-teaming’. At times such thinking will need to be ‘disruptive’ in the way it challenges strategy, technology and procurement assumptions. Too often procurement choices reflect an incremental, conservative approach to security and defence in an age when potentially revolutionary technologies threaten the security and protection of both NATO citizens and the NATO force. Indeed, the Alliance is entering a new and dangerous era in which disruptive and destructive technologies will also threaten both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the Alliance. Why, for example, need a tank be necessarily replaced by a better tank? Maybe a completely new capability could perform better and give the Alliance an operational edge over the extended times and distances future operations are likely to demand.
MESSAGE THREE: ADAPT AND STRENGTHEN NATO’S ENTIRE SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE... AND MORE

Much of NATO’s effort to promote efficiency and effectiveness in Allied defence procurement is focused on the so-called system life cycle. NATO’s aim is to promote harmonisation and standardisation through the adoption of best practice from conception to retirement, supported by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) which aims to act as a broker between national end-users and suppliers. However, it is the strategic level, and the work of both the Defence Investment Division (DID) and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), that is the key to driving innovation in Alliance-wide procurement, in close collaboration with the Committee of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). This ‘iron triangle’ will be critical to delivering the future platforms and systems for NATO, particularly the acquisition of all-important enabling systems architectures. However, in conjunction with the EU’s increasingly important European Defence Agency (EDA), NATO Adaptation must help drive the synergies that will vitally increase the performance of new platforms and systems and help drive down unit costs, and deliver assets to forces well within one defence planning cycle, which is too often not the case today.

What is needed is a much more rigorous and systematic approach to understanding where waste happens and how it can be eradicated at every stage of the cycle from conception to retirement. NATO’s system life cycle has six stages; concept, development, production, utilization, support, and retirement. If Alliance forces are to be equipped for the full range of missions, which both the Wales and Warsaw summits called for, there needs to be much tighter convergence at the conceptual stage when the requirements are established. Too often establishing common requirement fails because of hidden national and parochial industrial pressures. Such failures immediately push up defence cost inflation and the unit cost of defence equipment. Only through a proper and early establishment of a fair and systematic approach to work-share will nations feel comfortable enough to harmonise requirements.

Making production smarter and bigger, harmonising utilisation of assets, pooling support functions, and better managing mutually the retirement of assets, are when taken together, all areas where more efficiency and effectiveness could be driven into equipping and affording capability and capacity. Common requirement and specification also needs to be enacted throughout the entire life-cycle of an asset, including common life-cycle logistics. The latter point is very important because not only is much of the cost of an asset incurred during the extended life of an asset, but a reasonable level of work-share among partners helps facilitate consensus for multinational programmes.

MESSAGE FOUR: MAKE THE CASE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT HARMONISATION

One of the main reasons industrial policy has trumped defence policy in the making of defence investment choices is the lack of a reasoned rationale. Indeed, the under-supply of over-priced military assets in the Alliance is precisely the consequence of the lack of any shared assessment and agreement over the definition of what is a reasonable, or what is a sustainable, level of operational capabilities. There has been a particular failing on the part of the expert community to Alliance political leaders, with issues of equipping and affording forces too often subordinated to strategy and policy.

However, precisely because affording and equipping has been allowed to drift for so long, rectifying the problem to meet the Warsaw mission will require substantial reform. For example, Adaptation must be the platform for the ruthless re-examination of the EDTIB by the Alliance, in close collaboration with the EU’s European Defence Agency (EDA), to properly understand the relationship between those producing platforms and those integrating systems. Such a review would need to be undertaken in conjunction with a full analysis of the defence supply chain to see where rent-seeking by defence companies is being generated, inefficiencies maintained, and where possible to open up defence to a much broader supply chain, and thus help Allies drive down development, production and in-life support costs.
MESSAGE FIVE: INNOVATE NOW...

This aim of the Adaptation must be to help safeguard the defence base and associated supply chains whilst reforming them at one and the same time. Equally, procurement adaptation must also be pragmatic if it is to secure high-level support across the Alliance, and any assessment of future requirements must not shoot for the moon. Indeed, unreasonable moon shooting is an affliction from which for too long the military community has suffered, and which has driven costs to unsustainable and unnecessary levels. Procurement innovation is needed to promote a range of new practices.

Innovation could include the following: encouraging defence industries in conjunction with defence establishments to look more closely at dual technologies rather than bespoke military solutions; the generation of ‘disruptive solutions’ that might encourage and favour shared innovative multinational approaches rather than more conventionally-driven systems and platforms; adoption of a broader concept of ‘defence industry’ as a driver of economic development and technological innovation; viewing defence as a driver of advanced qualified jobs (rather than the cost-plus low level jobs it too often generates today).

There is also a range of practical solutions that could be pursued. The EU’s idea of permanent structured co-operation or Pioneer Groups, or something similar, could be adopted by the Alliance, with commanders and end-users, together with industry helping to develop new forms of partnership. The Alliance is already fostering clusters of members and partners to help develop key asset areas, but both the idea and implementation need to be far more robust in the future. Offsetting agreements could also be further developed to enable partner states to be involved from the outset in the development of advanced defence technologies.

All the above pre-supposes a new level of openness and transparency between Allies. However, ‘openness’ will only be politically viable for many NATO nations if it is seen to be fair, and part of a real two-way street of co-operation, not just yet another device to favour national champions at the expense of allies. Equally, the more advanced NATO states will not, and cannot, be expected to dumb-down their own programmes simply to ease political pressure on recalcitrant allies. NATO has for too long suffered from a lowest common denominator approach to both common and collective procurement that has undoubtedly helped to accelerate relative decline. If the more advanced Allies are to commit to enhanced collaboration under ‘openness’ then less-advanced Allies must in return drive out their own inefficiencies, not see Adaptation as yet another excuse to lock them in through a form of adapted protectionism.

MESSAGE SIX: ...BUT DO THINK FUTURE INNOVATION AND REFORM

Adaptation also implies real change in both structure and practice in the future. Whilst it is correct the Alliance must not shoot for the moon, equipping and affording Adaptation still demands ambitious ‘out of the box’ thinking that may take years to realise, but which is nevertheless important. For example, Macro-Defence Convergence Criteria (MDCC) have been around since the Venusberg Group suggested them in 2004 (together with the 2% defence investment benchmark). Such criteria could be a) extremely useful for the smaller NATO members; and b) a vehicle for deepening the EU-NATO strategic partnership. MDCC also calls for increased military effectiveness by promoting the functional integration of key support elements – starting with the tail and moving towards the teeth of the force. As such, the idea also builds on the proposals made by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg at the May 2003 Tervuren meeting.

MDCC would be divided into two criteria: economic and military. The main economic criteria would require the Allies to properly agree and enforce defence spending levels, lead to more balanced defence budgets, and in time agree a common budget for main capital investments and to pay for the conduct of long campaigns and operations. There would also need to be a major effort needed under MDCC to rationalise and re-group Europe’s defence industries and more deeply embed them in the wider technological base.

MESSAGE SEVEN: REINFORCE THE DEFENCE INVESTMENT PLEDGE WITH CAPABILITY ACTION

Back in the early 2000s, the then European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) identified 144 military shortfalls Europeans needed to fill. By mid-2003 some 100 of the smaller shortfalls had been resolved. However, some key areas, then and now, remain unresolved or only partially resolved. These include air-to-air refuelling, properly manned and equipped deployable headquarters, combat search and rescue, CBRN protection, theatre ballistic missile defence, unmanned aerial vehicles, strategic airlift, and space-based assets. There are also critical lacunae of attack helicopters, cruise missile stocks, precision guided munitions, strategic airlift, munitions procurement in general and their utilisation, and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR).

Operations over Libya revealed the extent to which NATO Europe lacks key enablers. It is also the case that whether it be through pooling and sharing, Smart Defence or the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), efforts are indeed underway to close these dangerous gaps in Alliance capability and capacity. However, given the long and sad story that NATO Europe has to tell in this regard it is clear more is needed than the Defence Investment Pledge, important though that is. Perhaps even more important is the 20% of defence budgets that must be spent on new equipment because the ultimate test for NATO Europe will be the capability it can bring to the table. Therefore, the Defence Investment Pledge should be reinforced by an Alliance Capability Action Plan or ACAP.

MESSAGE EIGHT: THE ADAPTED NATO NEEDS TO FOSTER A NEW APPROACH TO MULTINATIONAL DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

The critical need is to create a critical mass of defence investment to ensure the right platforms and systems are purchased at the right price. Indeed, lessons from the past also suggest that multinational defence procurement programmes only work if they are built upon real common requirement. How to do this? If the establishment of a common European defence market is some way off, NATO could seek to become a ‘broker’ for the Allies forging synergies, harmonisation, and thus efficiencies into the relationship between suppliers and end-users, which in Europe today is so weak.

Too often defence planners mask what is in effect national defence protectionism under the banner of nationally-specific requirements, which in turn leads inevitably to inefficient national solutions. This leads in turn to the proliferation of different, over-priced, low production runs, as well as often incompatible platforms and systems. One driver of Adaptation is to better promote interoperability, or at least prevent interoperability ‘killers’, which again suggests the Alliance has a direct role to play in equipment harmonisation. Therefore, to further a more constructive relationship between adapted defence procurement and a reformed industrial policy, the Alliance needs to play a stronger role in better promoting a shared understanding about what, where and when to buy. In a sense the Adapted Alliance would act as both broker and referee. This is important, because again market openness and fair competition are indispensable pillars for more intense defence cooperation among and between the Allies.

Such an initiative would face many political, regulatory and business hurdles and would thus likely be more concept than fact. However, in time it would foster a closer relationship with the European Defence Agency, and would also help further foster a more delineated Alliance procurement and acquisition ‘space’. Such a ‘space’ could also better promote the harmonisation of specification and requirement and further promote R&D and R&T, which is woefully under-funded in NATO Europe.

Some form of NATO Off-the-Shelf Defence Market might also be worth exploring, with again the Alliance acting as a ‘broker’ matching need to supply at a reasonable level of cost. Close partnership with the EU would help promote momentum in such an effort. There is also a peculiarly European problem that such an approach might help resolve; ‘Christmas trees’. Christmas trees are platforms which, because they are so few in number,
compensate by hanging as many systems as possible onto them leading to the entire system becoming sub-optimal, over-priced, and because of shifting requirements, often very late. ³

Under such a system some states would still choose to develop national strategic assets in parallel with multinational programmes, such as the British decision to build NATO-assigned large aircraft carriers, nuclear ballistic missile or hunter-killer submarines. However, expanding on the naval/maritime theme Adaptation could also help foster a culture of enhanced multinationalism for all so-called ‘work-horse’ assets, such as, say, air defence or anti-submarine frigates.

Over time well-conceived and managed multinational programmes (underpinned by effective project management) help and facilitate not only convergent defence strategies, but also harmonise the timing of defence planning. Therefore, if NATO’s capability-capacity gap is to ever to be closed, Adaptation should, at the very least, seek to foster a new culture in which national defence planning cycles converge as much as possible, both in timing and the establishment of capability requirements.

PART TWO: AFFORDING THE ADAPTED NATO

MESSAGE NINE: VALUE-FOR-MONEY MEANS BETTER SPENDING...REALLY!

Adaptation must also confront an Alliance bottom-line; affordability. Better defence spending will be vital in enhancing Alliance deterrence and defence, but it is equally vital to state that better spending will also need more spending. This challenge raises a specifically EU problem which will also profoundly impact the Adapted Alliance. At the EU’s December 2016 European Council the European Defence Initiative (EDI) was agreed. In spite of the likelihood that Britain will leave the EU in 2019, EDI, if closely-coordinated in terms of planning and capabilities with NATO defence planning, might be the best tool and vehicle politically available to bolster the defence spending of European allies.

The implications for the Alliance of such a step-change in the role of CSDP in Europe’s force modernisation would be profound. Indeed, over the medium-to-longer term such a change could well foster the development of new pillars within the Alliance – an Anglosphere and a Eurosphere. Desirable or not as such a development may be, it may also be both politically and strategically inevitable. That is indeed the current political drift and, as ever, policy, strategy, power and structure will over time realign.

Consideration must be given to the balance to be struck between common assets (both NATO and EU) and collective assets. And, by extension, which of those assets that should be procured through common EU funding, those assets that could be procured through collective NATO funding (both multilateral and bilateral), and purely national procurement.

At the very least, if the centripetal forces generated by the need for increased defence efficiency are not to be confounded by centrifugal political forces (Brexit, a widening political divide across the Atlantic, and European defence blindness), an enhanced EU role would also suggest, somewhat paradoxically, the need for much tighter collective procurement planning, based on common procurement standards to promote not just a much higher degree of technical interoperability, but also a crucial sense amongst Europe’s political elite that NATO’s future force is affordable.

To that end, the Alliance also needs to further promote an ‘affordability culture’ amongst the Allies, which champions creative thinking. For example, it may be possible to work in conjunction with the financial sector to see where financial instruments, such as leasing, might be applied to the procurement of equipment, particularly equipment that has dual civil-military utilisation. NATO might also consider the establishment of a NATO Defence

³ All European states suffer from this syndrome. However, the British fleet of armoured battlefield vehicles known as the Future Rapid Effect System or FRES is a particularly egregious example of the ‘Christmas tree’ syndrome.
Business Affairs Office to better consider lessons from the civilian sector, such as the outsourcing of non-core activities, leasing of equipment, and just-in-time or focused logistics.

Hitherto many NATO nations have been very conservative and failed to be properly seized of the impact of new technologies on the utility, structure and equipment of armed forces. This conservatism has been reinforced by the preservation of a funding stovepipe between armed forces and prime contractors. In fact, nowadays civilian technologies are often far in advance of their military counterparts, and because they are not bespoke often cheaper. Therefore, far more needs to be done to involve innovative companies from across the industrial and services base in helping establish technical solutions that promote force-on-force comparative advantage.

Finally, it is hard to see how an affordably equipped Adapted NATO could be realised without being in close partnership with the EU. For EU member-states, if Adaptation is to be generated via increased spending and in time enhanced assets, the European Stability and Growth Pact, as well as European fiscal and budgetary practices, would also need to be adapted. First, EU members would need to include in the common EU budget a meaningful level of common resources for defence research and development from conception up through to the development of prototype capability. Second, national R&D and defence expenditure would need to be excluded from the rules in the Stability Pact (in toto or in part). These steps could lead to a fundamental change to the current European fiscal construct. Such steps would also be an indispensable step if NATO Adaptation is to lead to increased European defence spending at a time of enduring economic constraint in most European allied members.

MESSAGE TEN: THE EQUIPPING AND AFFORDING AGENDA

The figures at the start of this short concept paper demonstrate both the need for NATO Europeans (in particular) to become far more efficient and effective and the opportunity that exists for such improvements to be made. Equally, more efficiency and more effectiveness can also work against each other if baseline investment is insufficient.

The Adaptation equipping and affordability agenda could look thus:

- There is no centralised NATO system to support procurement. Whilst some harmonisation of NATO Agencies has taken place since 2010 Adaptation, it is not enough, nor has it happened quickly enough. The aim must be the creation of a single procurement and acquisition advisory hub focused on the Defence Investment Division, both for the procurement of common assets and to better support the co-ordinated procurement strategies of the nations.

- NATO should seek to establish Standards for equipment specification and requirements. NATO Standards exists across four domains: operational, procedural, material, and administrative. The aim is to facilitate standardisation in support of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). In support of the NDPP, NATO should undertake an Alliance-wide systems audit of existing platforms and systems, covering campaign critical military and civilian assets. The aim would be to establish where force synergies can be better fostered, to properly establish shortfalls, and to better understand how existing assets might be better used.

- If the Alliance is to properly embrace innovation it must as a matter of urgency consider the role of ground-breaking developments in technology, such as artificial intelligence (AI), deep learning, the military application of nano-technologies, as well as the developing and changing threat posed by chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and missile and other kinetic delivery systems and weapons;

- Under the current system there are too many decisions that need to be made at too many levels with consensus needed at too many milestones on the road to procurement delivery. Military commanders and end-users need a far greater say in requirement development, and much greater effort needs to be made to enable operational commands to drive operational requirement. The Defence Investment Division and NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) have a critical role to play in accelerating procurement processes and should be given the resources and manpower to do the job.
Too often defence planners mask what is in effect national defence protectionism under the banner of nationally-specific requirements. This protectionism in turn inevitably leads to specific national (and costly) ‘solutions’, as well as the proliferation of different, over-priced, low-production runs, and often incompatible platforms and systems.

There is a vital need for an enhanced and sustained exchange and interface between defence planners, the technology/industrial community, and the broader security policy community.

An audit should be undertaken by the Alliance to better understand the level of resource-waste caused by redundant fixed assets and duplication, especially in non-essential areas. Perhaps the establishment of an Alliance Defence Audit Office might assist with such a process.

A Future Requirements Framework should be established that would purposively focus far more on the operational capability the Alliance needs, rather than the generation of specific capacity if the more efficient use of assets is to enhance NATO capability. Such a Framework could lead to more pooled assets reducing the need to purchase expensive urgent-operational requirements (UOR) during a campaign.

A deeper NATO-EU strategic partnership is needed, especially in areas such as countering hybrid warfare, internal security, and defence capacity-building where the two organisations’ mandates overlap to help drive economy of action and force.

Since 2012, Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative have proved invaluable in driving more efficiency and effectiveness from munitions procurement through to defence education and training. However, thus far most of these projects have been driven from the bottom-up. The Alliance must be far more systematic in the design and application of such projects and properly embed them in a development programme that will reach far beyond the limited goals of NATO Forces 2020.

CONCLUSION

If efficiency and effectiveness are to be successfully re-married in European defence procurement, Adaptation must strike a new balance between the two. Adaptation and value-for-money are the flip-sides of effectiveness and efficiency and must thus go hand-in-hand with affordability. It is already clear that the Trump Administration intends to undertake a deep analysis of the cost-base of US defence industries. At the very least, there should be a root and branch review of the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB). Therefore, if NATO Europe is to close the gap between being credibly able to deter and defend against all threats, as Warsaw demands, and the capabilities and capacities its armed forces need, then the Alliance needs to be far more systematic and rigorous. This means a much stronger role for the Adapted Alliance in standardising, harmonising, and converging both the choices and the defence procurement investments made by Allies. Better buying and better spending is not simply vital to reinforce the Defence Investment Pledge, it is an essential driver of the entire NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and thus the outcomes the Adapted Alliance seeks to generate. The aim eventually must be clear; a sufficiency of investment critical mass leading to agreed requirements and specifications, enabling Allies to afford the right type and number of military capabilities, at the right level of capacity, from an efficient defence, technological and industrial base, able to provide a level of security and defence at an affordable price that does not bankrupt the very societies that seek defence.

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NATO PROCUREMENT AND MODERNISATION:
Towards an Innovative Alliance with Much More Deployable Combat Capability

SUPPORTING PAPER
The NATO alliance is made up of 29 nation-state members with combined military spending of some $850 billion USD in 2016 (or about 700 billion Euros). This is an extraordinarily large amount of money. Yet we know that in some ways it is not enough. As of 2016, NATO’s European countries average spending less than 1.4% of GDP on military activities, well below the famous 2% goal that NATO has officially adopted and that President Donald Trump, with considerable justification, constantly reminds the allies to respect.Fortunately there is recent movement on that front, some of it preceding Mr. Trump’s inauguration and some following thereafter. Even more significant, perhaps, than the amount of money NATO spends is how the alliance’s members spend it. Most European militaries are still highly inefficient, and get far less bang for the buck than they should. Most of all, they wield far less deployable combat capability than they should be able to generate, even at current resourcing levels.

This paper takes a somewhat different tack than many critiques of European military efficiency. Among other things, I argue that, as they add up to $100 billion in annual aggregate military spending in coming years, European NATO nations can roughly double their power-projection capabilities from today’s aggregate total of perhaps 60,000 troops (a generous estimate) to something approach 125,000—if, and only if, they focus adequately on logistics, transport, and enablers in their resource allocation decisions. Doing so might require that they devote an additional $10 billion to $20 billion a year, over several years, to such purposes. This approach would not only make NATO burden sharing in the abstract more equitable. It would, more importantly, shore up western defence posture and capability at a time of growing global security challenges from Russia to China to North Korea to the Middle East, as well as within Europe and North America themselves.

The standard critique of NATO efficiency—and it is a valid one, to be sure—focuses on the multitude of production lines for major types of combat equipment that are maintained, despite declining defence budgets, by a number of national governments that wish to keep defence production at home and sustain what are often seen as national technology and manufacturing jewels. They also generally see defence industry as an important symbol of state sovereignty. Since almost all NATO manufacturing is done by individual member states, not the alliance organization itself (which has a combined annual budget of less than $3 billion for alliance-wide activities and investments3), this problem is endemic and hard to fix. One hears talk of how Europe still produces five main battle tanks, for example, despite having a combined defence budget less than half that of the United States (which produces just one now, and which has less than half the number of shipbuilding sites as does Europe). This line of critique should continue. Europe’s defence manufacturing inefficiency has been estimated to squander $20 billion to $30 billion a year, essentially propping up an industrial base that is too large and diffuse for the amount of procurement it is asked to carry out. This is true without even trying to argue that transatlantic defence trade should expand dramatically, with more European countries buying equipment more often from the efficient and large American defence industrial base. Indeed, transatlantic defence trade today is relatively modest; for example, of America’s top 15 buyers of weapons, only 4 are in Europe, with a combined total of 14 percent of the U.S. export market or about $3.5 billion in 2015.4 A related question, though separate, is whether it simply has too many independent defence companies. Europe has 25 of the western world’s top 100

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defence companies, about the same fraction of its aggregate defence spending relative to the western world’s total, so the case for mergers and acquisitions can probably be argued both ways.⁵ What is harder to argue both ways, though, is that the plethora of production lines for main combat equipment is necessary or justifiable or in any way advantageous.

NATO has good processes in place, including its official NATO Defence Planning Process, as well as its Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, to establish guidelines for member states to equip and modernize their forces (after receiving broad guidance from the North Atlantic Council). But it is still those member states that individually make their budget decisions, and these often fall short of a solid standard.⁶

Moreover, whatever the theoretical quality of the NDPP process, one might question how well it performs in practice. Take the 2011 Libya operation. NATO Europe proved famously short in enablers, including tanker aircraft and reconnaissance assets, as well as advanced munitions, for an operation against a mid-sized country very near its coast. One could claim that the operation came as a surprise but, in war, surprise is normal and, moreover, an airpower-oriented campaign against an aggressor state had long been the norm following Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001. NATO should have been much more ready. One can also claim that 2011 was the peak of the Afghanistan operation, making it harder to find forces for the Libya operation. But the Afghanistan mission employed a much different mix of forces, emphasizing ground-combat power, so the two should not have been mutually exclusive. The issue is not simply that European NATO allies needed a lot of American help. Rather, what is truly noteworthy is that almost everyone (including leaders in Washington) seemed surprised by how much American help was needed. This suggests that NATO was unaware of its own capabilities and its own shortfalls and limitations. The alliance was not thinking particularly cogently or rigorously about the demands of modern war prior to the operation. This observation in turn casts doubt not just on the quality of defence-budget and resource-allocation decisions by individual member states, but also on the effectiveness of the planning mechanisms used to determine realistic force requirements.⁷

All that said, my main emphases here are, as noted, somewhat different, though very much related. Specifically:

- By propping up too large of an industrial base, the alliance tends to underinvest in logistics support, transport, tankers, reconnaissance assets, and other enablers that are crucial for preparing for the most pressing and difficult contingencies, such as a possible Russian threat to the Baltic states. It is the lack of such support that would hamstring NATO, even more than inefficient production of main combat equipment, in such a scenario.

- Thus, NATO’s European members are not just 10 to 15 percent inefficient, relative to a hypothetically more streamlined standard, they are perhaps 50 percent inefficient. That is, they maintain a deployable military power that is only half as large as what they should be able to field, given how much they collectively spend on their armed forces.

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Put differently, and for somewhat dramatic effect, NATO Europe is collectively about the equivalent of the U.S. Marine Corps in its power projection capabilities. The U.S. Marine Corps budget, even if one accounts for the amphibious shipping provided by a separate service, the Navy, is in the low tens of billions of dollars a year—certainly less than $50 billion. Yet purely for the sake of illustration, imagine a hypothetical combat simulation, the U.S. Marine Corps against Europe on a third continent, with each side given two to three months to deploy forces before a simulated combat exercise were conducted. By my calculations, the Marine Corps forces that had reached this mock battlefield would by then be able to defeat all forces gathered by all NATO European member states. (As a subsidiary conclusion, I am also arguing that the U.S. Marine Corps is more efficient in generating quickly projectable power than other American military services, because it focuses somewhat less on current high-technology weaponry and is more expeditionary in mindset—a good model for many European countries to emulate.) The British and French militaries, with their traditions of power projection, are also relatively good at maximizing deployable combat forces per pound or Euro spent, though they are not as efficient as the U.S. Marine Corps.

By worrying so much about propping up a large and inefficient industrial base with waning resources, NATO’s European members tend to underinvest in research and development and remain underprepared for new trends in warfare.

By keeping an overly large industrial base on life support through difficult times, any increase in available military resources—such as may now be coming, due to the Russian threat and NATO’s greater seriousness about the 2% target—tends to be gravitationally sucked towards legacy systems, viewed as a lifeline for otherwise dying or threatened industries rather than as an opportunity for a major rededication to the twin goals of increasing deployability and innovation. Both of the latter priorities are much more important than producing more tanks or fighters or destroyers, in the view of this author.

By spending a grand total of $100 billion, spread over five to ten years, European NATO nations can roughly double their power-projection capabilities from today’s aggregate total of perhaps 60,000 troops (a generous estimate) to something approach 125,000.

To develop my argument, I proceed as follows in this paper. First, I attempt to assess the state of current European/non-U.S. military efficiency within NATO, by briefly summarizing some of the work already done on the subject and then offering my own assessment of how inadequate attention to transport and logistics assets constrain the capabilities of key member states. I compare what NATO presently fields, in terms of power projection capabilities, with what an organization boasting considerably more than $200 billion in annual military spending by its European member states should arguably be capable of supporting. This then leads me to anticipate what non-U.S. NATO allies might attempt to achieve as their combined spending possibly approaches $300 billion annually, over the coming decade. While ultimately reiterating the importance of consolidation of defence production capacity, as many others have also done, I also highlight the need for roll-on/roll-off shipping, tank transporters, mobile depots and field hospitals, bridging equipment, and other often mundane and relatively low-technology capabilities. These are essential for effectively deploying and sustaining combat power far away from national territory (and not necessarily in Asia or Africa—even the Baltics are fairly far away for most NATO countries). I then finish by returning to the realms of research, development, and military innovation, offering some suggestions for how NATO nations can better carry out these functions in the future as well.

**EUROPEAN POWER PROJECTION CAPACITY TODAY**

As noted above, various estimates have been done over the years to estimate how much the inefficiencies in European defence manufacturing squander resources. One prominent estimate from 2013 put the annual waste at some 26 billion euros, or some $30 billion. To be sure, those estimates require complex methodologies about how much less it might cost to produce the same military capability if equipment were more clearly standardized and if production lines were rightsized; they are not exact numbers. But the figures do nonetheless suggest that Europeans may be getting 10 to 15 percent less for their money than they should, due to the parochial/national politics of propping up too many industries and factories when a much smaller number could suffice. That is
certainly one dimension of the European military inefficiency dilemma. For example, Europe produces three main fighter aircraft (admittedly one being Swedish, outside of NATO), but it has 11 different armoured vehicle programs and shipyards in most of its nations. In making this observation, I leave aside the inefficiencies from having multiple production lines for smaller and more mundane types of equipment (for everything from uniforms to trucks), which also contribute to the problem but are perhaps not as serious concerns given the amounts of money at issue.

Beyond such matters of redundant production lines for major combat equipment, there is, as noted above, an even more serious problem. Europe does not really build military force with the goal of power projection centrally in mind—at least not adequately so. With most European spending occurring in Western Europe, and most of the threats to the continent rising in the east, this tendency represents an even more serious problem than that of excessive defence industrial capacity. To be blunt, Europe is collectively not taking seriously the imperative of deterring possible Russian aggression against an eastern member state.

Prevailing paradigms for European defence planning have thus not yet caught up to the realities of today's world. Indeed, some of the defence analytical literature that one might expect to help explain and highlight this problem actually does the opposite. Some prominent work, for example, has argued that many European militaries have better “tooth-to-tail” ratios than does the United States, suggesting that they have more efficiently designed military organizations. That is, they have more trigger pullers and fewer support forces. But my point is that those support forces are often precisely the ones needed to make forces rapidly deployable and sustainable in combat. Thus, a tooth-to-tail construct that downplays the importance of support forces does a disservice. Trucks; mobile equipment repair depots; bridging equipment; construction units; transport aircraft, ships, and tankers; and reconnaissance and support aircraft are not collectively wasted “tail.” They are integral to any use of military force beyond national territory. If European militaries maintain a higher fraction of troops who carry guns because they depend on their own nations’ internal logistical systems to support those troops, that does NATO little good. It is to some extent a vestige of the Cold War. When a number of NATO states were rightly and principally worried about a Russian attack on their own territory, a major alliance-wide forward defence of West Germany, with pre-stationed forces, reduced the logistics challenge somewhat. But times have changed. Today, what matters is deployable combat capability.

In challenging these comparative studies of the relative military efficiencies of European and American militaries, I do not mean to argue that the latter is truly efficient—far from it, in fact. Rather, I am attempting to assert that putting substantial personnel and money into logistics and transport capabilities is a major virtue of the U.S. armed forces, not a weakness.

Although NATO is now officially committed to developing greater power projection capabilities, as reflected in the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communique and other official policies, it has a very long way to go in this regard. Its present ambitions include creating a division-sized high readiness capability—a rather modest aspiration for the greatest military alliance in history. And its goal of having many more member states devote at least 20 percent of their military budgets to acquisition (only ten meet that NATO standard today), even if achieved, will not guarantee any solution to its power projection problem if added funds are dedicated largely to the wrong priorities.

Today NATO Europe has more than 1.8 million active-duty troops, more than the United States. Earlier this decade the figure was closer to 2.0 million, with a combined budget of about $270 billion. That was this century’s moment of peak European military effort, exemplified by the Afghanistan surge of 2010–2011. At
that time, European NATO militaries, in aggregate, deployed about 40,000 troops to Afghanistan and nearly
another 20,000 or so in peacekeeping missions around the world, probably constituting Europe’s maximal
plausible capacity. The peacekeeping missions were sometimes in less stressful environments but, for the
sake of generosity, if we take 60,000 troops as the maximum deployed total for NATO Europe, that equates
to an efficiency of 3 percent of total active-duty force structure. That figure equals the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal
that was established for EU member states—a goal that was never reached—so my 60,000 figure is generous.
NATO’s more recent proposals for very high readiness joint task forces and the like have, in fact, aimed for only
a few thousand additional troops to be quickly capable of power projection.

In any event, take that figure of 60,000 deployable forces. Relative to defence budgets, this can be thought of
as $4.5 million in defence spending per deployed troop. Compare that with the United States armed forces and
their military budget, in recent years ranging roughly between $600 billion and $750 billion annually. The
U.S. military is often described as excessively pricey, with a high premium on expensive weaponry and an
unfavourable “tooth-to-tail ratio” (that supposedly reflects a modest number of actual trigger pullers relative to
the size of the force). Again, without contesting all of this narrative, it is worth noting that the U.S. military, with its
rough commitment to a two regional war standard, is built to sustain a deployment of well over 500,000 troops
for a year. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 involved more than 500,000 U.S. military personnel on its own, the
Iraq invasion of 2003 some 200,000 in and near Iraq. Some of these troops would, to be sure, come from the
reserve component, just as might be the case with certain European militaries. But for consistency, if one uses
the same algorithm to calculate efficiency, 500,000 American troops would represent an efficiency standard
of 30 percent (dividing deployable force by total active-duty force structure). By this admittedly somewhat
contrived and imperfect metric, that would reflect an efficiency standard ten times that of Europe, on average.
It would also equate to $1.2 million to $1.5 million in annual spending per deployable troop, three times better
than the European equivalent.

Even if one takes a much more conservative approach to estimating sustainable and deployable U.S. military
capacity, the contrast between Europe and the United States is stark. If one adds the nearly 200,000 total
troops that the United States sustained in and near Iraq and Afghanistan in the late 2000s to the 50,000 or
so deployed personnel at sea and in parts of East Asia, the American total is about 250,000, roughly four
times that of Europe. The United States by that estimate would still have 15 percent of its total force structure
deployable—some five times the European average. It would be estimated as spending $2.5 million to $3
million per deployable trooper, at least a third less than is the case among NATO’s European militaries.

Moreover, the emphasis on innovation and high-tech capability within the U.S. armed forces means that the
American military has a burden to innovate that is not equally shared in Europe—in realms such as space
capabilities, stealth, long-range strike assets, and missile defence. Indeed, the United States outspends Europe
on defence research and development by a ratio of roughly $70 billion to $10 billion, just to give one indicator.
In other words, not all of America’s greater emphasis on high technology is bad, and some of it reflects
preparation for missions that Europeans do not tend to prioritize equally (though in fact they should prioritize
such innovation more than they do, including in areas such as cyber and artificial intelligence). Thus, America’s
armed forces could be expected to be less efficient, in terms of being able to deploy and sustain a given number
of troops—yet in fact, it is much more efficient.

Conservatively speaking, and averaging across all the above estimates, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the U.S. armed forces, for all their excesses and imperfections, are perhaps twice as efficient by any measure in translating financial resources into projectable power.

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What this means is that NATO Europe today should be able to project at least 100,000 troops to a distant battlefield within weeks or at most a couple months, and then sustain them in combat, without depending on logistics provided by the economy of the country to where they have deployed, for a year or more. At present, measured against this standard of real physical deployability (and not just declared deployability, based on which troops and units are intended and legally authorized for operations abroad, which is a much lower standard), Europe is roughly half as efficient as it should be.

AN INVESTMENT AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

Looking forward, NATO may soon create a moment of great promise that it would be very unfortunate to squander.

If NATO European countries in coming years collectively approach the 2% of GDP standard, thus adding roughly $100 billion to their aggregate annual military spending from today's figure of some $230 billion, and reach a level of roughly $325 to $350 billion a year, they should be able to use the added funds to redress many current gaps. The coming defence budget upturn, which in fact is now already underway, should be seen as a great opportunity to repair current weaknesses and shortcomings. In principle, once they have attained that budget range, NATO European nations as a group should be able to catch up to the American armed forces in efficiency. With roughly half as many defence resources as the United States, collectively, they should be able to deploy roughly half as much power as the United States beyond their borders.

Some would say that this is too ambitious a goal, given that the United States has the inherent advantage of building its military through a single Department of Defence (and that its geography necessitates that it make most of its military deployable). However, it might again be noted that the United States has nearly $100 billion in annual base-budget defence expenditures that Europeans do not need to worry about matching—largely in nuclear forces, missile defences, advanced military research and development, and related capabilities. Thus, it does not seem unfair to aspire to a combined NATO Europe capacity that could approach half that of the United States by the middle of the 2020s, when in principle most European countries could have reached the NATO goal of spending 2% of GDP on their armed forces. By that point, NATO’s European member states should be able to aim for a goal of roughly 125,000 truly deployable forces—and they should certainly be able to field 100,000.

How much would it cost to create the power projection capabilities that I propose? My overall estimate, based on previous studies at the Congressional Budget Office about providing organic logistics to mobile units, as well as standard costs for transportation assets (using C-17s and LMSRs as proxies, even if European nations would likely buy other capabilities), is about $100 billion in 2017 dollars. That would be, to be clear, a one-time investment that could be spread over five to ten years, meaning an average annual cost of $10 billion to $20 billion—a very modest and affordable fraction of the $100 billion in annual increases that a Europe spending $325 billion to $350 billion each year on military capabilities, rather than today's $230 billion or so, would have available. In other words, this initiative would typically require only 10 to 20 percent of the added funds that will be available if NATO nations meet their 2 percent standard. Roughly half the added costs would be in strategic transport, roughly half in tactical/theatre logistics assets—mobile hospitals, trucks and equipment transporters, ammunition handling and storage units, mobile depots, more combat engineers and construction crews, transport helicopters, and so forth.17

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A NEW NATO

The above analysis focuses mainly on making NATO more efficient for today's kind of warfare. But things are changing, and to dramatize the point, I include as an appendix an article written with a colleague that discusses Artificial Intelligence as well as General John Allen and Amir Husain's concept of “hyperwar.” This concept

moves us beyond the buzz-words and paradigms of recent decades—such as the revolution in military affairs, net-centric warfare, full-spectrum warfare, shock and awe, Air-Sea Battle, and the third offset. It takes us to a whole new world for which NATO must be ready, in no small part because its potential adversaries will take advantage of these new technologies and associated warfighting operational innovations. Indeed, Vladimir Putin made a statement in September of 2017 that might be read as one part prognostication and one part challenge—asserting that whoever achieves breakthroughs in artificial intelligence will likely control the world.18

There are a number of challenges associated with preparing for an era of “hyperwar.” Already, we see the harbingers of these challenges in an age when high-tempo operations require rapid and real-time connectivity between many sensors and shooters on the battlefield. Thus, modern sensor and communications systems absolutely must be interoperable—they must be able to share data quickly and electronically.19

But NATO has had the luxury of conducting mostly lower-technology, geographically segmented and dividable operations in the 1990s and this century. As such, while airplanes needed to avoid shooting at each other and some data needed to be shared in some cases, such as in Kosovo or Afghanistan, operations against the Taliban for example did not typically place a high premium on real-time comprehensive data sharing.

That situation is changing fast—partly because Russia is again a credible challenger that must be deterred with real military capability, partly because trends in warfare will require even more rapid, often automated, and geographically integrated sharing of information across many different platforms from numerous nations. The plethora of armies participating in Operation Atlantic Resolve in the Baltic states and Poland underscore the point already—if these multinational units actually had to fight, their limited abilities to work together in a fast-paced battlefield could risk disaster.20

As such, I will conclude with several brief ideas that NATO could consider, not just to make production lines more efficient, not just to make forces more deployable, but to innovate in ways the 21st century will surely require:

- Consider raising the 20 percent standard, according to which NATO members are supposed to devote at least one-fifth of their defence budgets to acquisition-related expenses, to 25 percent (the U.S. figure, for procurement plus research, development, testing and evaluation together historically ranges from about 30 to 35 percent).

- Within that 25 percent figure, commit to spending 7 percent of total military spending to research, development, testing and evaluation (the current figure is below 5 percent, and likely to drop further if defence budgets grow without greater emphasis on innovation; the U.S. figure as a fraction of the base defence budget is more than 10 percent now).

- Consider creation of a NATO version of DARPA, the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency, that would be based in Europe (not in Norfolk, Virginia) and, in the model of the “Defence Innovation Unit—Experimental,” or DIU(x), initiative of former Secretary of Defence Ash Carter, have a presence in at least several of Europe’s major universities and/or research centers. Although NATO has a Science and Technology Organization now,21 that is not the same thing as having a critical mass of scientists with grant-making authority to commission research and development or even the actual acquisition of some cutting-edge systems.22

- Create a NATO Centre of Excellence in Artificial Intelligence, to spur innovation and to help prepare NATO states intellectually, technologically, and doctrinally for the coming realities of “hyperwar.”

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21 On NATO’s Science and Technology Organization, see https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/organization.aspx.
22 DARPA has some 220 employees overseeing 250 projects aimed at major innovation. See https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/about-darpa.
Consider creation of a standing task force of roughly brigade size that would be an experimental unit designed to prototype, field, test, and exercise with new equipment and weaponry as it becomes available. Findings would be fed into both the Defence Planning Process and Allied Command Transformation to facilitate the writing of new doctrine and the alliance-wide acquisition of technologies that are interoperable and state of the art.

There is no better way to conclude this paper than with the admonition that finishes the May 2017 report of the Steering Committee of the NATO Adaptation Initiative: “Some past ages forgave mediocrity. This is no such age.”

APPENDIX

“America Can’t Afford to Lose the Artificial Intelligence War”,

— Robert Karlen and Michael O’Hanlon, nationalinterest.org, August 21, 2017

Today, the question of artificial intelligence (AI) and its role in future warfare is becoming far more salient and dramatic than ever before. Rapid progress in driverless cars in the civilian economy has helped us all see what may become possible in the realm of conflict. All of a sudden, it seems, terminators are no longer the stuff of exotic and entertaining science-fiction movies, but a real possibility in the minds of some. Innovator Elon Musk warns that we need to start thinking about how to regulate AI before it destroys most human jobs and raises the risk of war.

It is good that we start to think this way. Policy schools need to start making AI a central part of their curriculums; ethicists and others need to debate the pros and cons of various hypothetical inventions before the hypothetical becomes real; military establishments need to develop innovation strategies that wrestle with the subject. However, we do not believe that AI can or should be stopped dead in its tracks now; for the next stage of progress, at least, the United States must rededicate itself to being the first in this field.

First, a bit of perspective. AI is of course not entirely new. Remotely piloted vehicles may not really qualify—after all, they are humanly, if remotely, piloted. But cruise missiles already fly to an aimpoint and detonate their warheads automatically. So would nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles, if God forbid nuclear-tipped ICBMs or SLBMs were ever launched in combat. Semi-autonomous systems are already in use on the battlefield, like the U.S. Navy Phalanx Close-In Weapons System, which is “capable of autonomously performing its own search, detect, evaluation, track, engage, and kill assessment functions,” according to the official Defence Department description, along with various other fire-and-forget missile systems.

But what is coming are technologies that can learn on the job—not simply follow prepared plans or detailed algorithms for detecting targets, but develop their own information and their own guidelines for action based on conditions they encounter that were not initially foreseeable in specific.

A case in point is what our colleague at Brookings, retired Gen. John Allen, calls “hyperwar.” He develops the idea in a new article in the journal Proceedings, co-authored with Amir Husain. They imagine swarms of self-propelled munitions that, in attacking a given target, deduce patterns of behavior of the target’s defences and find ways to circumvent them, aware all along of the capabilities and coordinates of their teammates in the attack (the other self-propelled munitions). This is indeed about the place where the word “robotics” seems no longer to do justice to what is happening, since that term implies a largely prescripted process or series of actions. What happens in hyperwar is not only fundamentally adaptive, but also so fast that it far supercedes what could be accomplished by any weapons system with humans in the loop. Other authors, such as former Brookings scholar Peter Singer, have written about related technologies, in a partly fictional sense. Now, Allen and Husain are not just seeing into the future, but laying out a near-term agenda for defence innovation.
The United States needs to move expeditiously down this path. People have reasons to fear fully autonomous weaponry, but if a Terminator-like entity is what they are thinking of, their worries are premature. That software technology is still decades away, at the earliest, along with the required hardware. However, what will be available sooner is technology that will be able to decide what or who is a target—based on the specific rules laid out by the programmer of the software, which could be highly conservative and restrictive—and fire upon that target without any human input.

To see why outright bans on AI activities would not make sense, consider a simple analogy. Despite many states having signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a ban on the use and further development of nuclear weapons, the treaty has not prevented North Korea from building a nuclear arsenal. But at least we have our own nuclear arsenal with which we can attempt to deter other such countries, a tactic that has been generally successful to date. A preemptive ban on AI development would not be in the United States’ best interest because non-state actors and noncompliant states could still develop it, leaving the United States and its allies behind. The ban would not be verifiable and it could therefore amount to unilateral disarmament. If Western countries decided to ban fully autonomous weaponry and a North Korea fielded it in battle, it would create a highly fraught and dangerous situation.

To be sure, we need the debate about AI’s longer-term future, and we need it now. But we also need the next generation of autonomous systems—and America has a strong interest in getting them first.

October 2017

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GLOBSEC NATO ADAPTATION INITIATIVE

FUTURE WAR NATO?

From Hybrid War to Hyper War via Cyber War

SUPPORTING PAPER
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FUTURE WAR NATO? FROM HYBRID WAR TO HYPER WAR VIA CYBER WAR

By John R. Allen, Philip M. Breedlove, Julian Lindley-French & George Zambellas

“Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”

— President Vladimir Putin
1 September 2017

ABSTRACT

This is a paper about NATO strategy in future war. It is built around two scenarios: one in which the Alliance is defeated because it did not prepare for future war; and another in which the Alliance prevails because it did. The paper calls for the crafting of a NATO Future War Strategy (and Strategic Concept) that would convince Moscow that under absolutely no circumstances would the threshold to war be so low as to make it imaginable, let alone winnable. Or, that the threat of such a war would force the Alliance and its nations to accept unacceptable compromises over either sovereignty or security.

Future war will see an adversary seek to destroy the ability of the Alliance and its nations both to protect people and to project power and influence in pursuit of sound defence. Future war will thus be part of a grand asymmetric strategy by enemies to offset Allied strengths. Attacks on Alliance societies will take place at the seams between peoples, their beliefs, and their states, to keep NATO strategically, politically, and militarily off-balance. Traditional military platforms, systems, technologies, and strategies, allied to new and accelerating technologies such as robotics, artificial intelligence and beyond, will be used in an effort to achieve decisive strategic aims quickly.

A NATO Future War Strategic Concept must be crafted to quickly establish a credible twenty-first century deterrence and defence, and forge the intelligent use of hard power with the smart use of technologies and influence across the conflict spectrum. Article 5 operations will need new ways to understand when an attack is underway and to establish rapid action, cyber-defence & offence, hybrid defence & offence, allied to the strengthening of societal resilience to address the attack. The Alliance must be able and willing to meet the force-on-force challenge from Russia and other adversaries. NATO is behind the twenty-first century future war curve, and adaptation must help that Alliance correct that.
SUPPORTING PAPER

FUTURE WAR NATO? FROM HYBRID WAR TO HYPER WAR VIA CYBER WAR

“We who have put this book together know very well that the only forecast that can be made with any confidence of the course and outcome of another world war, should there be one, is that nothing will happen exactly as we have shown here”.

— General Sir John Hackett
The Third World War: A Future History
August 1985

INTRODUCTION

This paper is about NATO strategy in future war, and the fast-changing relationship between strategy and technology in warfare. Twenty-first century war will be a war fought with autonomous systems, in which mass disruption by an enemy could be the harbinger of mass destruction. How would NATO defend against such an enemy, and how would the Alliance fight and win such a war? The paper considers the interaction of Allied strategy with fast-emerging technologies, and the extent to which the former must adapt to the latter if collective Alliance deterrence and defence are to remain credible.

This paper calls for a new NATO Strategic Concept to address the challenges of future war. Several adversaries are engaged in preparing for future war, as is the United States. However, central to this paper is Russian thinking on future war. This is because Moscow has undertaken a systematic analysis of how an ostensibly weaker, but unitary actor, could exert influence over the far stronger, but far more divided, set of actors that is the NATO alliance. To that end, the paper rest on two scenarios: one in which the Alliance is defeated because it did not prepare for future war; and another scenario, at the end of the paper, in which the Alliance is victorious because it did.

The paper also considers Russian future war strategy as a case study in evolving strategic threat. The paper concludes with NATO’s response, and the new balance the Alliance, its nations, and its partners must strike if they are to successfully protect vulnerable, open societies, and project the future warfighting power that will be vital to the maintenance of credible Alliance deterrence and defence.

The very idea of future war is controversial and must be acknowledged as such. Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman writes, “The idea that societies, and their associated military systems might be comprehended as complex systems encouraged the view, reflected in the perplexing searches for enemy centres of gravity that hitting an enemy system in exactly the right place would cause it to crumble quickly, as the impact would reverberate and affect all the interconnected parts”. ³ In almost all imaginable circumstances NATO would not crumble and would respond. However, evidence from stated Russian strategy, and its military posture would suggest that President Putin, and some around him, actually believe a combination of Russian strengths and Western vulnerabilities might indeed afford Moscow such a ‘decisive moment’. Or, at least, believe some strategic benefits might accrue to Russia, given that such thinking is now central to Russian grand and military strategy. Russia is already working on a range of strategies that support its belief that Moscow could benefit from what it calls “controlled

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chaos”, in the event of a struggle with the West, that engages a range of media, technology and military assets to achieve strategic and political objectives.⁴

At best, the search for an accommodation with Russia must now be reinforced by the need to again consider the worst case. Whilst the West has undoubtedly made mistakes in its dealings with Russia, responsibility for this shift in Russian strategy and its aggressive posture must lie firmly with Moscow. Therefore, this paper is ultimately devoted to a NATO Future War Strategy that would convince Moscow that under absolutely no circumstances would the threshold to war be so low as to make it imaginable, let alone winnable, or that the threat of such a war would force the Alliance and its nations to accept unacceptable compromises over either sovereignty or security.

CORE MESSAGE

The core message of this paper is thus: NATO needs a new Future War Strategic Concept if the Alliance and its nations are to maintain credible deterrence and defence in the twenty-first century. Specifically, NATO will need to have a far more holistic understanding of the relationship between protection of citizens and the projection of power and influence, in all its many forms. The Internet of Things, allied to emerging technologies with wide-ranging military applications, such as Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and the systems-driving algorithms it creates, make it increasingly possible for ostensibly far weaker powers, such as Russia, possibly in tandem with criminal and Islamist groups, to cause damage to Western societies out of all proportion to their size and capabilities. Such technologies will (and must) profoundly affect Allied security and defence policies and strategies, which are the focus of this paper.

SCENARIO 1

STRAT-TECH WAR 2025 – NATO DEFEAT IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF NORTH CAPE

It is August 2025. The United States is mired in a growing short-of-war scenario that involves a series of dangerous crises in Asia-Pacific. Europe is vulnerable. Exhausted and worn down by the years of complex Brexit negotiations, sustained mass, irregular migration from its south, a seemingly endless flow of terrorist attacks, and years of relative economic decline caused by leaders unable or unwilling to take the necessary measures to resolve Europe’s myriad political, economic and social tensions.

Britain’s 70,000 ton heavy aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth is sailing off the North Cape of Norway. These are historic waters for the Royal Navy as ‘Big Lizzie’ is not far from where on the late afternoon of 26th December 1943, in the Arctic twilight, the British battleship HMS Duke of York sank the German battlecruiser KM Scharnhorst. The First Battle of North Cape was, in effect, the opening engagement of a new computer/missile age and the last battleship-to-battleship dual in history, in which no aircraft played any part.

By the standards of the age, HMS Duke of York was a floating electronics platform armed with state of the art sensors and several layers of radar capability. The battle, most of which took place in the Arctic dark, saw HMS Duke of York link her Type 284 main gunnery radars to a rudimentary computer in the Gunnery Control

⁴ Gudrun Persson in a March 2017 article for the NATO Defence College critiquing a 2017 book, “The War of the Future: A Conceptual Framework and Practical Conclusions: Essays on Strategic Thought” by Igor Popov and Musa Khamzatov, that critiques Russian thinking and cites writes, “A particularly topical subject in Russian military strategic thinking in recent years concerns the view on soft power and so-called ‘controlled chaos or manageable chaos… recent conflicts demonstrate that ‘peaceful demonstrations, anti-regime demonstrations, and in some cases foreign military intervention turning entire countries and regions into a state of controlled chaos can now be called a new type of contemporary warfare”. See Persson G. (2017) a critique of “The War of the Future: A Conceptual Framework and Practical Conclusions: Essays on Strategic Thought” by Igor Popov and Musa Khamzatov (Rome: NATO Defence College) pps.5–6.

⁵ Angus Konstam writes, that as well as “…the radars, the battleship [HMS Duke of York] was also fitted with an extensive suite of electronic equipment, designed to detect aircraft, radio or radar transmissions, IFF (Identification of Friend or Foe) transmissions from friendly aircraft or ships, and radar detection equipment. The battleship was buzzing with electronics, and although these were fairly rudimentary by modern standards, in late 1943 they were ‘state-of-the-art’; and that afternoon they were all working perfectly”. See Konstam, A. (2009), “The Battle of North Cape: The Death Ride of the Scharnhorst, 1943”. (Barnsley: Pen and Sword) p.113
Centre which then trained the ten 14 inch guns of the main armament. Unheard of in any prior battleship-to-battleship engagement, the Scharnhorst was straddled and hit by the initial salvo, with one main armament turret immediately disabled. The eventual sinking of the KM Scharnhorst some three hours later ended the threat posed by Nazi surface raiders to Allied convoys en route (and not without some historical irony) to Murmansk, Russia.

Tensions with Russia have been building for months as an increasingly erratic President Putin, faced with economic and societal challenges that make those of the rest of Europe seem trivial, has become steadily more aggressive. Central and Eastern Europe face regular cyber-attacks, with banking, transportation, and even health systems effectively shut down for days at a time. RT, Sputnik, and other Kremlin-controlled Russian media organs, pump out increasingly hysterical fake news stories about Western aggression. In recent weeks, Russia’s Western Military District (Oblast) has been reinforced with several new spearhead divisions, threatening much of NATO’s eastern border. Worse, Russia has markedly increased both the number and type of treaty-legal and illegal nuclear weapons deployed to its Kaliningrad enclave between Poland and Lithuania.

Above the Arctic Circle the Russian Northern Fleet has adopted aggressive patrolling with aircraft, ships and submarines regularly attempting to intimidate NATO naval forces far out into the North Atlantic. However, the most dangerous encounters take place in the so-called Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, and close to Norway’s North Cape.

In early July, Russia moved a large formation of Naval Infantry (marines) to Pechenga, close to Russia’s short border with Norway. An alarmed Oslo called for Alliance support. On August 10th, as tensions ratchet up, and by way of response to Russia, the North Atlantic Council ordered SACEUR to take all necessary steps to demonstrate to Moscow the Alliance’s determination to defend its borders, and the vital sea and air lines of communication around them. However, few US ships are available to the Alliance given the mounting tensions in Asia-Pacific, the size and capability of the Chinese People’s Liberation Navy (PLN), and a series of humanitarian disasters in the Mediterranean and beyond, engineered by Russia and Iran, and partly linked to the ongoing migration crisis.

A hastily-organised NATO Task Group is formed and organised around HMS Queen Elizabeth. The Task Group includes ships, aircraft and submarines from Britain, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and of course, Norway.

August 15th 0430 hours: 150 nautical miles WNW of North Cape. Suddenly weapons and defence systems on board HMS Queen Elizabeth crash, as the Task Group flagship suffers a sustained cyber-attack, along with much of the rest of the twenty-ship flotilla. Almost simultaneously the huge ship is attacked by an intelligent swarm of autonomous, flying armed ‘attack-bots’. The Second Battle of North Cape has begun.

0431 hours: Situational awareness is effectively reduced to nil. The decision-action cycle of the ship’s captain is reduced to less than a second, whilst the commodore loses all communications and command and control links to the Task Group. Parts of the robotic drone swarm split up and attack specific systems on HMS Queen Elizabeth.

0432 hours: Internal communications are disabled and the damage control centre fails; the ship stalls to a sudden halt as the engines go into reverse. Two Russian Yasen-class nuclear attack submarines, successfully avoiding the 3G and 4G detection systems of the Task Group by exploiting the different temperature and density layers of frigid North Atlantic waters, each launch an Iskandr PL anti-ship missile and cripple ‘Big Lizzie’. The damage to HMS Queen Elizabeth is devastating.

0434 hours: The ship takes on water rapidly and begins to list heavily to starboard. After an enormous internal explosion, a shocked captain gives an order he never thought possible. He orders the surviving crew to start shouting “abandon ship – every man and woman for themselves”. Those ‘lucky’ enough to make it into the water die within minutes from hypothermia.

0453 hours: Twenty-three minutes after the attack begins, a burning HMS Queen Elizabeth, the largest ship ever to serve in the Royal Navy, capsizes and sinks by the bow, propellers spinning in the cold, dark, light of an Arctic dawn, with the loss of almost all hands. Much like HMS Hood, which blew up in the Denmark Strait in May 1941
not so far from the scene of the Royal Navy’s latest battle, there are only three survivors from a crew of 1500. ‘Big Lizzie’s’ complement of F-35 Lightning II/5 (Enhanced Range) fast jets, and Merlin 7 ASW helicopters, never got off her decks.

0454 hours: The Russian submarine Novosibirsk flashes a success signal to Moscow. It contains just one word; ‘Kursk’.

As ‘Big Lizzie’ sinks, vulnerable critical infrastructures crash across Europe. Telephone and computer systems fail, air and rail transportation is brought to a halt, TV and social media are hacked, and, through the Internet of Things, even certain domestic appliances begin to run out of control, some even exploding. Europeans awake to chaos. Disoriented, and in shock, they search for reassuring news only to find TV, radio and the social media suddenly seized with apocalyptic messaging warning of impending nuclear, biological and chemical attacks on major European cities.

Mass hysteria ensues. It is made worse by simultaneous terrorist attacks upon the gathering groups of bewildered people by sleeper cells carefully implanted into the European Union, most notably in Brussels where crisis response rapidly collapses. False reports of plague being spread by terrorists in several European city centres only complicate the movement of first responders and security forces as populations panic. Over the ensuing hours people try to flee Europe’s cities, clogging up transportation arteries vital to any Allied military response.

Worse, political and military command in many NATO allies is rapidly decapitated at a stroke by a series of well-coordinated cyber-attacks on insufficiently robust government and military communications systems. NATO’s limited forces are also over-stretched. Needed to reinforce the Enhanced Forward Presence in Eastern Europe, to cover an extended and continuing Russia ‘Super Zapad’ exercise, the bulk of NATO’s main defence forces are covering the Baltic States and Poland. And, given the crisis in Asia-Pacific, available reinforcing US forces in Europe are few in number.

As the Second Battle of North Cape unfolds, and with Russian nuclear services on high alert, Russian forces seize Norway’s North Cape, Spitzbergen, and all non-Russian forces within Arctic Circle. Moscow’s aim becomes clear; to seize the new Northeast Passage between Asia and Europe and to secure by force all the hydrocarbons believed to lie under the Arctic Circle. With victory, President Putin becomes domestically invulnerable.

0930 hours: President Putin calls several NATO leaders and puts to them a simple, but brutal question, in his simple, but brutal way: “Russia’s objectives have been achieved”, he says, “and the threat to us removed.” Putin continues, “Do you really want to go to nuclear war over some polar bears? I am ready, you are not. The British ship? That was regrettable, but NATO’s deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth was a provocative act and a direct threat to our Northern Fleet base. Our response was a proportionate and legitimate act of self-defence. By the way, China agrees. Ladies and gentlemen, we do not like each other. That is immaterial. I am offering you peace. After all, what price has NATO really paid and are you ready to consider the alternative?”

With NATO and the EU effectively disabled, ‘solidarity’ collapses. As dawn breaks on a cold, new reality questions begin to be asked of political leaders about the years of underfunding resiliency, readiness and response, both civil and military. One thing is clear; Europeans can neither protect themselves, nor can they project power. Welcome to the end of collective self-delusion. Welcome to strat-tech warfare.

A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PEARL HARBOR?

Could NATO suffer a twenty-first century Pearl Harbor? The December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor took place in a vacuum between US policy, strategy, technology, and capability. The aim of broad spectrum holistic hybrid-cyber-hyper future war strategies is great effect at minimum time, and at minimum cost to its architects. At present, NATO, its nations, and most of the armed forces that serve it, are increasingly vulnerable to a crippling future war attack. In 2017, NATO faces a range of future war ‘threats’. Interoperability within the Alliance is also becoming increasingly difficult, intensifying the vulnerability of open European societies and militaries to a
range of crippling attacks. Adversaries such as Russia are systematically exploring those vulnerabilities and seeking to exploit them.⁶

Hyper warfare: The impact of new technologies, and the interactions between them, are changing fast the nature, character and conduct of war. Hyper war will see an accelerated speed of conflict allied to vastly shortened decision-action cycles. Hyper war will see an enormous compression of time and consequent effect, with the command of war becoming steadily and necessarily more automated; and part of a new escalation ladder that climbs from chaos to capitulation. The increasing reliance of Western populations on internet-based social media makes diverse societies vulnerable to political manipulation via fake news. This forms part of a new form of hybrid warfare which transcends the civil-military divide.

Cyber warfare: Cyber-based civilian infrastructures from healthcare to air transportation will also be natural targets, adding disruption of life to a profound sense of uncertainty. The threat of hyper warfare at the high-end of the military spectrum would simply ram home a message, by those who have mastered it, that resistance is futile.

One of the many dangers from such a hybrid-cyber-hyper warfare continuum is that it again renders plausible the once unimaginable idea of ‘warfare’ in and between developed societies. It could also render traditional nuclear deterrence, as a stand-alone stratagem of last resort, increasingly obsolete. Indeed, ‘deterrence’, as currently conceived of, will need to be re-thought across a new spectrum of conflict if it is to remain credible, whilst Allied armed forces will need to become demonstrably capable across many domains – land, sea, air, space, cyber, intelligence, information, and, above all, knowledge.

Russia and China are already making significant technical progress at the very highest-levels of future warfare, efforts that could soon be reinforced by new ‘force multipliers’, such as quantum computing and its integration into the future order of battle. There are concerns in the West that artificial intelligence in weaponry will produce morally unacceptable military capabilities. Quite possibly but, like the advent of the torpedo-firing submarine and the moral dilemma it created around commerce raiding on the high seas, the enemy will exploit any such capability ‘freedoms’. Or, to put in another way, NATO is unlikely to successfully deter or defend against hybrid warfare unless it can also demonstrably do the same against cyber and hyper warfare.

Russia has placed increased emphasis on nuclear weapons, and other forms of unconventional hybrid and hyper warfare capabilities and capacities, to counter what Moscow believes to be NATO’s conventional military superiority. However, such thinking about future war is not confined to Russia. Radical Islamist groups, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, are also exploring the use of technologies and strategies to penetrate open, western societies, erode the protection of the home base, and undermine the social and political cohesion upon which all security and defence strategies in democracies must be based.

Even the United States ‘poses’ a threat to Europe, at least to its complacency, after a decade of European defence cuts. Consequently, as technology increasingly drives and shapes both policy and strategy, a split is emerging between the US and Allied militaries. Indeed, technologically-driven US military strategy is advancing so fast compared with the European allies that, sooner rather than later, all-important NATO military interoperability might well become a thing of the past. Over time a profound mismatch in military technologies undermines the politico-military cohesion of any alliance.

Russia’s strategic approach is technologically far less ambitions than its American counterparts, but robustly pragmatic. In effect, Russia is endeavours to weave existing platforms, systems and strategies with new capabilities and technologies across the civil-military conflict spectrum. Critically, much like the British and German strategic bombing campaigns of World War Two, the Russians make no attempt to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in a war that Moscow understands would be existential for the regime.

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⁶ In his 2016 book, “2017: War With Russia”, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSACEUR) General Sir Richard Shirreff wrote, “It does not need Russian soldiers marching through Berlin and Paris for the world to as we know it to cease to exist. A militarily victorious Russia, able to dictate to a defeated Europe and NATO from the end of a barrel as to exactly what will and what will not be acceptable to them, will be enough for life as we know it in Western Europe to come to a very abrupt end”. See Shirreff, Richard (2016) “2017: War With Russia”, (London: Coronet) p. 13
Russian strategy seeks to exploit and link technologies as a big power, short action strategy. It is a strategy which includes the threatened use of nuclear weapons to force an adversary to accept what Moscow calls the ‘changing of facts on the ground’; gaining local military superiority via regional deployments and keeping adversaries politically and socially off-balance through the use of extended deception, thus rendering a cohesive defence impossible. The strategy is attributed to the long-serving Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov. In a well-known 2013, article General Gerasimov wrote, “I would like to say that no matter what forces the enemy has, no matter how well-developed his forces and means of armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found. He will always have vulnerabilities and that means that adequate means of opposing him exist”.7

Russian strategy is designed in part to offset advantages in Allied air power, and thus gain strategic and tactical air superiority at a time and place of Moscow’s choosing. Russia is also investing significant efforts in the development of autonomous systems as part of a new force architecture. These include autonomous, robotic and remotely-controlled systems, new and advanced forms of electronic warfare (EW), as well as a rapidly-expanding offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Russia’s armed forces are also fast developing advanced command and control systems designed to exert effective and sensitive political control at the strategic apex of force, whilst at the same time developing a better devolved command authority culture on the battlefield. The Russians are also steadily increasing their already extensive use of battlefield internet, as well as enhanced ultra-range air defence and missile defence systems, and burgeoning anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities that threaten NATO SIGINT and milsatcom architectures.

The focus on air power is also driving Russian advances in the development of ‘5G’ fighters. The aim is to (at least) match Allied aircraft, such as the F22 Raptor and F35 Lightning II, and threaten them with advanced air defence systems, such as the S-400, and from 2020 the S-500 (Prometheus) system. Russia is enhancing the battlefield mobility of its forces, and seeking to make deployed Russian forces far more robust than in the past. However, it is the Russian interest in the development of hyper weapons and directed energy weapons which should be of great concern to Allied planners. Specifically, Moscow is developing so-called hyper-sonic weapons, as well as a new and robust generation of nuclear warheads, as part of a next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile system that would be effectively impregnable against future Allied missile defences. The new architecture Moscow is seeking to develop could also be capable at some point of remote command via artificial intelligence systems, and autonomous ‘learning’ systems.

US future war military technologies include autonomous systems, unmanned undersea vehicles, advanced sea-mines, hyper-sonic strike weapons, advanced aeronautics, and new weapons systems such as electromagnetic rail-guns, and high-energy lasers. The US Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program includes military robotics systems, system autonomy, weapons miniaturisation, scaling big data for applied military use, artificial intelligence and deep-learning, all as part of new military-strategic concepts. The Pentagon is also seeking to establish innovative relationships with US industry so as to deploy the technologies and intellect across the US national supply chain (not simply the defence supply chain) in support of the defence effort. This kind of civ-mil-tech interface goes far beyond such relationships in Europe, and there is clear evidence China and Russia are following a similar track.8

The US is also developing new and advanced nuclear and space-based capabilities, advanced sensors, extreme range stand-off weapons, and communication systems designed for twenty-first century warfare. Most European allies are either failing to invest at all in such futures, or investing at levels far below the US, China and Russia. Moreover, Beijing, Moscow and Washington are all looking to develop more advanced missile defence systems, as well as extensive offensive and defensive cyber capabilities.


8 The Russians seem to have embraced the important point made by General John R. Allen and Amir Hussain when they wrote, “If, indeed, we are poised at the edge of hyperwar, we must explore the changes necessary to adapt to this new conflict environment. Our adversaries and our enemies are moving forward aggressively in this area. The United States must make the strategic investments both to be ready to wage hyperwar, and to prevent us from being surprised by it.” See Allen, J. & Husain A. (2017) “On Hyperwar”, in “Proceedings”, July 2017, (Washington: US Naval Institute) p 27.
RUSSIA’S FUTURE WAR AIDS

On 1 July, 2014 President Putin said, “In the past 20 years, our [Russia’s] partners have been trying to convince Russia of their good intentions, their readiness to jointly develop strategic co-operation. However, at the same time they kept expanding NATO, extending the area under their military and political control ever closer to our border”.9

The replacement of ‘right’ with ‘might’, and the rejection of the community concept of international relations central to the idea of the European Union, is part of an ‘eternal’ search by Moscow for a new Russia-friendly balance of power in Europe. As such, Moscow’s strategy embraces several strategic ends, the most notable of which is the re-drawing of the post-Cold War European strategic map, via the effective expulsion of the United States from Europe and by keeping other European powers divided and/or permanently strategically and politically off-balance.

To better understand the Russian view of future war, and the interaction between technology and strategy across the hybrid, cyber, hyper spectrum, it is useful to look at Russian strategy as a case study. Napoleon once said that “The art of war does not need complicated manoeuvre...The most difficult thing is to guess the enemy’s plan, to find the truth from all reports. The rest merely requires common sense...”10 Russia’s future war strategy is a function of a grand strategy that reflects President Putin’s anti-western world-view, allied to a sophisticated understanding of the West’s many divisions and vulnerabilities, and how best to exploit them. Russian strategy is now part of a single-minded effort to do just that. The centralisation of power on the President’s Office, and indeed on his own person, intensifies and reinforces the policy assumptions that underpin it. What is perhaps different from the past is that Moscow has learnt to exercise power in a more nuanced manner than the Soviet Union, or Tsarist Russia before it.

Russia’s strategic aim is to create a buffer zone to its south and west, and to gain control over its high north, including the Arctic Circle, and along the entirety of its northern border that will likely form the new Northeast Passage between Asia and Europe. Moscow would also like to weaken transatlantic ties to force some European states into a Russian sphere of influence, and compel the rest to comply with Russian strategic interests. In an ‘ideal’ Kremlin world, Russia’s Future War Strategy would thus see the eventual expulsion of the US, Canada, and even the UK from Europe and its institutions, and the creation of a new Russia-friendly European security ‘architecture’.

Russian strategy has been described as non-linear warfare. This is an entirely inadequate description of Russian strategy. Rather, Moscow is applying strategic deception (Strategic Maskirovka) as grand strategy. In essence, Strategic Maskirovka is a form of high or grand asymmetric warfare by a relatively weak, but nevertheless unitary actor, against an ostensibly far more powerful, but also more pluralistic, fractured group of actors at a moment of their maximum vulnerability.

The aim of Russian strategy is the preservation of the Putin regime. To that end, Moscow is deliberately creating tensions with the West to present Russia as a victim, in order for the Kremlin to reinforce its authority domestically in spite of the excessive security burden the Kremlin places on Russian society and economy. As such, the Putin regime is utterly cynical when it comes to its understanding and use of power, and in its appreciation of Russia’s strengths and weaknesses.

The nationalistic exploitation of expansionist Russian history is a key element in the Kremlin’s strategy. Indeed, President Putin and his regime have a romantic, uniquely Russian nationalist view of history, informed by past heroes such as Alexander Nevsky and Peter the Great, about Russia’s place in the world, reinforced by the 1941–1945 Great Patriotic War against ‘fascism’. It is a view furthered by President Putin’s own prejudice about and against the West, and what he believes are past hurts the West inflicted on Russia. Consequently, NATO is vilified as an extension of traditional Western aggression towards ‘peace-loving Mother Russia’. These efforts are reinforced by the promotion of a personality cult around President Putin that presents him as Russia’s ‘super-patriot’.

For all the bellicose rhetoric and aggressive military posturing Russia still does not want war. As Professor Michael Clarke has observed, “In a disordered world the powerful live with an existential threat of war that may be remote but which affects them in a number of more immediate ways. It is remote in that the prospect of war directly between the powerful states themselves is now hard to imagine. The ruinous costs of major wars, the shrivelled political advantage they would be likely to give the victor, the sheer unpredictability of the consequences, all indicate that war between them is highly unlikely”. Rather, Moscow is using the threat of both a limited, and/or a more general war, to sow division between the US and its European allies and to force tacit acceptance of Russian territorial aggression, most notably in Ukraine, and Russian influence elsewhere.

Thus, Russian strategy must be seen as a whole-of-state, whole-of-conflict spectrum, regional dominance game designed to ensure Russia can exert effective control over a self-defined ‘strategic neighbourhood’ via strategic manipulation. The strategy rests on the threatened use of re-strengthened armed forces as both a strategic lever and the ultimate arbiter in any conflict. This strategy is allied to a narrative that exaggerates Russian strength, but which masks Russia’s many inherent, and potentially debilitating, weaknesses. The cost of such a strategy is high, but it has been strengthened domestically through the destruction of independent civil society and other sources of potential opposition to the Putin regime, and further reinforced by the centralisation of all state organs of power, with security, defence and intelligence structures re-established at the very core of the state and its identity. The danger of such closed systems is that policy assumptions become self-fulfilling, and thus prone to miscalculation, hubris, or both.

The desired outcomes the Kremlin seeks would be Russian-friendly trade-offs as part of a transactional military and economic relationship with the rest of Europe, in which Moscow has the whip hand. The strategy presumes limited cooperation combined with the threat of confrontation, even nuclear confrontation, allied to offers of energy ‘security’ if European powers exclusively import Russian oil and gas.

Russia is not alone in seeking a return to a more classical balance of power. Indeed, Strategic Maskirovka is part of a growing use of strategic asymmetry by illiberal regimes across the world, to dismantle the rules-based system of international relations the West built. This is partly because such powers do not believe that the Western system of ‘right’ serves their respective interests, and partly because President Putin, and to lesser extent President Xi of China, believe that such a system is simply a control mechanism or device by and for the US and the wider West. President Putin firmly believes that over the past twenty of so years the West itself abandoned the rules-based system it created, when it served Western strategic convenience.

RUSSIA’S FUTURE WAR STRATEGY

Russian future war strategy is purposeful and combines the threat of all force with disinformation and destabilisation from the very top of the state, through tightly-controlled multiple messaging, to the possible application of force at several levels of escalation intensity. President Putin is the architect of this strategy, a new/old Russian strategic method that can be summed up as the conduct of war via 5Ds: de-stabilisation, disinformation, strategic deception, disruption, and, if needs be, destruction. Russia’s close analysis of European societies and political elites has convinced the Kremlin that many European states no longer possess the political will to deter Russia, or run the political risk all credible deterrence demands. As such Moscow believes many Europeans are particularly prone to wishful thinking about Russian policy and strategy, namely that Moscow too wants friendly relations. Consequently, Moscow believes European elites and peoples are susceptible to political manipulation underpinned by conflicting strategic messaging, much of it from President Putin himself, allied to the threat of overwhelming, sudden force, that plays on European memories of World War Two, the Euro-strategic balance of the 1980s, and a renewed threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD).

Russia’s future war preparedness combines the build-up of Russian nuclear and conventional forces on NATO’s border, the destabilisation and intimidation of states around all of Russia’s northern, western and south-western borders, the intimidation of EU and NATO allies, and routine offers of ‘peace’ in return for a Russian veto over NATO policy. Moscow backs up such efforts with political agitation to suggest Russia’s enforced indispensability

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to European/Western ‘strategy’, and thus influence over it. This approach has been particularly evident in Moscow’s support for the Assad regime and its highly-conditional anti-ISIS co-operation with the US and its allies and partners. Russian involvement in the Middle East has little to do with the region, but everything to do with Europe and Russia’s influence therein. Future historians may well propose that, even insofar as the Syrian civil war was a policy catastrophe for the US and the West more broadly, Russian support of the Assad regime and its complicity with the genocide in Syria actually served the greater strategic Russian purpose of destabilising European society and polarising its politics, by virtue of the near constant flow of Syrian and regional refugees into Europe; a flow abetted by the Russian incursion into the conflict and active support for the regime’s horrendous attacks on its own population.

However, for all of its undoubted sophistication, Russian future war strategy must still balance capability with affordability. That is why Moscow’s military doctrine goes far beyond the armed forces and rewrites ideas about the utility of force to combine hybrid warfare, cyber warfare, ‘conventional’ warfare, warfighting nuclear warfare, and hyper warfare into a future war meme that bestrides the strategic and the tactical. Strategic deception is central to that strategy with Strategic Maskirovka an adaptation of Russia’s traditional use of battlefield deception, which is why in 2016 Russia invested some $250m in offensive cyber capabilities alone.12

Russia’s future war strategy is, in effect, war at the many seams of the West, and acts across the conflict spectrum from disinformation to disruption to destruction. At the lower end, Russian strategy employs electronic means, use of propaganda (fake news), and FSB (Russian foreign intelligence services) interference in the electoral processes of the Western democracies to cause as much internal division and dissent as possible. Moscow understands that effective security and defence policy in any state rests necessarily upon a significant level of social cohesion and support. With Western European states now divided into many groups, ideologies and belief-systems, Moscow believes it can successfully undermine their respective security and defence policies. This approach is reinforced by consistent messaging to reinforce the belief in Europe that ‘Russia is back’, a superpower re-born, even though that is very far from reality.

RUSSIA’S FUTURE WAR STRUCTURE AND METHOD

On 26 June, 2014 President Putin signed, “On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation”, which instructed all social, economic and political development to be linked and considered within the framework of national security. At the centre of the planning concept is a new National Security Strategy and Plan for Defence. This follows a June 2013 order that gave the General Staff powers to co-ordinate the work of all federal agencies with executive power in “securing national security and defence”.

To conduct such a strategy, the Russian state under Putin has been re-organised along Soviet-lite lines. In September 2009 President Putin issued a Presidential Order (Ukaz) requiring the linking of all situation centres and ordering the creation of a new inter-agency information sharing system. A new National Defence Management Centre (NDMC) was ordered by a Presidential ‘Ukaz’ (decree) on 10 December, 2013, following the bungled August 2008 military operations in Georgia, and after lessons had been identified and learned. On 20 January, 2015 Defence Minister Shoigu likened the then-new Centre to the re-creation of the old Stavka of the Supreme Commander of Soviet Forces. Whilst still very much a work in progress the NDMC is at the very heart of Russia’s future war strategy and covers the spectrum of strategies, campaign and operations from hybrid war to hyper war via cyber war. The NDMC became operational on 1 December, 2014, with its given purpose to link all departmental systems concerned with the management of monitoring of ‘defence’ (offensive and defensive), and to act as national information hub and headquarters, including a strong civil-military component to promote a cohesive whole-of-government approach. This whole-of-government approach has been further reinforced by the planned re-creation of another Soviet-era organ, a new pan-government mega-ministry called the Ministry of State Security (MGB).

At the military-strategic level, Russia is seeking to exploit growing American military over-stretch to ‘demonstrate’ to Europeans the growing incapacity of the US, and be extension the inability of NATO to defend them. Russian

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intent is reinforced by ‘proving’ Moscow’s growing mastery of coercive military power via snap exercises, blue water deployments, aggressive nuclear posturing, reinforced A2/AD capabilities, and leadership of new thinking in warfare – future war.

Russia’s future war strategy is also being steadily operationalised. In June 2015 General Vladimir Zarudnitskii, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of General Staff said: “The creation of the National Defence Management Centre (NDMC)...will make possible the creation of a system covering all links of the leadership of the armed forces and also give the possibility in an operational regime to co-ordinate the efforts of 49 ministries and government departments participating in the fulfilment of the Plan of Defence of the country”.13

The NDMC includes the Federal Strategy Centre, situation centres, information and stratcom command and control, with a direct link to the President’s Office. It also affords President Putin real time strategic options and intelligence, with real time assessment of Russian forces and resources, including the readiness of military districts, the role, state and preparedness of the other ‘power’ ministries (home, foreign, MGB), as well as non-military aspects of Russian strategy. Crucially, NDMC also monitors the strategy and armed forces of foreign states, as well as the world-wide media. In addition to its functions as a campaign hub the NDMC also includes: the Centre for the Management of Strategic Nuclear Forces; the Centre for Combat Management; the Centre for Daily Management of the Armed Forces. To ensure its writ runs far beyond Moscow the Centre has offices in the HQ of each Oblast or military district.

**FUTURE WAR NATO?**

Bernard Brodie once said that, “Deterrence is a strategy designed to dissuade an adversary from an action not yet taken”.14 NATO Adaptation must necessarily be a first step towards a future war Alliance deterrence and defence posture. How far is NATO towards crafting a sound future war strategy? Only a NATO that demonstrates unequivocally that it is adapting to future war will ensure and assure the deterrence and defence required to prevent it. Future war will thus require the Alliance to deter an ‘adversary’ by having the capacity – both directly and indirectly – to take many actions at many levels of conflict, across the conflict spectrum, and often simultaneously.

Several decisions taken at the 2014 Wales Summit and the 2016 Warsaw Summit suggest that the Alliance is at least moving in the right direction as it begins to grapple with the implications of future war. However, such efforts are as yet insufficiently ambitious, holistic, and/or properly resourced to be called a NATO Future War Strategy – the outcomes-driven test of NATO Adaptation.

The Defence Investment Pledge to spend a minimum 2% GDP on defence by 2024, of which 20% per annum must be spent on new equipment, is an important statement of intent. And yet, several NATO nations are already questioning that solemnly agreed goal, or trying to circumvent its meaning by challenging how such expenditures should be calculated, and what expenditures such be included. Worse, the overwhelming focus of most of the Allies on domestic expenditures, including defence budgets, is in danger of fatally weakening the collective authority each Ally gains through NATO, and upon which the credibility of their own respective security and defence rests. The Readiness Action Plan and the Enhanced Forward Presence are also important commitments to deterrence, but only as far as they go, some consider them ‘trip wire’ forces at best. Russian forces far outnumber their Alliance counterparts on NATO’s eastern flank, and seem to be held at a higher state of readiness, which was demonstrated by the September Zapad (West) 2017 exercise.

Between 14 and 20 September, 2017 Russia, and its junior partner Belarus, (the so-called ‘Union State’) conducted the largest military exercise in Europe since the Cold War. The exercise took place centred on Brest close to the Belarusian border with Poland, as well as in Kaliningrad, the small Russian enclave some 60 kilometres from Belarus across NATO territory. Zapad 2017 incorporated a massive series of wargames involving between 60,000 and 100,000 military and civilian personnel. Crucially, the exercise tested Russian military and civilian readiness and effectiveness across a conflict spectrum that stretched from hybrid warfare to hyper warfare.

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via cyber warfare, backed up by the threat of nuclear force and strengthening anti-air, area defence (A2/AD) capabilities – the new linear/non-linear order of twenty-first century strategic battle pioneered by General Gerasimov.

NATO? Continuing reforms of the NATO Command Structure are indeed underway, allied to ongoing efforts to improve military interoperability via a range of initiatives, such as the 16 nation Framework Nation concept, and the Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training Initiative (TACET). All such efforts suggest the military and intellectual underpinnings needed for a NATO Future War Strategy are beginning to fall into place, in no small part due to American prompting and the funding provided by the European Reassurance Initiative.

A truly sound and credible NATO Future War Strategy would need to be far more holistic, far more joined up, and far more ambitious, and demonstrably match an adversary across the hybrid-cyber-hyper strategic continuum. The Alliance needs to go far further and far faster if a credible NATO Future War Strategy is to be established that could underpin a future Alliance deterrence and defence posture, reinforced by forces able to sustain a high level of readiness, responsiveness, and resilience across the conflict spectrum. NATO Force Structure reform, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the Cyber Defence Pledge, NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, heightened interoperability, the Alliance Maritime Posture, institutional adaptation, and efforts to modernise platforms and systems development with industry are all well and good. However, they are insufficiently embedded in the respective national strategies of Allies, with progress too often measured by limited, marginal improvements to existing structures, and undermined by weak links to the civil intellectual and industrial resources which, in many ways, are driving the strategy and technology underpinning future war, albeit often unwittingly.

Future deterrence also rests upon strong resilience and manifest systemic redundancies in enablers, systems and infrastructures. At its most simple, the Alliance and its nations will need the capacity to block mass fake ‘strategic’ messaging, and to beat an adversary to a message. This in turn will require an effective counter-hybrid warfare strategy built on agile and resilient strategic communications. Alliance societies also need to become far more hardened against terrorism, attacks on critical infrastructures, and denial of critical services so that consequence management and recovery also become demonstrably more agile. Critically, NATO must be able to undertake offensive and defensive cyber operations to deny an adversary the ‘free’ cyber-space to undertake attacks against the Alliance and its peoples. Above all, adapted twenty-first century deterrence will need Allied forces armed with the systems, platforms, and structures at the very cutting edge of technologies able to overcome an adversary, most notably in the area of anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD). A2/AD is increasingly expanding beyond point defence or limited area defence, to the defence of growing strategic ‘space’.

Much like Russia’s future war strategy, the Alliance strategy will necessarily be as much about structure and organisation, as technology will also require the Alliance to craft an integrated deterrence concept that also promotes functional cross-government civil-military co-operation. In Europe, which will remain the main theatre of NATO operations, such a strategy will thus mean a new form of civil defence and a conscious effort to prove to an adversary an innovative edge and critical comparative systems advantage. This aim will place particular importance on real ‘strategic partnerships’ with other institutions, most notably the European Union.

Responsiveness, readiness, agility and adaptation will thus go hand-in-hand in defeating a future war adversary that seeks to use mass disruption and mass destruction in dark tandem. Critically, given the accelerated pace of destruction in a future war, the NATO Secretary-General may well need to become akin to a strategic chief executive officer with far more devolved authority from the North Atlantic Council than at present. Simply reacting may simply be too slow (and too late) especially with the looming prospects of hyper-war. SACEUR and his/her team will also need to be far more empowered to be nimble and agile, particularly at the strategy/intelligence/political/capability interface, and far more empowered to use his/her individual judgement in every sense. Indeed, the lack of established and practiced command agility is one of the most profound weaknesses from which the Alliance suffers. The full exploitation of new NATO capabilities in hyper warfare thus demands a corresponding agility in the decision-making processes, so that they are better, faster, and more reliable and resilient than any enemy. Otherwise, the capability advantage would be at best compromised, at worst dangerously diminished.
Consequently, to deter future war, NATO will need a measured future war strategy of its own, built on a firm foundation of understanding about the nature, extent, and above all, the immediacy of threats and their strategic and tactical interplay. At the very least, NATO will need the twenty-first century equivalent of Wellington’s ‘Exploring Officers’, part of which will necessarily include a new and deeper partnership between academia and intelligence to better understand Russian (and other) intentions, capabilities and actions. Countering future war will also require far more intense, and far deeper co-operation, between military and criminal intelligence to better prevent penetration of Western societies and to counter Russia’s ability to wage war at the seams of Western societies, thus preserving the vital balance between protection of people and projection of force. Or, to put it another way, future war will demand of NATO and military establishments new cultures and new ways of doing business, often with people who in the past have not been either natural or easy partners.

**NATO’S FUTURE WAR STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

If NATO is to match Russia it must also demonstrate improved military resolve, responsiveness and readiness. A credible NATO Future War Strategic Concept must thus be the outcome of NATO Adaptation which, at the very minimum, must see the Alliance redefine full spectrum warfare, and its role therein. Such a Concept would help drive forward the hardening of systems and structures upon which all Alliance society depends to function. Crucially, this new Strategic Concept (“From Hybrid War to Hyper War via Cyber War”) would demonstrate to the world an Alliance not only adapting to twenty-first century warfare, but able to deter it, and if needs be fight it.

The Concept would be a far more applied document than its 2010 forebear, and help drive the future war security and defence choices and investments of all the Allies. It would necessarily include an Alliance stratcom and information warfare strategy to counter Russia’s use of Maskirovka, a resilience strategy to help shore up both the seams between government and society, identify ‘strategic infrastructures’ vital to the defence of the Alliance, and an adapted nuclear policy that communicates credibly there would be an overwhelming NATO nuclear response should any such weapons be used against the Alliance, however low the yield. NATO cannot permit the delusion to be held anywhere that such weapons have a warfighting role, or could be used for nuclear blackmail. Critically, the Concept would also need to demonstrate the determination of the Alliance to overcome any perceived ‘deterrence gap’ that may emerge because of exotic technologies, most notably in the area of offensive cyber capabilities.

A NATO Strategic Concept would also enshrine an outcomes-driven NATO Strategy for Future War at its core. The future Alliance military posture would also need to be front and centre of the new NATO Strategic Concept. Future War will demand that NATO develop a kind of strategic defence ‘singularity’ – THE future war command hub for the Allies and partners. Even before a New Strategic Concept is agreed, specific, immediate steps should be taken now (and which will cost little in the short-term), which could include (inter alia);

- realistic exercises that, again, involve political leaders to promote elite political cohesion
- the further establishment of NATO at the core of a matrix of stabilising and legitimising institutions
- the sharpening of intelligence and early-warning systems
- the hardening of strategic military communications
- force adaptation to better engage across the emerging conflict spectrum, including the exploitation of new technologies
- development of future war programmes of education for civilian and military leadership
- enhancement of expertise via innovative mil-mil and civ-mil exercises

There will, of course, be a cost to establish credible NATO Future War readiness, but it need not be prohibitive. Structurally all of the above begs better EU-NATO co-operation and should be central to a future EU-NATO Strategic Partnership.
For all the organisational and structural steps NATO needs to undertake, defence innovation is ultimately the key to future war. Sadly, Europeans are far behind the US in investing in the new technologies and sciences that will drive and define the character of war and conflict in the twenty-first century. For that reason it would be useful for the Alliance to stand up an organisation similar in ambition to the US Defence Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA) with which it could partner. Only via such a radical approach will the Alliance be able to shift to the outcomes-led strategy future war will demand of it.

A truly reformed NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) would have a vital role to play in establishing the basis for rational defence choices by all the Allies given the future war challenge. At the very least, the NDPP must be placed far more to the fore of the defence planning of all the Allies, effectively driving force and equipment planning choices. Indeed, a future war NDPP will be vital if the Alliance is to meet the core threat – the future force-on-force challenge.

SCENARIO 2

STRAT-TECH WAR 2025 – NATO VICTORY IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF NORTH CAPE

It is August 2025. The United States is mired in growing short-of-war, but nevertheless dangerous conflicts in Asia-Pacific. Europe is vulnerable, exhausted and worn down by years of hyper-migration from its south, Brexit, a seemingly endless flow of terrorist attacks, and years of relative economic decline caused by leaders unable or unwilling to take the necessary measures to resolve Europe’s myriad political, economic and social tensions.

In July, Russia moved a large formation of Naval Infantry (marines) to Pechenga, close to Russia’s short border with Norway. Alarmed Oslo called for Alliance support. As tensions increase, and by way of response, on August 10th, the North Atlantic Council ordered SACEUR to take all necessary steps to demonstrate to Moscow the Alliance’s determination to defend its borders.

A NATO Task Group, that has been working up to full operating capability for some years is despatched by SACEUR to demonstrate intent. The Task Group is organised around the British heavy aircraft carrier and command ship HMS Queen Elizabeth, and include ships, aircraft and submarines from Britain, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. Critically, the Task Group is supported by the Zumwalt-class ‘stealth’ destroyer, USS Lyndon B. Johnson, acting as a form of ‘picket ship’ some way from the fleet, NATO Global Hawk maritime surveillance systems capable of monitoring threats operating across the bandwidth spectrum, together with P8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft armed with an array of intelligent anti-submarine systems, offer a further layer of deployed force protection. Under the fleet, two Royal Navy Astute-class nuclear attack submarines lurk. HMS Ambush and HMS Audacious can operate both as part of the Task Group they protect, or independently of it. On this occasion the two submarines are also acting as platforms and command nodes for fully-automated ‘defence bots’.

0430 hours, August 15th: The Second Battle of North Cape commences. Weapons and defence systems on board HMS Queen Elizabeth, driven by a range of artificial intelligence packages, suddenly surge into life, as the Russians try and fail to breach the cyber-defences of the Task Group.

0431 hours: An autonomous Russian underwater stealth platform launches a swarm of intelligent autonomous, flying armed ‘attack-bots’. Immediately, the NATO Task Group puts up an automated layered defence, and launches a counter-swarm of ‘defence-bots’, reinforced by the latest missile and ‘goalkeeper’ defence systems.

0432 hours: The commodore in charge of the Task Group orders the fleet to engage full, automatic defence. Interlocking systems on board all the ships engage the enemy, creating a ‘defence sphere’ around the fleet, on,
above and below the water. Autonomous underwater bots begin to systematically search for the source of the Russian attack.

0433 hours: Using ‘block sonar/radar technology’ that creates a hi-def 3D picture above and below the fleet, two Russian Yasen-class nuclear attack submarines are identified, together with a Sevastopol-class unmanned underwater launch platform.

0434 hours: The now autonomous Task Group launches a wave of intelligent bots, the twenty-first century descendants of World War Two torpedoes and depth charges. Several ‘pods’ are launched from the two Astute-class nuclear attack submarines.

0434 hours: HMS Queen Elizabeth scrambles 809 Naval Air Squadron and its F-35B Lightning II/5 (ER) fighters to provide top cover against any possible Russian manned air incursion. She also deploys EH-101 Merlin 7 helicopters, together with a host of data-link and weapons drones. In fact, the manned systems are little more than back-up for increasingly sophisticated, long-range autonomous systems, a further layer of defensive redundancy just in case.

0437 hours: Three enormous underwater explosions are registered to the north and west of the Task Group. All a now-shocked and alarmed Moscow hears is silence...as HMS Queen Elizabeth and her NATO fleet forge forward. Deterrence achieved, collective defence confirmed.

0630 hours: After Russian losses are confirmed, a shocked President Putin picks up the telephone to the White House and several European leaders. He apologises to them all for what he calls “rogue elements within the Russian Navy” and the wholly unauthorised attack on the NATO force. He promises to do all in his power to root out the “traitors”.

Europe slumbers on, none the wiser...

**FROM HYBRID WAR TO HYPER WAR VIA CYBER WAR**

Future war – from hybrid war to hyper war via cyber war – is the new way of war, not in the future, but now. This paper began with a scenario in which an under-prepared and under-equipped NATO force was quickly defeated by a more advanced and determined Russian force using the latest future war technologies. The paper concludes with an entirely different scenario in which the same battle is fought, but this time by NATO forces forged in preparation for future war, and which quickly and decisively defeats the aggressor. Either scenario is plausible. However, which scenario becomes more likely depends on decisions that need to be taken by Alliance political leaders, and taken now. The challenge? A truly adapted NATO must be a future war NATO.

NATO’s new Future War Strategic Concept must realise an Alliance that has at its immediate disposal credible, intelligent, hard power and real smart power across the conflict spectrum. That will demand the modernisation of Article 5 to include rapid action, cyber-defence/offence, and hybrid defence/offence, and bespoke hyper war capabilities allied to a new concept of the very meaning of the word ‘attack’. Only with Future Defence combinations will the Alliance be able to properly understand when the Alliance and its peoples are under threat, and if needs be successfully fight a future war.

If Adaptation is to be worth a row of beans the Alliance must be able and willing to meet the future war force-on-force challenge, from whomsoever and wherever it comes. Future war is one of THE real twenty-first century strategic challenges to the Alliance. Is NATO up to that challenge?

■ October 2017
FUTURE WAR NATO? FROM HYBRID WAR TO HYPER WAR VIA CYBER WAR

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS


General (Retd.) **John R. Allen** is Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, the former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and former Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

General (Retd.) **Philip M. Breedlove** is the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and Distinguished Professor at the Sam Nunn School at Georgia Tech.

Professor Dr **Julian Lindley-French** is Senior Fellow of the Institute for Statecraft in London, Director of Europa Analytica in the Netherlands, Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University, Washington DC, and a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

Admiral (Retd.) **Sir George Zambellas** is the former First Sea Lord, Head of the Royal Navy.
MEMBERS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE

GENERAL (RETD.) JOHN R. ALLEN

John Rutherford Allen is a retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. John R. Allen assumed the presidency of the Brookings Institution in November 2017, having most recently served as chair of security and strategy and a distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. Allen served in two senior diplomatic roles following his retirement from the Marine Corps. First, for 15 months as senior advisor to the secretary of defense on Middle East Security, during which he led the security dialogue for the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. President Barack Obama then appointed Allen as special presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, a position he held for 15 months. During his nearly four-decade military career, Allen served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Marine Corps and the Joint Force. He commanded 150,000 U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan from July 2011 to February 2013.

PROFESSOR DR JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH

Educated at University College, Oxford, UEA and the European University Institute in Florence, Yorkshireman Professor Dr Julian Lindley-French is Vice President of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Statecraft in London, Director of Europa Analytica in the Netherlands, Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, as well as a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Lindley-French is also Strategic Programme Advisor at Wilton Park, an agency of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In 2015 he was made an Honorary Member of the Association of Anciens of the NATO Defence College in Rome where he served as a member of the Academic Advisory Board. He is a member of the Strategic Advisory Panel of the British Chief of Defence Staff and was formerly the Head of the Commander’s Initiative Group of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. He was both Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy and Professor of Military Operational Art and Science at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Special Professor for Strategic Studies at the University of Leiden. He was also Senior Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and Course Director at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in Switzerland.

ADMIRAL (RETD.) GIAMPAOLO DI PAOLA

Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola is former Minister of Defense of Italy and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. Admiral Di Paola joined the Italian Navy in 1963 and graduated from the Naval Academy in 1966. Than he served in higher commanding officers and became a commander of the aircraft carrier Garibaldi in 1989. In 1990 he returned to the Navy Staff. In 1994 he was assigned to the Defence Staff in the Ministry of Defence where he became Chief of the Directorate of Defence Policy (1994–98). He was also the Italian representative to the HLG on nuclear and proliferation issues. From 1998 to 2001, with the rank of Rear Admiral, he assumed the position of Chief of the Cabinet Office of the Ministry of Defence. On the 1st of January 1999 he was promoted Vice Admiral. In March 2001 he was appointed Secretary General of Defence/ National Armaments Director. From 27 June 2008 to 17 November 2011, he assumed the position of Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. On 18 November 2011, Admiral Di Paola was appointed Minister of Defence.

GENERAL (RETD.) WOLF-DIETER KARL LANGHELD

Wolf-Dieter Langheld is the General a.D. of the German Army. From September 2010 to December 2012 he was the Commander of NATO Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum. General Langheld had 42-year career in the military, which he started as a conscript in a German armored brigade in 1971. Prior to assuming the post of

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1 General Allen is part of the project team in a private and personal capacity. The major bulk of the work was completed prior to General Allen’s appointment as President of the Brookings Institution. Whilst his participation is in agreement with the Trustees of Brookings this report and all associated GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative reports have no formal or informal links to the Brookings Institution.
Commander of JFC Brunssum, General Langheld held numerous high-level positions in the German Army. In 1999, General Langheld took command of the Armoured Infantry Brigade in Augustdorf, a post he held until 2002. Together with part of his Brigade, he was deployed to Kosovo and became Commander of the Multinational Brigade South in Prizren, from December 2000 until June 2001, as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). In 2002 General Langheld became Director of Armour and Commandant of the German Armour School at Munster. The following year he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed Forces Staff VI (Planning) at the Federal Ministry of Defence, Bonn. In 2005, he assumed the position of Commander of the 1st Armoured Division, in Hannover. Since December 2008 General Langheld has been Commander Response Forces Operations Command Ulm. General Wolf Langheld took over the responsibilities as Commander Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum on Wednesday, 29 September 2010.

AMBASSADOR (RETD.) TOMÁŠ VALÁŠEK

Tomáš Valášek is the director of Carnegie Europe, where his research focuses on security and defense, transatlantic relations, and Europe’s Eastern neighborhood. Previously, Mr Valášek served as the permanent representative of the Slovak Republic to NATO for nearly four years. Before that, he was President of the Central European Policy Institute; an independent regional think-tank in Bratislava, Slovakia. From 2006 to 2012, he worked as Director of Foreign Policy and Defence at the Centre for European Reform in London. Previously, he served as Policy Director and head of the security and defence policy division at the Slovak Ministry of Defence. Before joining the Ministry, Mr Valášek founded and directed the Brussels office of the World Security Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based independent defence and security think-tank (2002–2006). From 1996 to 2002, he worked as senior European analyst in CDI’s Washington, D.C. office. Mr Valášek is the author of numerous articles appearing in newspapers and journals including the International Herald Tribune, the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times. He advised the Slovak Defence and Foreign Ministers, the UK House of Lords and the group of experts on the new NATO Strategic Concept.

AMBASSADOR (RETD.) ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

Ambassador Alexander Vershbow is the former Deputy Secretary General of NATO. Ambassador Vershbow became the Deputy Secretary General of NATO in February, 2012 after serving for three years as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In that position, he was responsible for coordinating U.S. security and defense policies relating to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including NATO), the Middle East and Africa. From 1977 to 2008, Alexander was a career member of the United States Foreign Service. He served as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1998–2001); to the Russian Federation (2001–2005); and to the Republic of Korea (2005–2008). He held numerous senior positions in Washington, including Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council (1994–97) and State Department Director for Soviet Union Affairs (1988–91).
SUPPORTING PAPERS

This project has relied in large part on research and writing done by members of the Steering Committee, experts, and scholars.

- Steering Committee Scoping Paper. *NATO in a Changing Strategic Environment: The Questions NATO Adaptation Must Address*, by the Steering Committee

- *The Political Adaptation of the Alliance*, by Alexander Vershbow

- *The Military Adaptation of the Alliance*, by Karl-Heinz Kamp and Wolf Langheld

- *Comprehensive NATO*, by Stefano Stefanini and John Allen

- *Integrated Deterrence: NATO’s ‘First Reset’ Strategy*, by Paul Cornish

- *Ten Messages for Affording and Equipping the Adapted Alliance*, by Giampaolo Di Paola and Julian Lindley-French

- *Reanimating NATO’s Warfighting Mind-set: Eight Steps to Increase the Alliance’s Political-Military Agility*, by Ian J. Brzezinski and Tomáš Valášek

- *NATO Procurement and Modernisation: Towards an Innovative Alliance with Much More Deployable Combat Capability*, by Michael O’Hanlon

- *Future War NATO? From Hybrid War to Hyper War via Cyber War*, by General (Retd.) John Allen, General (Retd.) Philip M. Breedlove, Professor Dr Julian Lindley-French, & Admiral (Retd.) George Zambellas

- Interim Report. *One Alliance? Change Drivers in a New Strategic Environment*, by the Steering Committee